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T H K
EXAMINATION
O F
i .
Mr. E D
ARDS,
C O N T i N U E U.
'■*»**#>'*'
,m
i*
31
The “EXAMINATION
Of the late
Rev’d Prelident Edwards’s
Enquiry on Freedom of Will,”
CONTINUED.
SEc.I.On felf-determination.
II. On the influence of
motives in moral voli¬
tions.
III. On neceflity.
IV. On the origin of evil.
V. On the connexion be¬
tween the nature and
caufe of volition.
Sec. VI. Moral evil not bell
for the world.
VII. On fore-knowledge.
VIII. Ontexts of fcripture
mifconftrued.
IX. ©bjediions confldered.
X. On metaphyflcal rea-
loning.
XI. Recapitulation.
To WHICH ARE SUBJOINED,
Strictures on the Rev’d Mr. W est s
“ eBay on moral agency,” &c.
By JAMES DANA, D. D.
Pastor of the first church in WALLINGFORD.
Fr of effing t h cm f elves to be wife^ they became fools .
Where is the wife ? where is the fcribe ? where is the
difputer ef this world ? Hath not God made foolifh
the wifdom of this world ?
NEW- HAVEN:
Printed by Thomas and Samuel Gp.ee n. 1773.
INTRODUCTION.
SOME things which were but juft touched, orconfider-
ed only in a general way, in the examination of Mr.
Edwards, require a further and particular examination :
And other things need a more diftindt explanation : His
denial of moral, rational liberty •, his diftinftion of natu¬
ral and moral neceffity •, attributing the origin of evil to
the want or withdraw of divine affiftance ; federating the
obliquity of fin from its caufe *, are feme of the points
that require a further examination . And thofe that need a
more diftinft explanation are the doeftrine of human liberty
as maintained by the examiner, and the confiftency thereof
with admitting the operation of motives in the choice and
determinations of moral agents.
The examiner hath the fame opinion ft ill of the intri¬
cacy of the fubjeft as was expreffed in his former publica¬
tion, and means to proceed in it with caution and diffi¬
dence. If he may be fo happy as to caft any light on the
abftrufe fubjeft of liberty and neceffity, or refeue it in any
important refpeft from its obfeurity, his time will not be
ill-employed. But the main thing in view all along has
been to vindicate the moral character of the Deity from
the injurious reprefentations, either of defigning, or well-
meaning but miftaken men*
The
vh INTRODUCTION.
1 he fcheme of neceffity, in oppofition to felf-determi-
nation, cannot, he thinks, be defended on the principles of
revelation or theilm, if this one thing be admitted, that
Goa is not the caufe of moral evil. If it be affirmed, that
he is the efficient caufe of it, his moral perfections are de¬
nied.. If moral agents themfelves are the efficient caufe,
this is to admit felf-determination.
Some maintain only an hypothetic liberty. On their
principles neceffity may be tenable— -provided there is nei¬
ther holinefs nor fin in the creation of God— no being wor¬
thy of moral complacence or difplicence, praife or blame.
The examiner begs the reader to keep in mind this
lingle quefhon, Whether Mr. Edwardses dohfrine makes God
the efficient caufe of all moral wickednefs ? He is himfelf
clear in the affirmative of the queftion, or would not have
undertaken to examine Mr. Edwards’s book.. If this
fhould alfo be the reader’s opinion, it is prefum’d the
fcheme which contains or concludes in this will be re¬
jected. To reduce a Chriftian writer to this is fufficient,
without going any further. Nor will there be occafion to
fney/ how different fuch a fcheme is from the fentiments
of thofe who have beenefteemed orthodox in the pur eft
times of the church : It is with no great propriety, that
Mr. Edwards makes it the caption of almoft every fedion,
that his foundation principles are the dodrines of Calvin-
ifm \ and the oppofite ArminianiCm , Pelagianifm , &c. Were
it indeed fo, what other purpofe can this ferve than to caff
an odium, and fix a perfonal ftigma? But in truth, when
have Calvinifts maintain’d, that the vicious wills of moral
agents are derived from God, and unalterably fixed by
his efficiency ? that the find exiftence of fin arofe from
the withholding his influence and afliftance ? Should it
alfo appear that Mr. Edwards’s dodrine leaves no room
for a diftindion between rational and animal creatures in
refped of liberty and agency— that it concludes in favour
of the rnechanifm of the human mind, this is a bafis on
which Calvinifts have not built their fcheme of dodrine.
In fome parts of the enfuing performance, the examiner
hath been obliged to be more abftrufe than was his own
INTRODUCTION. vii.
wanting in refpe&toMr. Edwards, whofe book is repleat
with fuch reasoning; abundant pains being taken this
way to deduce his adverfaries to abfurdity. But whate¬
ver propriety there may be in oppofing metaphyfics to
metaphyfics, yet the examiner would allure the reader,
he hath taken care not to fubftitute any metaphyfics of
his own for truth ; but hath endeavoured to fuggeft fome
plain things on what he takes to be the real truth in the
prefent debate. He defires the reader would excufe a few
things that may appear abftrufe, and hopes the greater
part of what he hath written will be thought fufficiently-
clear, and adapted to do fome good. The whole calls
for the public candor, which he would not forfeit by-
writing with a four temper.
He hath not been at all intimidated by the opinion or
arguments of his remarker, who thinks “ the grand pillars
“ of Mr. Edwards’s dodtrine ftand firm and un^haken.5,
Nor hath he any apology to make for undertaking to ex¬
amine Mr. Edwards’s book. Tis enough, that the ex¬
aminer treated “ this great man ” with no difrepeft in his
firft publication, and determines not to in the prefent.
March 29, 1773.
SECTION
»'
~"l‘]|-' -- . .—■ — — - ■ - '* - -..i. I,, .... | | ,
»*»»«-, »l ■ ll|«l-lW.lHl I '" l' . . . 1 " ■— ■'■ l"t - - 1 • 1 ' 1 ^
SECTION I.
On Self-determination.
WE ffiall firft explain the dodtrine of human lb
berty in the fenfe in which we maintain it. Se¬
condly, Make a few curfory obfervations on
Mr. Edwards’s fcheme of liberty.
"tt
Power, motion and agency are terms of various fignifi-
cation. The two firft ate frequently ufed in mechanics,
and all of them may be applied to animal creatures.
a Power may refide in a fubjedt that is no agent ; as in
the cafe of phyfical or natural powers.55
When we fpeak of the motions and revolutions of in¬
animate bodies, it may amount to the fame thing at laft*
whether we attribute thefe to an eftablifhed original law
of nature, of to the conftant agency of the Deity upon
matter. The courfe of nature is the confutation of the
author of nature. It is demonflrably not fo fixed as to
preclude fpecial divine interpolation, whereby the opera¬
tion of fecond caufes is fufpended or countersdted. We
cannot, indeed, determine how far this is the cafe. Man/
events maybe brought about (atieaft in part) by fecond
caufes, which we may imagine belong to the head of fpe¬
cial interpofitions, over-ruling thofe caufes. 5Tis difficult
to afcertain the powers of nature, as well as thofe of moral
agents.
There is a fenfe in which there is no power but of God .
And if any chufe to fay, that natural caufes (fo called) are
really no caufe at all ^ that God adtuates all the powers of
nature, and that from his energy every effedt in the natural
world proceeds, we have no objection to make. We only
defire it may be remembered, that mechanic powers, the
motions of inanimate bodies, bear no refembfence to, and
give us no idea of, the powers of moral and accountable
B creatures*
4
Sect. L
\
io On Self-determination .
creatures. Shou’d one undertake to illuftrate confciouf-
nefs by the vibrations of a pendulum, it would not be
moie udiculous than a pretence to explain the powers of
human nature by the motions of the planets, the growth
of vegetables, &c. Thefeare fo far from being any exem¬
plification of moral agency, that they bear no likenefs even
to animal motion, kor this is voluntary. And we pre-
fume it will not be faid that voluntary motion is predi¬
cable of inanimate things— not even by thofe philofophers
who have refembkd the powers of moral nature to thofe
of material bodies.
Nor will the confideration of animal motion and agency,
any more than the motions of inanimate bodies, afford us
any proper illuftrat ion of moral agency. Voluntary mo¬
tion and exertion is indeed common to moral agents and
the lower animals. Fhefe have natural power, forecafte,
memory, can move this way or that as they pleafe , or ac¬
cording to the determination of their will. They are agents--
voluntary agents— ’Tis apparent they “aft eleftively”—
from defign— to certain ends. They are capable of being
taught many things. From the fagacity feme of them
difeover, many have conjeftur’d that they have an immor¬
tal fpirit, and are accountable. This, we apprehend, is
going too far, and find Mr. Edwards concurs with us.*
Whatever gradations there are in the creation, mankind
appear to be the lowed: order of intelligent moral agents.
1 he appearances of reafon in many of the brute creatures
areeafily accounted for without fuppofing them poffefs’d
of a moral faculty— in much the fame manner as we ac¬
count for many inftances of the conduct of ideots, who
hever had the exercife of this faculty ; of madmen,
who have loft it *, and of children before they arrive to
the exercife of it. What they fee and experience from
day to day affords them inftruftion, and influenceth
their conduft, without their having any perception of
good and evil in a moral view. The fame holds, in a
degree, in the inferior creatures. (The ox knoweth his own¬
er, and the afs his wafer's crib. And thofe animals, who
have no guide , overfeer or ruler , give proofs of fagacity
and forecafte, the confideration of which wou’d be of
ufe
* P. 41.
/
Sect. I. On Self-determination. xt
life to many who have reafon for their guide. The ani¬
mal creatures are alfo the fubjeds of certain internal dif-
pofitions and affedions. They have a common care and
tendernefs for their young. Some of the feebler fort af-
fociate for the double purpofe of protedion and.com-
mon ufefulnefs. Some kinds of them are of a fierce, ve¬
nomous, or ravenous difpofition •, others are mild, gentle
and harmlefs. “Spontaneous voluntary exertion” belongs
to every fpecies of them. But though fpontaneous ani¬
mal motion may approach the neareft to moral agency,
of any thing in vifible nature j yet it is effentially diffe¬
rent thereform, nor doth it give us any proper idea there¬
of. A juft notion of moral agency we can derive only
from attending to the nature and operations of the hu¬
man mind— not from a contemplation of inanimate or ani¬
mate nature. The inspiration of the Almighty hath given us
underftanding. I will praife thee ; for I am fearfully and
wonderfully made •, marvellous are tty works, and that my foul
knoweth right well. God created man in his own image.
It feems, notwithftanding, that fome gentlemen need
to be inform’d, that man hatha diftindive power from
animals. We fcruple not to rifque the whole controverfy
on their being able to point out a difference, ftill retaining
their own principles.
Hard is our talk to be obliged to explain the difference
between a man and a brute in regard of liberty and felf-
determination. Such minds as acknowledge no difference,
we fear cannot be convinc’d. In regard to truths we are
immediately confcious of, every medium of proof, all rea-
foning, not only feems needlefs, but rather ferves to ob-
fcure than elucidate what is propofed to be proved. As
tho’ by removing the objed to a greater diftance, we wou’d
obtain a more diftind and full view of it.
The diftindive faculty of moral agents we before en¬
deavoured to ftate and explain— and we think it was fhewn,
that moral liberty really differs from animal, and that,
“■ in finite beings placed upon trial, it implies an opportu¬
nity and capacity of chufing and ading otherwife than
they in fad do.”* Further to illuftrate and confirm the
fame
* Examination of Edwards, Part III. I.
IZ
* j. ; \ -AA \Jr
On Self-determination. Sect. I,
fame thing, we defire the capacity moral agents have of
examining and con/idering before they make their choice, or
proceed to aft,, in any given cafe, may be well attended
to. They can determine to confider the reafonablenefs
or unreafonablenefs of any propofed objeft of choice _ whe¬
ther it be confident with, or contrary to, their duty _ whe-
thei it be foi their intereft upon the whole--and confe-
quently, whether it is the part of wifdom to chufe or re-
fufe it. They have this power in regard to fpeculative prin¬
ciples, as well as with refpedt to life and condudt. They
can examine the nature and evidence of what is propofed
to 5m for truth, and embrace or rejeft it as it fhall
appear to be true or falfe upon diligent and impartial en¬
quiry •, or give it that weight which its greater or lefs im¬
portance fhall demand. Error in principle is one great
fource of men’s praftieal deviations from the paths of
righteoufnefs. Hence it is, not infrequently, that they
juftify and boaft themfelves in a way that is not good, im¬
agining they are doing God fervice, when in reality they
are fighting againft him. Now fo far as men judge wrong,
and in confequence thereof aft wrong, thro’ their own care-
lefTnefs,or negleft,or through partiality in their enquiries af¬
ter truth ; fo far they are criminal, and chargeable with all
the practical confequences of their wrong judgment. If
the miftakes of mankind on practical fubjefts are fearch-
ed to the bottom, the probability is, that the greater part
of fuch miftakes will be found to proceed from that caufe
our Lord mentions, Every one that doeth evil , hateth the
light , neither cometh to the lights left his deeds JhoiCd he re¬
proved. And this is their condemnation. For what hath
that man to plead, who receives not the love of the truth,
hce,aufe he hath pleafure in unrighteoufnefs ? From whatever
caufe men refufe to examine the foundation and reafona-
blenefs of thofe religious principles they profefs to main¬
tain, or re j eft ; whether it be from education, intereft, or
partial affedtion *, they are criminal, and mu ft anfwer it to
him who has given them a capacity to difcern the diffe¬
rence between right and wrong, good and evil— who has
granted them the necefiary means of knowledge, and re*
quires that they prove all things ; and hold f aft that which
is
Sect. I. On Self-determination.
is good— that they judge even of tbemfelves what is right . Had
that rule, which ioine have laid down to themfelves and
others, firlt determine and then examine f been univer¬
sally adopted, knowledge cou’d never have increafed —
ignorance, fuperflition and barbarifm mult have ov£r-
fpread the earth. '
Then in matters which more immediately refpeCt the
heart and life , moral agents have the fame power of ex¬
amining and attending to what is laid before them. Mod
of their vicious elections and purfuits probably proceed
from want of attention and confideration. They have a
power of reflecting— of acquainting themfelves which is
the wife choice and courfe. But they do not ftop
and confider what is before them-— what choice they are
about to make — what will be the confequence in this world
or another. Their conclufions are precipitate, and they
^ceed to aCtion as the horfe rufheth into the battle.
What ftrikes their external fenfes, and promifes a prefent
gratification to their particular aflfeCtions, lulls or paflions*
is wont to be greedily embrac’d and purfued— what re¬
quires fome felf-denial and mortification of thefe is quick¬
ly rejected, before that faculty, which is naturally fupream,
and was given to direCt andcontroul the bodily appetites,
inftinCts and paflions, can pafs judgment in the cafe.
Wrong apprehenfions, wrong affeCtions and conduCt, pro¬
ceeding in fo many inltances as they manifeftly do from
the negleCl of reafon and reflection, fliew of what valt im¬
portance it is that moral agents fet down and confider be¬
fore they pafs judgment, or make their election, and de¬
termine what courfe t© take, in things that concern them.
Experience concurs with the facred oracles in attefting,
that the want of attention and examination is a principal
fource of the fatal miftakes and milcarriages of mankind :
And how cou’d it be expeCted it fhou’d be otherwife, when
the regulating faculty of our nature, inltead of being im¬
prov’d in the fearch of truth and duty, is ufed, if at all, as
a fervant to the fenfitive appetites ? This is a like contra¬
diction in morals as it is in civil life to fee fervants on hor-
les, and princes walking like fervants on the earth— or as
if the feet ffrould ufurp the place of the head in the natural
When
14 On Self-determination. Sect. I,
When in any given cafe it is dubious what courfe is
our duty to take, or wou’d be moft prudent all things con-
fidered, by deliberating on the matter we may come to be
clearly fatisfied •, whereas if we proceed immediately to
action, we are liable to err fatally — and fhou’d it be other-
wife, we can’t have the pleafure of knowing that we are
right — ’tis accidental that we ate fo — we merit no com¬
mendation, but rather deferve blame for runing the hazard
of being in the wrong, when we might have obtained full
convidion had we been at the pains, and given ourfelves
time, to reflect a few moments.
Or fuppofe the fenfe of duty is fufficiently clear, but we
are belet by numerous and powerful temptations, have we
not power to make a paufe ? By this means, we may ob¬
tain fuch a view of the particular evil to which we are en¬
ticed, fuch conflderations may be fuggefted to our minds,
as that a prefent temptation, however ftrong, fhall not pre¬
vail, but gradually loofe ftrength and be overcome. Will
you fay that men in this cafe have not power to forbear
immediate adion ? to re fled: a moment ? Doubtlefs they
have power to determine immediately with themfelves to
confider the matter. Efpecially muft they be admitted to
have this power, if we take into the account the operations
of divine grace on their hearts. In this way many good
tiio’ts are often injected in the moment of danger. May
they not be cherifh’d, and made our own ? By reflections
on the nature of v irtue and vice ; their rewards and puir-
iihments prefent and future •, the paft peaceable and hap¬
py fruits of the one ; and contrary effects of the other,
in our own experience, or obfervation of others ; by re-
Bedions on the moral perfections and government of God ;
the perfon and offices of Jefus Chrift, and calling to mind
other conflderations fuggefted by the oracles of truth, the
force of a prefent temptation may be fpeedily weakned
thro’ the influences of grace fuggeftingand concuring with
fuch moral conflderations. While the force of conference
is abated by ftifling it’s remonftrances, and hearkning to
the follicitations of luff and appetite in oppofition there¬
to ; it’s fenflbility is, on the contrary, proportionably in-
creafed by refledion and attention. Now to fay that thofe
Sect. L
On Self-determination . i$
who live very much without moral reflection and attenti¬
on ; therefore cannot determine otherwife with themfelves,
is implicitly to deny that they have the faculty of reafon.
They can deliberate on the means and opportunities of
gratifying their lulls. What good reafon can be offer'd
to lhew they have not power to turn their meditations in¬
to another channel ?
But as it is an important duty of moral agents to ac-
cuftom themfelves to diligent enquiry and mature confide-
ration, that they may know what they ought to chufe and
purfue, and what to refufe and avoid, and not aft as the
horfe and mule who have no underftanding---fo it Ihou’d
not be forgotten, that they fometimes deliberate with a
very different and oppofite view— -not to difcover their
duty where it is doubtful, but to explain it away where
it is plain. In cafes where an upright mind can be at no
lofs, but makes immediate choice, a difhonefi: heart will
hefitate, and, under a notion of deliberating in order to
difcover what may or ought to be done, contriveth ex-
cufes for the violation of a clear command. Sometimes
great and fcandalous vices are refined upon till they are
tho’t to be no vices •, perhaps are transformed into vir¬
tues. Well were it if fome men were as dexterous and
ingenious, in calling to mind arguments to their duty as
they are in finding out reafons againft it, and means of
darkning and perplexing the fenfe of it— -as they are in the
palliations and excufes they contrive for their fins, and in
what they offer in juftification of themfelves. They had
rather fin with their eyes {hut than with them open. Hence
they take abundant pains to obfcure the fenfe and mean¬
ing of the plained commands, that they may poffefs the
hope of religion, while they walk according to the courfe
of this world. A fingle example will fet this matter in a
ftrong light. Balaam, we read, loved the wages of unrigh-
teoufnefs, while he hoped to die the death of the righ¬
teous. Hence he wou’d not go in direS contradiction
to his duty in order to obtain Balak’s reward, but fet
himfelf to reconcile his duty with his views of worldly
gain and preferment. After God had plainly told him
once, that he fhould not curfe Ifrael, it was enough— he
ihou5d have enquired no further. Yet after this he held
onq
)
1 & On Self-determination . Sect. L
N
one confultation and another with Balak’s meffengers, and
enquires of God again and again concerning the matter
whereof he had already been fully certified. Not fucceed-
ing according to his mind, though he perfifted in his refo-
Jution not to curie Ifrael without an explicit divine per^
million, yet he proceeded to counfel Balak to lay a fumbling
block before them, which prov’d their deftruCtion. In this
way he pacified his confcience, while he as effectually broke
over the divine inftruCtions as if he had curfed Ifrael in the
name of God. In many (perhaps moft) cafes men’s duty
is plain at the firft propofal. It is difficult to miftake it.
In fuch cafes, deliberation is but a fubterfuge to break o-
ver the obligation of it. Hence it is that men affeCt to
doubt in the plaineft matters, i. e. the moft important.
By indireCl means, they evade the fenfe of moral and reli¬
gious obligation, and keep all quiet within, while they do
thofe things in effebt^ which they wou’d ftart back at the
thought of doing in a direct manner. Had they made
their choice and aCled according to the firft appearance ot
things, they wou’d have chofen the good and right way :
But fiome favourite hypothefis muft be maintain’d, fome
lull or paffion gratified, at all events *, and hence it is that
they labour to reconcile things contrary, as light and dark-
nefs, righteoufnefs and unrighteoufnefs. ’Tis hard to give
up the hopes of religion, but harder to facrifice their
worldly views.
Some (and thefe men of fine parts) have gone further,
and proftituted their fuperior talents in embellifhing vice,
and attempting to take off from it it’s juft odium *, em¬
ploying their powers in the caufe of infidelity* faping the
foundation of every religious principle, and confequently
of all virtue. As though the gift of realbn were beftow-
ed on us to fubferve the gratification of the appetites and
paffions— that we might make ourfelves more vile than
the beafts that perifh— might fin with more delicacy and
malignity indeed, but with no remorfe. We cou’d wifh
there were not fo great a fimilarity between the writings of
fome authors of this ftamp, and Mr. Edwards’s book on
the will.
That attention and examination, which, as moral agents,
Sect. I;
On S rtf -determination'.
17
we are capable of, and is our bounden duty, is of fucli
evident importance that to the negled of it are attribut¬
ed in fcripture moft of the fins and miferies of men. Mi
people will not conftder . 0 that they were wife , that they
— would conftder ! Confideration is reprefented as neceflary
to, and a likely means of, the reformation of finners.
And the exhortation to conftder our ways is in effed the
lame as that, amend your ways . This capacity of confider-
ing and judging, of diftinguifhiiig virtue and vice, “and
their fruits in the prefent life, which are the proper farm
pies of 55 their coniequences in another, is an important
diftindion of mankind from the animal creatures, and
fhews that the former determine themfelves in a fenle
which the latter do not. Especially when we further
conlider, that “ fhou’d reafon negled it’s poll, confci-
ence is appointed as an inftindive kind of monitor, perpe¬
tually to remind us both of our intereil and our duty A
The animal creatures aft as impelled by inftind and ap¬
petite. They have net a power of deliberating, reafon-
ing, refleding-- -they wait only for an opportunity of adi-
011, without being able to confider the coniequences. And
when moral agents aft without: confideration, they forget
the diftindion put on their nature, and hafte as a bird to
the fnare , not knowing it is for their life .
By fufpending judgment, eledion and adion^ new rea-
fons often arife to the mind— many times diverfe from, and
oppofite to, thole fi Ml extant in it, and an overmatch for
them. This obfervation may be applied to matters of
fpeculation and pradice, * and to that two-fold defign mo¬
ral agents have in deliberating and fufpending, of which
we have , been fpeaking, viz. either to difeover the truth
and their moral obligations, that they may the better ful¬
fil their duty— or to get confirmed in error, to darken the
fenfe of moral right, and find means to juftify or excufe
themfelves in their various vicious purluits. By fufpend-
C
inn;-
* There is, indeed, no fpecuUtive truth of importance but whac
/elates to pradice, in an higher or lower degree, immediately or more
remotely. Speculative error is wont to beget vicious affections, end
vicious affections fpeculative error. Infidelity and diilblute manners
are mutually the parents and the offspring ot each ether, That
the foul be wilheu; knowledge! it h nor good
V -
i § On Self-determination . Sect. I.
ingand reflecting with the former view, a full perfuafion
may be begotten in the mind that that is truth, which be¬
fore was luppofed to be falfhood or error— that which was
doubtful may be clear’d up— the path of duty may become
plain— new arguments in fupport of truths before receiv¬
ed may he fuggefted-new inducements to profefs and live
according to them. To which may be added, that the
fpirit of truth and holinefs is ever ready to direft andfuc-
ceed the enquiries of thofe who have probity of mind to
fuggeft to them the moil convincing reafons for the truth,
the moft powerful motives to duty, and to operate there¬
with. None of the wicked ffiall underftand, but the wife
ffiall underftand.
On the contrary, thofe who fufpend and deliberate from
the latter view mentioned above, juftly expofe them-
felves to be given over to ftrong delufions •, their foolifh
heart becomes darkned, and hardened through the deceit-
fulnefs of fin. They become an eafy prey to the god of
this world, wTho is permitted to blind their eyes, fo that
the arguments and motives of reafon and religion have
little or no weight with them.
Much the fame may be faid of thofe, whofe lufts and
paffions precipitate their moral judgment, as of the more
deliberate workers of wiekednels who take much pains to
darken and bribe it. They alike expofe themfelves to be
delivered over to the will and power of the deceiver of
the nations, the enemy of ail righteoulnels.
But it is objected, that fufpending implies, the mind
hath already made its choice ^ that is, it hath chofen to
deliberate and examine— that the difficulty, therefore, ftill
returns, and the caufe of this determination to fufpend re¬
mains to be pointed out.
To this we anfwer, that a moral agent either hath pow¬
er to originate an a cl of fufpenfion, and lo bring himfelf
into the view of new motives ; or the lufpending aft pro¬
ceeds from a motive extant in his mind at the fame in*
ftant with fome motive to immediate eleftion or aftion.
The former will not be allowed, as it v/ould be at once
to admit fjlf-determi nation. And on the latter fuppofiti-
on, the motive to fufpend, muft be previous to the aft of
fufpenfion.
Sect. I. G# Self-determination. 19
fufpenfion, elfe it cannot be the caufe of that aft— cannot
move or excite to it. There muft be the exertion of the
caufe before the effeft can take place. But if the mo¬
tive to fufpend be previous to the aft of fupenfion, then
the other motive to immediate eleftion and aftion muft
determine the will till the motive to fufpend has produc¬
ed its effeft : That is, the agent is determined, his choice
is made, before he determines to fufpend ; the aft of fuf¬
penfion is an alter aft. In other words, there is, proper¬
ly fpeaking, no fufpenfion at all. Or viewing the mat¬
ter in the moft favourable light, it will Hand thus : A
moral agent cannot be the fource of fufpenfion in himielf.
No motive ab extra to fufpend being extant in bis mind,
he muft immediately make his choice. To fay he had a
power of awakening in himfeif a motive to fufpend, or
of negativing a prefent motive to action, would be to af-
fert felf-determination •, or to fay, that the aft of fufpen¬
fion had already taken place, which, by fuppoiition, can
be only in confequence of fome previous motive. There
was, then, a temptation exhibited to the mind of Lucifer,
while a fon of the morning, to rife up in rebellion againft
the Moft High. It had polltive influence to excite and
move him to this thing. He had no intrinfic power . to
negative it, or to fufpend eleftion, or view the temptation
in any other light than he in faft did. It neceffarily de¬
termined him. Upon his revolt, he was an inftrument in
luggefting a fimilar temptation to our progenitors in pa-
radife— which they could view no otherwife than they did —
their choice was determined in the fame way. Thus fin
and mifery came into the world. Here is the true fource
of all the wickednefs of men and devils. Can it be de¬
fended on the maxims of reafon, experience or religion ?
Is it not wholly forgotten, that moral agents have the
faculty of reafon , the power of reflection ? Let this fingle
queftion be decided, Whether vicious beings derive the
ft ate of their wills from the author of their frame? and
the whole difpute will be determined accordingly. T he
affirmative makes God the caufe and fountain of wickcd-
nefs ; the negative makes ijagral agents themfelves the
caufe,.
2©
On Self-determination,
Sect. I.
if
\
*
3^
JarfiMiWB
cauie- and religion lay, which opinion is to
be prefered.
I heie can, fluidly fpeaking, be no motive to the choice
and determination ot a rational creature, but fuch as com¬
ports with the dignity of his nature, confcience being al¬
ways confida ed as fupreme. Hence motives of intereft,
honor, pinafore, are motives to purfoe what is, upon th£
&hole, oeneficial, honorable, pleaforablc- — not what may
cafually gratify the lower aifedions and appetites, in op-
pofition to reafon, to the true intereft, dignity and enjoy¬
ment of a moral and accountable creature. To fay, that
Inch a creature, in cafe of a competition of objects, cannot
flop and confider which reafon direfts to, and govern him-
ielf accordingly, is either to deny him the power of reflec-
tion, or to fuppoie him given. over to a reprobate mind.
When the animal propenfities and the didates of reafon
ere at variance, (as they often are) may not the former be
negatived r And is it not fomewhat of a folecifm to fay, a
rational creature can have a motive to ad unreafonably ?
Jn a loofe way of fpeaking, we are indeed wont to fay,
that the covetous, ambitious and voluptuous have motives
to the purfoit of unjuft gain, unlawful pleafure, and to
make their way to preferment by difnonorable means.
But it may be worthy of confederation, whether, in ftrid
propriety, a motive to fuch a choice and purfuit, as con-
cradids the leading and diftinguifhing principle of our na¬
ture, really deferves to be called a motive to fuch a being
as man ? Be this as it will, we evidently have a power of
deliberating, refkding, or fulpending— of considering what
is before us-— Moral agents “ have a capacity of being in-
fluenced in their actions by moral inducements and mo-
tives, exhibited to the view of underftandin ? and reafon ,
to engage to a conduff agreabk to the moral faculty ” This
capacity in moral agents, admitted and maintain'd by Mr.
Tdwards, is a demonftrabie proof of lelf-determi nation, as
it implies the power of fulpending, which we have been,
arguing for. A power of fufpending eledion and adion *-
is plainly a power of determining whether we will be go¬
verned by reejbn and the. principles of reljgion, or nou
And
■ ■
Tmm
Sect. I. On Self-determination . 21
And can this power be allowed to moral agents confif-
tently with the denial of felf-determination ? *
While the agency of the animal creatures is as necefifary
as the rotation of the earth and revolutions of the planets,
the caufe of moral volitions is in the mind itfelf which is
the fubjedt of them, as will appear, we apprehend, from a
little attention to the moral faculty of underftanding. This
regulating power of moral agents ideots and madmen have
not, and therefore are not moral agents any more than
brutes. And though, as was faid before, the motions of
inanimate bodies or of animals are not fimilar to moral
agency ; yet were the dictate of the moral faculty follow¬
ed without deviation, mankind would as regularly fill up
their place in the creation, as the lower animals do theirs
—as regularly as the feafons revolve, or the heavenly bo¬
dies move. There would be as great harmony in moral
nature as appears in the other works of God.
Superior intelligences, in other worlds, we may iuppofe,
afe as regular to the duties of their ftation, and fulfil the
pleafure of the Creator with a like punctuality and con-
itancy, as the luminaries of heaven fhine. That men on
earth do not, in their meafure, fulfil his will as it is done
by higher orders of beings in heaven, is their fin ; as they
have the fame general faculty to direct and govern ’em,
how much foever the inhabitants of the world above may
excel in intellectual firength. Were there not a proper
caule in the mind, the exercifes and actions of mankind
wou’d uniformly be fuch as the order of our nature points
out. And the fuppofition of the fall of angels or men
wou’d be as wild, as the fuppofition of the everlalling
mountains moving out of their place, or the interruption
of the harmony of the fpheres. At lead it wou’d be view¬
ed
* A learned and very worthy friend, cn perufing what we had wrote
on the article of fufpending prefent volition, deliberating, &c. was
pleafed to fuggeft, that “ as it mart depend on the moral agent him-
fe\f \ whether he will fufpend, confidcr, Sec. and confequently is a
** full proof, or rather the a&ual exercife, of ieif-determination ; fa
4t this may be the foundation of an entice difference between God and the
creature . There is no room for conii deration, or any or ex-
** ercife fimilar to it in God, becaufe of h:s omnifcience. But the
V vertue of an intelligent ersature depends nuich^ very much, not to
V fay wholly, upon it.”
22 On Self-determination . Sect. I.
ed in no otner light than any alteration in the material
world, or iufpenfion of the laws of nature. The latter
might as well be judged criminal and morally evil as the
foi mer. If the caufe of the exercifes and adtions of moral
agents be not in themfelves, then the Deity is the proper
efficient caufe of them. Now we fee that all his operati¬
ons, all the efredts of his agency in the material world and
animal nature, are uniform and harmonious— the fame
irom age to age. If the moral exercifes and conduct of
rational accountable beings proceed from the efficiency of
the fame caufe, from the fame lover of order and harmony,
why then are they fo irregular and out of courfe ? This
fmg\e confederation is enough to fatisfy us, that the mind
of a moral agent is the true caufe of his own election, and
adtions. * ' !
The author of our beings is the proper caufe of our
moral capacity-— the father of our fpirits. This capacity
the effect of his infpiration, is the proper caufe of voliti¬
on. It may be well improved, or negledted and perverted.
There are created beings who have improved it well, as
there are who have perverted it. The latter might have
made the fame ufe of it as the former, and herein wou’d have
fallen in with the defign of the creator, and been workers
together with God for his glory and their own felicity
and honour. Therefore the perverfion of this capacity is
not to be attributed to God as the caufe : For God cannot
he tempted with evil , neither tempteth he any man . In their
innocent ft ate, men and angels were capable of attending
to the calm dictates of reafon— of perceiving clearly the
fuperiority
* The cffedh of divine agency in the natural world being uniform,
while moral volitions and aftions are net fo, is a clear proof that the
latter are not, in like manner, the produd of divine operation. For
as Mr. Edwards maintains, that the moral world is the end of the na¬
tural, can it be that the God of order adis out of courfe in events of a
mtral nature, which are of by far the greateft moment, while in natural
events he oblerves a dated method of operation ? The fuppofiticn of
the divine agency in fin, moreover, confounds the diflindicn between
the agency or influence of God, and that of the devil. And further,
how can that influence, which holy beings are under, be holy in re¬
ference to its caufe, unlefs that which vicious beings arc under is al¬
lowed to be wicked in reference to it’s caufe. However, the devil is
not the cauje of men’* fins, though it U through his inflation that;
they fall into fin.
Sect. I.
On Self-determination. 23
fuperiority of this principle to the inftinffcs and appetites
of animal nature. There was nothing “ in their wills 51
that cou’d indifpofe them to attend to the voice of reafon,
God made them upright— defigned they fhou’d continue fo,
and gave them power to abide in their firft ftate-in the
knowledge, love and enjoyment of himfelf. And how¬
ever this depended on continu’d divine communications,
thefe wou’d not have been withdrawn till the creature had
firft abufed and forfeited them-as is propofed to be ffiewn
in the fequel. The ableft philofophers and divines have
maintain’d, that God originally endow’d mankind with
freedom of will-that from the abufe of this “ freedom all
mifery and fin, all natural and moral evils, derive their
exiftence— it being more eligible that ” man “ ffiou’d be ’*
created “ a free agent, than a mere machine.”*
It may be difficult exaftly to determine what the powers
of human nature now are, or what they were in Adam in
his innocent ftate. We may yet fafely aflert, that his duty
did not exceed his abilities as he came out of the forming
hands of God. To fay it did, wou’d be impeaching the
maker and governor of the world with the injuftice which
the fervant in the parable complain’d of, ‘Thou art an hard
majler , reaping where thou haft not fown. And (hall we
prefume to fay of him who is righteous altogether, that he
demanded
* “ There is a gradation or fcale of afeent of the principle of a&ion
among creatures, in proportion to their perfection — The firll being is
the foie principle of action in all inanimate matter* In animal motion,
the animals themfelves are admitted into a final! participation of the
production of the effect, as they have the direction of fome motions, or
the power of beginning them. Brutes and men are thus far fpontane-
ous with regard to the motions of their bodies. But men have fur¬
ther a power of directing arbitrarily their perceptive capacity to and
throughout their paft perceptions, which brutes have not — and whick
therefore is the Jpecific difference betwixt rational and irrational beings.
— What is it to will? Is it not to a£l ? If it be to a&, it is to have
the internal principle of aftion - -This I take to be the ufe of the beau¬
ty of nature, and that conftancy, thofe certain dated laws by whick
the motions and changes in the world are governed, that free agents
could hanje no fore -fight or judgment without this confl&ncy . ‘There would
be without this no choice or judgment , becaufe there would be no courfc of
things . If we fhould fuppofe a contrary method to obtain, — what fear
and irrelolution, what difappointment, confufion and final difordcr
slight we not apprehend in all human affairs V*
Baxter on the foul, vo!. I. p, 177* 178 ; 203 ? 20S.
n""i 1-1 " 1 1 - — m ...
- rv J
2 4 O/Z Self-determination, Sect . L
demanded impiovement beyond the number of talents gi¬
ven ? If not, then the fall ot man was not owing to any
want of power to continue upright, but to his abufe of
onginal ability. His dependance on divine influence for
the prefervation of his moral reftitude, as well as of his
exiftence, proveth nothing to the contrary, if it be true,
that that influence wou’d not have been withheld, had not
man, by fome aft of rebellion, incur’d the forfeiture of it.
For we pretend not that any creature ever had an inde¬
pendent power, either for the purpofes of life or godlinefs.
But the creature may negleft or abufe what he hath re-
ceived ; and in confequence of that, what he hath may be
taken away. Man, therefore, had at firft fuch powers and
communications from God as were fufficient to his con¬
tinuing and improving in the knowledge, in the moral re-
femblance and enjoyment of his maker. His original fin
appears to have been a negleft of reafon and hafty liftning
to the follicitations of appetite. In all probability it was
a very fudden aft. By this he forfeited the prefence and
grace of God ; whereof he was immediately convinc’d, and
rear’d to appear before that glorious being whole difplea-
fure he had incurred, and with whom his correspondence
before was mod intimate. But upon the exhibition of a
ravior to him, under the character of the feed of the woman,
his hopes revived. With the delivery of this original
promife to him, he was put under a capacity of recovering
by repentance and faith in the feed promifed what he had
loft by hearkning to the tempter. In this promife life ana
bleffing were again fet before him, and his offended creator
faid to him, Chafe life . Whatever power was loft, what¬
ever inability incur’d, by the firft apoftacy, in regeneration ,
a fimilar power is reftor’d as man in innocency had— not;
indeed a power of living wholly without fin •, but a gene¬
ral habit of holinefs *, fuch exercifes and difpofitions of
heart as conform the creature to the creator, and which
in feripture are fignified by being renewed after the image
cf God— renewed in the fpirit of our minds- fanttified in Chrifi
Jefus- being new creatures , &c. Out of a regard to the me¬
diator, great and precious promifes are made to the apoff
tate fens of men-particularly the promife of the aids of the
fpirit
Sect. I. On Self-determination. 25
fpirit, through which alone any are renewed in know¬
ledge, and become partakers of God’s holinefs. Repen¬
tance and faith in Chrift hold the fame place in the re¬
ligion of a fallen creature, as unfining obedience did in
that of our progenitors while they remained upright.
By the gofpel God calleth upon all men every where to
repent, and believe in his fon for reconciliation and falva-
tion. He alfo gives his fpirit with his gofpel, of which
unregenerate men receive a meafure. And to him that
hath fhall be given, and he fhall have abundance. We
do not afcribe any lelf-derived, independent power, ei¬
ther to unregenerate or regenerate men •, but fuch only as
they have received from God, of which they are not,
flri&ly fpeaking, the proprietors, but ftewards. The lat¬
ter are faithful ftewards of the gifts and grace of God ; the
former are unfaithful, and wafte his goods. And what¬
ever impotency is derived to us from the human apoftacy,
5tis fufficient that in regeneration fuch power is reftor’d as is
equal to the purpofes of falvation— -that as men have re¬
ceived grace, fo God is ever ready to fupport them in duty,
while they acknowledge their dependance, and draw nigh
to him. For every one that ajketh , reeeiveth ; and he that
feeketh , findeth .
The things that have been offered are fufficient to
prove, that moral volitions proceed from acaufe in moral
agents themfelves, and to explain in what fenfe we main¬
tain this. They ferve further to illuftrate and eftablifh
our doftrine of human liberty. * The remaining part of
D this
* Further to illuftrate and confirm the fubjcft of our prefent en¬
quiry, we beg leave to make fome quotations from a writer of great
merit.
“ The true reafon why a perfon cannot complain of being made
anfwerable for at) action, is, that he has produced it himielf knowingly
and willingly— —;s the real author, the produdli've caufe> of his actions — >
the good or bad efFe&s from thence arifirig may be juftly attributed
and referred to him, as to the efficient caufe — the author or moral caufc .
Every thing aimoll that is faid and done in human lociety fuppofes this
principle generally received, and every body acquiefceth in it from art
inward convi&ion— Every adlion or omifSon lubje£l tc the direction
of man, can be charged to the account of the perfon in whofe power
it was to do it or let it alone : and on the contrary, every a&iorij
whole exigence or non exigence does net depend on our will, cannot
4
2-6 On Self-determination. Sect. I.
this fe&ion will be taken up in fhewing, that Mr. Edwards,
though he admits animal and external liberty, denies mo¬
ral,
be imputed to us. Obferve here, that omifiions are ranked by civili¬
ans and moralifts among the number of attions ; becaufe they appre¬
hend them as the efFe& of a voluntary fufpenfion of the exercife of our
faculties. -
We may impute to a perfon every action or omifiion, of which he \i
the author or cauje > and which he could or ought to have done or c-
mitted. -
With regard to another perfon* s actions, they cannot be imputed to
us, but in "as much as we have concurred to them, and as we could
and ought to have procured, hindered, or at lealt directed them after
a certain manner. The thing fpeaks for itfclf. For to impute ano¬
ther man’s adlions to a perfon, is declaring that the latter is the effci-
ent , though not the only caufe thereof ; and consequently that this
a&ion depended in fome meafure on his will, either in its principle
cr execution — —
It is not fufricient to have enlightened the mind in refpeft to the
nature of thofe goods and evils that are capable of rendering us really
happy or unhappy ; we fliould likewife give a£li<vity and efficacy to
thefe principles, by forming the will fo as to determine itfelf by tafte
£nd habit, parfusnt to the ccunlels of enlightened reafon. And let no
one think it impoffible to change our inclinations, or to reform our
taftes. It is with the tafte of the mind, as with that of the palate,
Experience fhsws, that we may alter both, fo as to find pleafure at
length in things that before were difagreable to us. We begin to do
a thing with pain, and by an effort of reafon ; afterwards we fami-
liarife ourfelves to it by degrees ; then a frequency of a6ls renders it
cafier to us, the repugnance ceafeth, we view the thing in a different
light from what we did before ; and ufe at length makes us love a
thing that before was the object of our averfion, — —
— — — Our mind inclines naturally to that lide which feems the moil
probable ; but this does not debar it from fufpending its alfent, in
order to feek for new proofs, or to refer the whole enquiry to a future
opportunity.*—
In refped to things that are evident. It is always in our power to
apply our minds to the confideration of thofe things, or effc to divert
them from thence, by transfering fomewhere elfe our attention. This
jirft determination of the will, by which it is led to confider or not to
confider the objects that occur to us, merits particular notice, becaufe
of the natural influence it mud have on the very determination, by
which we conclude to add or not to adt, in confequcncc of our reflexion
and judgment. Secondly, we have it likewife in our power to cteate,
as it wete, evidence in fome cafes, by dint of attention and^ enquiry ,
whereas at firfl fetting out, we had only fome glimmerings, inefficient
to give us an adequate knowledge of the date of things. 1°
v hen we have attained this evidence, we are ftill at liberty to well
’more or lefs on the confideration thereof ; which is alfo of great con¬
ference, bsca-fe on this depends its greater or letter degree or im-
prdlion. - 10
Sect. I.
On Self-determination.
2.7
raU and in a few curfory obfervations on this part of his
fcheme. indeed a free agent— let us therefore confult
To prove that man is ltld if ;s mafter, for infiance, to
only ourfelves. kvdry , . • tongue. Do not we alfo experience
Walk or fit ; to fpeak or hold h.s tongue^ to fuf d ou.r
continually, that it dePend.SmSn'S erquiry ? Can any one ftri-
jodgment, in order to proceed^ ^ /vil our reflations are
oufly deny, that in > • bft g the firft impreffion, we have it
in our power to > “' • cun be«pt«e<d'Oi" rhe fr«» »-
tfK;! r: »;“»»».«« -o »• ‘he ,ii,s'
I am free r r er;or to all cbje&iom and produc-
,,7:?“: s in'Shh ti
»!.■» “StuVoVhVch oo“,.eo'.lr .....Jr *• Wb.<
thLS m faintvl have we' of cur exiftance 1 And how is it we know
Sfc"wrffik7*V* bUt vocal, as it is not mo-
This fente of liberty is fenfe tbat n£ver leaves us, and of which
mentary or tranfient . ■ , :„nce-.Refledtions, deliberations,
we have a daily and continual « p fc th(j ufe of liberty. Hence
refearches, aftions, judgments , a^fpp . hence> as a natural
the ideas of good and evi , the cenfiire or approbation of our
confequence, anfes prai e or « • bc faid of the aflec-
own, or other people’s conduft. Thefame m^ay ^ friend_
tions and natural ientiments ' J sr complaints and reproach-
all order, and introduccth a general ffib!e for any body
It is natural here to enquire, h?w fte, of hu own aftions, whether
ferioofiy to doubt, whether man is “ . ;t concerning
he is free ? I ^uld be lefs X Ll no" tr.of.aed within ourfelves
a ftrange or remote fad, thing, of which we have an internal
But the queftion » » regard o “ ‘ d f,’ expericnce. Strange, that
immediate feeling, a cor, ft ant and d I J P£ fou[ , May not we as
any one Ihould call in quetlion a fa y of the liberty of man ?
well doubt of the undemanding and , ^ fenfe ,h£re is no more
For if we are content to abide by But fcme too fubtile phi-
. room to difpute of one that 1 0 mltaphyfical light, have fiript
lefophers, by confidermg this fubjea a i0fs to five
it, as it were of its nature ; a|?d ^>"8 ^Tt.ention to thefe difficul-
a few difficulties, they have g ven a g ;re.t ^ which ;nrcnflbly led them
ties than to the pofitive proof* o v f all aR iHuf10n.-Wc arc in¬
to imagine that the notion of hbeny whkh( in rcfpea to «.
formed by experience, that in levcra *» . Lprp re mnny du-
arc in veiled with the higheft degree «t “ ' fLcuUie*
N
'A
MjP
* *
1 strftmi A
r-' . ■ , . .• r r*i*
■ >-' .s^y-Mw*/1 iS 2?
2
Gk Self-determination.
■ SECt. J.
;; S£S
wards h,H , WhenCeitJs manifeft, that Mr. Ed-
"‘pj 4 ^ other n°t,0n °f liberty than what refpe&s
* The pleafure of the mind,
fcrent The C°n5U^S according to it, are entirely dif-
i rent. The adi of volition or choice is a different thin? from
tW. pur flit or execution of what is willed or chofen. ° And
if liberty confifts in the latter only, it cannot be at all re-
quilite to moral agency and accountablenefs. There may
be a willing or an unwilling mind when there is not ‘W
er, opportunity or advantage for one to do as he pleaf-
etn. And moral agents, it is conceded, may be worthy
of prane or blame in cafes where they cannot execute their
r s> 1 rea;on 01 external impediment or reftraint — and in
caies where they are compelled to aft contrary to their wills.
And where natural neceffity doth not take place, it is con¬
ceded that virtue or vice confifts not 'in the external doino-
or forbearing, but m theftate and difpofition of the mind
or will. Now as, on Mr. Edwards’s principles, the whole
or ibeity confifts in a ‘c power or opportunity to do as
one piealeth — to purjue and execute his will it clearly
follows, that liberty, according to his definition of it is
not eftential to virtue or vice, praife or blame. Yet he
affirms it is neceftary and eftential hereto.
IV o. Edwards s reafonsngon this point, reduced to pro¬
per form, will ftand thus : Liberty is eftential to praife
or blame. Liberty confifts in a man’s purluiiig and exe¬
cuting his will. Ergo, If he he cannot execute his willy
£culnes r^twithftanding, fchich we are incapable of refolving to our
alls action : And this is a natural confequence of the limits of the
irund. Let us conclude therefoie from hence, that when a truth
•umaently erinced by folid reafons, whatever can be obje&ed again fl
i! noc. ro or 'Weaken our convi&lon, as long as they are
fuc.o o, .Lcohies only as embarrafs or puzzie the mind, without iuva-
Jidating the proofs themfeivel$. \
Burlamaqui^s principles of law, VoL I. p. i7, iS : 24-27 ;
35 60 ; 238 ; 248 ; 258. 7 -
* Thofe who dtil/e particular fatisfa&ron that Mr. Edwards held
mo ether liberty ma„ examine p. 38,39,40; 76,773 13a ; 1S93
S 1 33; 214, 215 • 234 ; 236 ; 259. — &c, &c.
■/< * j <
Sect. I.
On Self-determination .
29
He cznnot be worthy of praife or blame. Would Mr. Ed^
wards abide by this coniequence ? If not, let any one ref-
cue his doctrine from it.
In truth, whether moral agents fhall execute their wills
depends not on themfelves. Their natural liberty may
be abridged or taken away, and yet their freedom a$ ac¬
countable creatures remain. If then liberty be really ne-
ceftary to praife or blame, it itiuft confift in a power either
to chute or refute that wherein virtue and vice confift.
And confequently the will itielf, its ftate, volitions or ads,
mu ft be determined by moral agents themfelves— at leaft
in fome inftances, and within a certain media re. There
is no occafion to add any thing further to what we before
■wrote on this point, Examination part I. fed. 3. and part
HI fed. 1.
But admitting Mr. Edwards maintained internal free¬
dom : We afk, of what fort ? moral f reedom, or only ant-
mal ? The latter may be called natural liberty, as well as
the freedom of the executive powers be fo denominated.
But it is not effential to praife or blame. Ideots, lunatics
and brutes have this liberty, but are not therefore moral
agents. Virtue or vice, reward or punifhment depend
not on the having this liberty. Yet Mr. Edwards admits
no other. If he means any thing by the freedom of the foul
as a moral agents it is this, that moral agents are fo framed,
have fuch difpofitions con-created with them, or infufed
into them by the author of their beings, that they exercife
freely what is created with or infufed into them, and can
do no otherwife. The ftate and bias of the mind, the par¬
ticular bent of their wills, by which all their purfuits arfe
determined, is fixed by neceffity. As fuppofe one hath a
propenfity to intemperance-, another to uncleannefs, a third
to theft, a fourth to covetoufnefs and extortion, a fifth to
pride, malice or revenge, &c. in exercifing, purfuing or
executing thefe different pafiions they are refpeftively free,
they aft as they pleafe, or according to their will but havb
no hand in the formation of thefe various propenfities. “Let
“ them come by their35 feveral inclinations and propen¬
fities “ how they will , yet if they are able, and there is nc-
thing in the way to hinder their pir firing and executing
them
u
jo On Self-determination. Sect. I.
them, they arc fully and perfeftly free.” f So are the dif¬
ferent fpecies of animals, who purfue and execute their pe¬
culiar propenfities— who follow nature— that is theinftindls
and difpofitions implanted in them by the author of nature.
We may venture to challenge any man to point out the
lead material difference between animal and moral agency
on Mr. Edwards’s fcheme of liberty.
There is a near refemblance between his fentiments on
this point, and thofe of a late writer. *
“ Our actions proceed from our wills, but our wills mufi
44 be derived from the natural difpofitions implanted in us by
“ the author of our being : Wrong eleftions proceed from
wrong apprehenfions, or unruly paffions ; and thefe from
cc our original frame or accidental education . Thefe muft deter-
44 mine all our adtions, for we have no power to aft dif-
44 ferently, thefe previous circumftances continuing exaft-
44 ly the fame. Had God tho t proper to have made ad
44 men with the fame heads, and the fame hearts, which he
44 has given to the mod virtuous of the fptcics *, they would
44 all have excelled in the fame virtues : Or had the bias.
44 implanted in human nature drawn as drongly towards
44 the good fide, as it now apparently does towards the bad,
44 it would have operated as fuccefsfully, and with as little
44 infringment on human liberty. Men , as well as all o-
44 ther animals, are exactly fitted for the purpofes they are de -
u Jigned for *, and have inclinations and difpofitions given them
44 accordingly . He who implanted patience in the lamb,
44 obedience in the horfe, fidelity in the dog, and innocen¬
ce ce in the dove, might as eafily have infpired tne bread
44 of man with thefe and all other virtues *, and then his
44 aftions would certainly have correfponded with his for¬
te mation. Therefore, in the firihd philo fophi cal fenfe, we toave
44 certainly no free-will •, that is, none independent of our frame-,
44 our natures , and the author of them, i
Other things belonging to the general fubject of this
feftion we intended to have added •, but as they will na¬
turally enough iali under the next branch ox oui defign,
we will relieve the reader’s patience tor the prefent.
wc SECTION.
t P. 40. * Mr. Seme Jennings of the board of trade,
1 fetters on origin of evib p* 59 1 ICOj 9
SECTION II.
On the influence of motives in moral vo¬
litions.
THE near relation this part of our fubjedt hath to the
preceeding naturally leads us to fuch obfervations
as may be explanatory of the things already offered, and
ftrengthen their evidence : While what hath been faid
may anfwer the fame purpofe with refpedt to what we
fhall now offer on the relation motives have to the voliti¬
ons of moral agents.
The whole diipute turns on the decifion or this queition.
Whether moral agents have a principle of efficiency in them-
felyes ? In what follows, we fhall endeavor further to fup-
port the affirmative.
By motives we mean external reafons or inducements
exhibited to the view of a moral agent. Mr. Edwards,
in a more general way, intends (as we fuppofe) an extrinfic
moral caufe, by the term motive. *
He affirms motives to be moral caufes, by way ol dii-
. tindtion
* We are very fenfible he had no fixed meaning to this word in his
writings. We took notice of his vague and arbitrary ufe and appli¬
cation of it, Examination feft. 2. part I —particularly p. 26, marg.
In the fenfe he fometimes ufeth the word [motive] it is not extnffic to
the mind, nor even antecedent to volition, nor dijtindl rom 1. con.e
quent'y, hath not a tendency to excite volition, is not the cauje, r.or lo
much as the occaRon of it. To fpeak of the preponderate and freva-
lency of motive implies that the mind is already determined i that its
choice is made. And hence a preponderating prevalent motive is
not the determiner of the mind’s eleftion. The caufe of this 1. ft.ll
to be fought fomewhere elfe. One while Mr. Edwards blends motive
and volition— at another time he makes the former the moral caufe ot
the latter— then again intimates that motive is not a proper efficient,
but only an occafion of volition— then turn! about and blends Percep:
tioa and action*
'e*
f
32 The influence of motives in tnofal volitions. Sect. II,
tindtion fiom natural caufes ; and, according to his rea-
omng, t ey produce their effedts in the fame way— that is,
t roug tne ci i vine energy. Moral effedts neceffarily fol-
■ ow t e efficiency of their caufe— moral caufes are as abfclute
as natural. (P. I03 . 261, &c.)
It might be abundantly Ihewn that Mr. Edwards af-
cribes efficiency to motives, from his whole book ; and
more efpecially from Part II. Sedt. 10. But we Ihall only
quote the following from p. 134, 135. in confirmation
hereof. “ If motives excite volition, then they are the
cause of it’s being excited— To excite, is pofiti vely to
“ do fomething •, and certainly that which does fomething,
“ is the cause of the thing done by it. To create, is to
11 caufe to be created •, to make, is to caufe to be made _
to quicken, is to caufe to be quickened •> and to excite ,
is to caffe to be excited. To excite, is to be a caufe in the
“ mod proper fenfe, not meerly a negative occafion, but a
ground ofexiftence by pofitive influence. The notion
of exciting , is exerting influence to caufe the effedt to
“ ar^e or come forth into exiftence — The production of an
“ effcdt is certainly the caufmg of an effedt •, and prcduc-
“ tine influence is cai'fal influence , if any thing is •, and that
“ which has this influence prevalently, fo as thereby to
“ become the ground of another thing, is a caufe of that
“ thing, if there be any fuch thing as a caffe” Thofe who
are ftill difpofed toqueftion whether Mr. Edwards afcribes
caufahty or efficiency to motives may call to mind the
ftory he tells of the animal in Terra del Fuego. (p. 282.)
However, we fee not what advantage can accrue to Mr.
Edwards’s fcheme, or what injury to our own, fhould it be
\ granted, that upon his plan motives are not, in a ftridt
j fenfe, the caufe of moral volitions. For if fo, what was
he about when he wrote his book ? Was it not his decla¬
red defign to point out the caufe of Volition ? Doth he
not labour abundantly to prove, that this caufe muft ever¬
more be that motive, which, in the view of the agent, is
higheft ? If by this moral caufe, as he {peaks, nothing
more be meant than the occafion of volition, not the caufe
in a ftrict and proper fenfe, how has he then anfwered the
queftion propofed, viz. “ What determines the will ? To
fay
Sect.IL The influence of motives in moral ‘volitions* 23
fay that motive is the occafion pf the will’s determination,
is nothing to the purpofe. We want to be directed to the
efficient » This enquiry is of no lefs importance than it is
to know the proper caufe of every moral event. It Mr.
Edwards did not fuppofe motives to be efficient caufes,
volition can have no fuch caufe at all on his feheme. — In
other words, there could be no fuch effect as a moral vo¬
lition. For a moral efiedt cannot exift without a caufe
any more than a natural effect : And Mr. Edwards denieth
that the fubjiedt of fuch volition, can be the efficient or
producer of it. So that to deny motives efficiency to pro¬
duce volition, is, upon his principles, to fay, that all moral
events are without a caufe — rather, that there are no fuch
events exifting.
Should it be faid, that creatures to whom moral agency
belongs are the proper efficients of their own volitions,
this would be diredtly to admit our dodtrine— to afiert a
fdf-determining power, and make this the foundation of
praife and blame, rewards and punifhments. Should it be
laid that the firft caufe is the proper efficient of every mo¬
ral volition, this would rather increafe than relieve the dif¬
ficulty. For it equally militates with Mr. Edwards’s
fclieme to fuppofe a felf-determining power in the creator,
as in the creature. And then to alcribe the finful voliti¬
ons of creatures to divine efficiency, is to affirm that God
is the proper caufe and author of wickednefs. In every
view Mr. Edwards’s feheme is ftrangely embarraffed. It
is conceded, that every moral volition hath an efficient
caufe. And is it a trivial point whether this caufe be fup-
poled to be in the fubjedt of fuch volition, or extrinfic to
him ? ,
As, on Mr. Edwards’s principles, the efficient caufe of
the moral volitions of creatures muft be either extrinfic
motive, or God himfelf through the intervention of motive,
each of thefe cafes fhall be diftindtly examined : And if
neither of them can be maintained, the other opinion muft
be the truth, that moral agents are the caufe of their own
volitions.
Now it cannot be that motives are themfelves efficient
caufes. For an efficient muft needs be an agent. A mo-
34 The influence of motives in moral 'volition's. Sect. II.
tal efficient muft be a moral agent. “ Abftfaft notions
cc (as all reafons and motives are55) are not agents. Or
fhould it be faid that moral agency belongs to them, it
would no way ferve Mr. Edwards’s caufe. For if motives
are agents, then they are themfelves determined by motive.
To be an efficient is to aft, and aftion implies agency. If
motives are not agents, then either the fubjeft of a moral
volition is alfo the moral cauie of it, or fome other agent
Is that caufe. To fay fome other agent is the caufe, is ei¬
ther to aferibe felf-determination to this fuppofed caufe,
or to run back the efficient of volition in infinitum .
Mr. Edwards himfelf faith, that the aft of volition is
determined always by that in the mind’s view of an objeft,
which caufeth it to appear molt agreable, not by the agre-
able. appearance for this, in his opinion, is nothing
diftinEl from volition (P. 11, 12.) This matter was? par¬
ticularly confidered, Examination, part I. feft. 2. To fave
the reader (and ourfelves alfo) the trouble of repetition,
we beg leave to refer moreover, to the notes p. 91, — 95.
If motives are not themielves efficients, let us next en¬
quire, whether God is the efficient caufe of all moral voli¬
tions in the creatures through the medium of motives.
Now in a moral eftimation, it makes no difference, whe¬
ther the Deity be the immediate or mediate caufe of fin and
moral turpitude. To fay he is the efficient in either fenfe
is equally and infinitely reproachful to him. To fay, the
will neceffarily follows the laft diftate of the underftand-
ing— that the underftandirig follows the appearance of
things * and that thefe appearances are all minutely order-
!" , tf ( ' ed
* Objeftion : “ It is not in our power to perceive things otberwife
'than as they offer themielves to our mind ; now our judgments are
formed on this perception of things ; and it is by thefe judgments
that the will is determined : The whole is therefore neceffary and in¬
dependent of liberty.”
Anfwer. “ This difficulty carries little more with it than an emp¬
ty appearance. Let people fay what they will, we are always at li-
berty to 6pen or fhut our eyes to the light 5 to exert, or relax our at¬
tention, Experience fhews, that when we view an objeft in diffe¬
rent lights, and determine to fearch into the bottom of matters, vve
defery feveral things that efcaped us at firfl fight. This is fufficient
to prove that there is an exercife of liberty in the operations of the Un¬
der ’Handing, as well as in the feveral aftions thereon depending/’
Uuilamaqui principles of laws, vol, 1, p. 19.
Sect. II. S The influence of motives in moral volitions.
ed and difpofed by the governor of the world, is ultimately
( o aferibe all moral evil to his efficiency. But how con¬
fidently with his moral character ? For can it be that the
efficient caufe of wickednefs is not wicked ?
Suppofe a parent, who had given it in charge to a child,
be fure to fhun this and the other vice, ffiould yet lay be¬
fore fuch child the ftrongeft temptations to the vices cau¬
tion’d againft, would not the child naturally conclude that
the parents admonitions are only words of courfe ? that
he fliou’d not affront, but pleafe his parent, by liftning to
the enticements of his own propofing ? Would not all
men lay the blame to the parent for feting invincible temp¬
tations before a child? Now the fuppofition that the pa¬
rent of the world exhibits to the minds of his rational
offspring, in an irrefiftible manner, motives to vice, is re¬
ally more reproachful, fince (by fuppofition) ’tis through
his operation and efficiency with them that vice is produ-*
ced, as the neceffary effect. Doth the father of angels and
men (who compared with him are children in underftand-
ing) leduce them in this manner, taking advantage of their
ignorance and weaknefs, and exert his own influence for
their ruin ? When Mr. Edwards fays, “ God is the fource
“ of all moral ability and agency,” (p. 42.) doth he mean
that he is the fource of all moral evil ? There is a fenfe
in which this obfervation is doubtlefs true. But if a di¬
vine efficiency in finful volitions was meant to be com-*
preheded under it, this is greatly to err.
But if motives are not efficient caufes, nor the Deity-
through the intervention of them, then moral agents
themfelves are. If the caufe of volition be not extrinfic,
it muft be intrinfic, in the agent himfelf •, which is to fay,
in other words, that moral agents are ielf-determined.'
By affirming this we mean not, however, to deny the
influence of motives in moral volitions. We may admit
the operation of motives on moral agents without attribut¬
ing caufalitv to motives. They are reafons exhibited to
us to determine ourfelves by ; but are not moral caufes,
as hath been ffiewn from the nature of them, and from Mr.
Edwards’s own doftrine on the article of motives.
Still it may be faid, If moral agents invariably determine
themfelves
#
I %
’the influence ef motives in moral volitions.
Sect. II.
themfelves according to the greateft apparent good, this
effectually eftablifheth the doctrine of moral necefilty ;
and, confequently, proves that the higheft motive necessi¬
tates volition, if it be not, ftriftly fpeaking, the caufe of it.
. This matter requires a careful examination. For with¬
out determing at prefent, whether a principle of caufation
in the mind or agent, in diftinftion from motive, is or is
not reconcileable with moral necefilty •, the ad million of
this would, doubtlefs, much weaken the evidence of the
point we contend for. It muff be allowed, that if the
. volitions of moral agents always are as the greateft apparent
good is , this amounts to a proof of necefilty in the philofo-
phic fenfe of the word. Is there, then, fuch a conftant
and unfailing connexion or coincidence between volition
and the greateft apparent good, as is pretended ? We are
clear in the opinion there is not.
Necefilty is uniform and fixed : f On the luppofition
of it, no moral agent can ever chufe or aft differently from
• what he doth. A Jingle inftance, therefore, of the before-
• mentioned coincidence failing, wholly fubverts the doftrine
of’ necefilty. Now two inftances of this kind were produced
and infifted on incur examination of Mr. Edwards, viz. the
: apoftacy of angels and mankind. They were under no moral
■necefilty of apoftatizing, Mr. Edwards feems to admit their
fail might have been prevented. Confequently, liberty may
be diftinguilh’d from moral necefilty. We believe no tolera¬
ble anfwer can be given to thefe inftances. What hath
been already laid upon them is fufficient, till fomething
is offered to invalidate or weaken the evidence arifing from
them. £ ' ■ „
Should it be admitted that motives may, in fame cafes ,
be exhibited in fo ftrong a light, that the mind in which
they are extant could not but make the choice it doth
yet unlefs this can be fhewn to hold true in every inftance,
the doftrine of neceffary determination cannot be fupport-
ed. Admitting, for inftance, this irreilftible exhibition of
motives to take place, with reference to angels and glori¬
fied fpirits in heaven, and in fome cafes of good men on
earth,
y Edwards 101,102; J 'o. Examination 118.
} Examination p. jo, ji, \% 53, 54 J 99>—i03 ; 109, HO*
Sect. II- cLbe influence of metives in moral volitions. 37
earth, and vice verfa ■, it will not follow that the fame
thing muft hold true as a general principle in regard to
mankind upon trial. It was not fact in reference to a-
poftate. fpirits, and mankind in their firft ftate.
We have not pretended to ftate the degree of moral li¬
berty, or fphere of its exercife by moral agents. All that
we have argued for is this, that accountable creatures
either have, or at leaft originally had, a freedom to chufe
differently from what they do. This is no more than the
generality of reformed divines have maintained. A liber¬
ty of indifference we have no where aliened. For though
we agree with Dr. Watts and fome other writers, who ufe
this term, in the thing they intend by it •, yet as we do not
entirely approve the manner of expreffion, fo we have ne¬
ver once uled this term to exprefs our fenfe of liberty.
Mr. Edwards reprefen ts thole writers who argue for a
liberty of indifference, particularly Dr. Watts, as meaning
hereby two contrary things, neither of which was their
fentiment. He more generally would have it, that they
mean perfebl indifference, or equilibrium. But he has alfa
intimated by his own ufe of the word, (p. 9.) that his op¬
ponents mean, by indifference, fomething neither agreable
nor difagreable , eligible or the contrary. Thefe are two
notions of indifference, altogether diverfe, and even
contrary. (One thing may be far from being abfolutely
indifferent, while another is preferable.) However,^ nei¬
ther of thele was the notion of indifference maintain d by
the authors Mr. Edwards oppofeth. The fenfe in which
they aflert liberty of indifference is precifely this — a free¬
dom in moral agents to chufe otherwife than they do —
what was called in the fchools, Liber tas indifferentia ad op-
pofita , “ a liberty of indifference to chufe one thing, or its
oppofite.” Such a fenfe of liberty is fo far from being
the peculiar notion of “ Pelagians , Semi-Pelagians , Jefuits ,
1“ Socinians, Jrminians, and others” of the fame ftamp, as
Mr. Edwards injurioully reprefents, * that it has been
maintained by the moft eminent divines called Calvinifls,
as we fhall be ready to fhew fhould there be occafion. 1 he
examples of fuch a liberty, in the defection of beings made
upright, are far from being the only ones that might be
' ‘ ' . adduced
* P. 89,
iijl
|B The influence of motive's in moral volitions. Si ct. IL
addticed-- but they are fufficient in the controverfy with
Mr- Edwards. *. 7
Viitnous or vicious election^ muft proceed upon motive.
And we grant that the greateft good really ought to deter¬
mine moral agents ; but that it in fa£t always doth9 even
where it is perceived, we deny. Where there is both a real
and evident preferablenefs, there can be no difpute as to the
obligations of moral agents. But even where there is a
inanireft as well as real preference, their election is nQt
oknays governed hereby. 5Tis too common, indeed, that
the paiTigns bias and pervert the moral judgment. Some¬
times they precipitate this judgment, when a little refle&i-
m would have been fufficient to preferve the refiitude of it.
Sometimes they blind and corrupt this judgment by re¬
tarding
'* W c might mention inftances of the will's determination, in which
there is imperceptible preference, either in the objeft itfelf fixed upon,
in the circttmftances of it. If there is no apprehended preference,
m perceivable reafon for chpfmg, between two objects, the mind mvA\
-f^fpend it^s determination forever, accord i#g to Mr. Edwards. Ter
*6 whatever is a motive muft he fomething extant in thewiesyo of the per-
*\ celling faculty ” (P,8.) Yet Mr. Edwards admits, that two or more
given things may appear 6( exaBly alike, one as good as another — -as fop*
pofe two eggs, or two cakes” — there is no preference, at leaft none
perceived by the miod, as he allows, in thefe cafes. Is then the will
determined by, or as the greateft apparent good in fuch inftances ?
He muft fuppofe fo. Arm indeed he inftfts, that in all fuch inftancea
the mind hath two or more general determinations, before it jeomes to
a particular determination or choice. He fuppofeth the mind hath a
jeal preference, if not of the object chpfen, yet of its own a&ion—
that it gives itfelf up (very deliberately) to accident . (Doth he mean,
shat this is done with an expe&ation that chance will direft the mind
to the wifeft choice ?) Is not this trilling i If there be no apprehended
preference, the mind cannot determine, or be determined at all, by
hh principles. In the inftances he had before him, he grants there is
no apprehended preference of one object to the other. Here he ob¬
serves, 6‘ The very e£l of chuftng one thing rather than another, is
<f prefering that thing.” What preference is there in the inftances
arr'ered to ? On what ground or reafon is one chofen ? To fay there is
$n a£ of choice, implying preference , between two objeds exaflly alike
in every aoparent refpeft, and yet no previous ground or reafon of
that preference, is very hardly reconcileablc witbMr.Edwa&ds’s fcheme,
or common fenfe. We believe it will not be doubted by the genera¬
lity of mankind, but innumerable inftances occur every day of the
will’s determination without any perceptible preference. There arc
which we leg leave to, call arbitriu?ns9 — implying no
pr.epolkp.cy
Sect. II. The influence of motives in moral volitions.
tarding it, (in the manner obferved in the preceeding feCIion)
to find out palliations, excufes, orjuftifying circumftances
for vice, that men may indulge their various lufts, and yet
be on o-ood terms with their confidences. By fuch means*,
the light in men becomes darknefs ; they call evil, good,
and good evil *, put bitter for fweet, and fweet for bitter.
Stfll we think nothing is more evidently falfe than the
opinion, that the affeCtions evermore follow the laft prac¬
tical judgment of the underftanding; Perception and vo¬
lition are as different as fight and tafte. Moral agents
ny times fin immediately againft prefent light and convicti¬
on, while they have full in their view the wifer choice.
And what is this but to determine themfelves contrary to
the greateft apparent good ? Through the impetuofity of
their lufts and paffions, they break over the cleared: bonds,
natural,
prepollency 6f motive— not excited by the great eft apparent good, no*
as this is— nor the contrary ; with refpea to which the mind is in
& equilibria . HoWever, fuch arbitriums feetn not to belong to the fub-
ject of morality and religion . They Bill fubvert Mr. E.d wards s fcheme
©F neceffaty connexion.
«« The exercife of liberty,” fays the learned Burlamaqui, never
«< difplays itfeU more than in indifferent things. I find, for inftance,
« that it depends entirely on myfelf to ftretch out or draw back my
“ hand ; to fit down or to walk ; to dire& my fteps to the right or
«« left, &c. On thefe occafions, where the foul is left entirely to ic-
felf, eUbef for wanr of external motives, or by reafon of the oppo-
<l fition, and, as it were, the equilibiium of thefe motives, if it deter-*
4< mines on one fide, this may be faid to be the pure effe£t of its
*< plcafure and good will, and of the command it has over it3 own
“ actions.” Vol. I. p. 20, 21.
As to the mind’s giving itfelf up to accident, this cafe is wrongly
Bated. Where the mind has a full perfuafion there is no preferable-
nefs of one obfea to another, is inftantly convinc’d they are exactly
alike, it cannot be faid to give itfelf up to accident. It hath no choice
Or preference, is perfectly indifferent (not whether it hath either , but)
which it hath. It doth not tarry to make one general •refolution after
another before it comes to a conclufion ; but determines immediately*
If the mind may be faid to give itfelf up to accident at all, it is in in-
BatiCes where it is well known in general, that the ifiue of its deter¬
mination may be either fortunate or unfortunate ; but neither being
extant in the minds view beforehand, and the event being altogether
independent of any human circumfpedlion, the mind determines with¬
out a perception of the confequences — which it leaves to time and
fortune. As in purchafing tickets in a lottery.
To pretend, that though the mind has no preference of the ohjsa
ihofen, in things indifferent, yet it hath of it’s own a%} is frifoloKi.
40 ‘The influence of motives in moral volitions . Sect. IL
natural, civil and religious — the force of vvhich they have
dome times a lively fenfe of even in the article of fining
perceiving the diredl tendency of fuch violations to ruin
them in this world and another. So far are they from
acting on the view of the greateft apparent good, that
they have a prefent fight of the ruinous confequences of
that rafh and mad conduit they determine upon.
Every delaying finner aits againft the greateft apparent
good, while he promifeth himfelf a future time of repen¬
tance, and repenteth not immediately. When fuch hear
the importance and excellency of religion reprefented in
fome judicious moral difeourfe, or fee the fame exemplifi¬
ed in real life, they highly approve it in their judgment j
they fee it to be their wifdom * but their practice is at va¬
riance with the apparent good— So much at variance, that
they are obliged to make ineffeitual promifes of becoming
wife foon, and are much diflatisfied with themfelves that
they have not been long ago. The fituation of many
great finners on a fick bed, in the apprehenfion of death,
is wont to alarm others of a like charaiter. They fee the
right and good way ; but perfift in their fins againft their
evident intereft.
Different confiderations are adapted to influence diffe¬
rent perfons, who have diverfe apprehenfions of intereft,
according to the diverfity of their temper and talents,
education and circumftances. But to confound all dif-
tinition between motives and moral habits, as Mr. Ed¬
wards doth, is to blend things that differ— to contradiit
reafon and himfelf. For he tells us, volition follows per¬
ception, is excited by it*, and the effect of it— that motives
are extrinfic caules. Surely then they are different from
volition. And if (as has been fhewn) volition is not al¬
ways as the higheft motive *, then, when thefe really meet,
it is not neceffarily •, that is, not in the way Mr. Edwards
contends for. One inftance failing, the chain is broken.
One link, or “ 10,000, breaks the chain alike.”
Motives exhibited to a moral agent may be ftrong or
weak according to the attention given to them. Moft
prefumptuous fins may proceed from fudden paffion or
inattention. It has been hinted, that Adam's firft fin may
be
Sect. if. lbe influence of motives in moral volitions .
be accounted for in this way. And if the manner of the
mind’s viewing an objedl may be the caufe of its chafing
or refufing, (as Mr. Edwards obferves) we enquire^
Whence is it, but from a caule in itfelf that the mind
views an objedl as it doth ?
On Mr. Edwards’s fcheme and our own, ex.trinfic mo¬
tives are concerned, as they have pofitivz influence^ in moral
Volitions. The difference is, Mr. Edwards (more gene¬
rally) teacheth, that they are moral caufes, and that the
will and the highefl motive neceffarily unite. We aflert*
that moral agents are themfelves the efficients of their own
volitions, and that there is no fuch neceffary union between,
volition and the highefl: motive. The advantage our
fcheme hath may, perhaps, appear from applying the doc¬
trine wherein we are agreed with him to a particular cafe
—that of the firft finful volition of the prince of darknefs.
The motive to this volition was extant in his mind. It
had pofltive influence to excite and move to the volition.
His rebellion was the confequence. Was it therefore the
greateft apparent good ? Had he a principle of action
within himfelf, either to concur with or reject the exhibited
motive ? If he had, then the caufe of this volition was in
himfelf, and our dodtrine of felf-dctermination is eftablifh-
cd. . If he had not, then let it be granted that the motive
exhibited was the efficient of the volition. But what ad¬
vantage will this conceffion be to Mr. Edwards’s caufe ?
it follows from it, either that this efficiency is ultimately
to be aferibed to God, and that the energy or caufality is
ultimately his ; (fince by his diipofing and determining
providence iuch efficacious motive to rebel was prefented
to the view of an innocent and holy being) or that God
himfelf is properly no moral caufe, but fubjedt, as crea¬
tures are fuppoled to be, to lome extrinfic efficiency and de¬
termination. And indeed this is the true refult of Mr.
Edwards’s fcheme. The divine being is not lelf-deter-
mined— is no proper efficient caufe. Fdtalifts and Ath'eifls
will not fail to make improvement on this fyftem. On
the fubjedt of moral agency, it is therefore of great impor¬
tance to keep up a diftindtion between the influence of
motives, and caufality or efficiency .
aJi The influence of motives in moral volitions. Sect. II.
To fay that volition fprings from itfelf, is a very diffe¬
rent thing from faying, that the fubjeft is the caufe of it.
Dr. Watts did not deny that volition hath a caufe, as Mr.
Edwards would inhnuate ; but maintain’d, that an intel¬
ligent fpirit is the caufe of it’s own volitions.
Upon the whole, it is agreed that moral agency may
confift with the want of fpontaneous, animal agency, or
the liberty of the executive powers. Befides, where there
is neither force nor impediment from without, the exertion
of our natural powers depends on our being vsilling to ex¬
ert them •, but whether we are willing, depends not at all
on ourfelves. For though “ our actions proceed frorn our
“ wills,” yet “ our wills muff be derived from the difpo-
“ fitions implanted in us by the author of our being.”
Such is Mr. Edwards’s fcheme. Where, then, is liberty 1
where moral agency 1 what pre-eminence hath a man a-
bove a beaft ! TThe lower animals follow the inftindts and
difpofitions implanted in them originally, or in which they
are “ accidentally educated.” They have not a moral
faculty, indeed : But if this makes only a conftitutional^ or
adventitious difference in their eledt ions and actions, it is a
difference no way material ; fince fuch accidental diffe¬
rences make no beings either virtuous or vicious. It
feems apparent, that Mr. Edwards has totally excluded
liberty from every thing wherein the nature of virtue and
vice is properly concerned.
SECTION
SECTION Ilf.
On neceflity.
TO make his dodtrine of univerfal neceflity confiftent
V(?ith moral agency and accountablenefs, Mr. Ed¬
wards infills much on two kinds of neceflity ; one of which
he calls natural , the other, moral. It is needful to
exhibit his dodtrine, and make a few remarks thereon,
that the reader may judge of the merits of this diftindtion!
After which fome things will be obferved with a view, if
poffible, to call a little light on theabflrufe fubjedt of ne¬
ceflity, rendered more abftrufe than before, by Mr Ed¬
ward’s refinements and fubtilties. Y
He frequently advertifeth his readers, that when he ap-
plieth the term ntceffily to moral fubjedts, he ufeth it “as
a term of art"— that when the words necetfary, impojfible ,
irrcjijlible , unable , &c. are applied to moral agency, they
are “ either uled in fome new fenfe diverfe from their o-
riginal and proper meaning, or with perfedt infigniftcan-
ce and nonienfe : For no inability whatfoever, which is
meerly moral, is properly called by the name of inabi-
‘ hty.” (P. 21, 22, 232, 287. etpaffm.) Did not Mr.
Fdwards then mean by moral neceflity any real neceflitv *
Did he ufe words as “ nonfenfically ” as other metaphyfi-
cians ?
While in common fpeech no proper neceflity at all is
meant by the ufe of the terms moral neceflity, * Mr. Ed-
• w rL ■ - wards
When in common fpeech it is faid, that any particular things are
morally neceffary.or morally impofiible, by way ofdiftinttion from
natural neceflity or impoflibility, nothing more is intended than to ex-
preis, on the one hand, the degree o t probability, or at moft moral
"Sa'V' l *• f“.Ch eveotS wil1 take PIace : °r' on the °‘her hand, the
’Jpcu ty iho.< .is in the way, and the moral euidenct that they will not
ecome efFeft. * ris not meant that there is any proper neceflity in the
cafe. When we fay, We mufi do or forbear fuch things-we cannot
wrt,1fa°«rif0,bCarftheum~iiWe 8te n,crJ‘ta,ed to do ®r forbear them, we
culd only exprefs the ftrength of obligation upon us, or the llronp-
inducements we arc under, in our prefent fituation and circumflancest
door omit them, When we fay of a msn of approved veracity
and,
WC
C(
On Neceffity.
Sect. III.
4*4
•wards manifeflly intends hereby a real neceffity, and in h.s
definition of moral neceffity includes what proper y e-
lono-s to natural — applying to it the following epit .ets,
infallible , unalterable , unfrujlrabie, unavoidable— and laying
rjP 30 ) c< moral neceffity is as abfolute as natural. but
jet’ us more particularly attend to his own explanation ot
the diftinftion between natural and moral neceffity.
« By natural neceffity , as applied to men, I mean faith
he, “ fuch neceffity as men are under through t he force of
« natural caufes •, as diftmguiffied from what are called
“ moral caufes, fuck as habits and difpofitions of the heart,
and moral motives and inducements. By moral neceffity
cc ;s rneant that neceffity of connection and confequence,
« which arifeth from the ftrength of Rich moral caufes as
“ the ftren°th of inclination, or motives, and the connec-
« tbn which there is in many cafes between thefe, and
« iuch certain volitions and addons. (P. 29.). o pm
vent any miftake of his meaning, he gives us notice ot them'
three things. Firft, that moral neceffity may be as abro-
,nd that he cannot lie, or violate his truft and engagements,
« W, b,.. »».l certainly be -ill frk
faithful to his promifes, to the truft repofed in « ha, re the
hl„he|t reafon to think fo, and no futpicion to the
/ ^ ' r u , U mav be barely pqjhble , however improbable, mat he
r>ay°wo8vc falfe and unfaithful (For iuch men fometimes aiVon-
louh'v ol their general charader, to the great furpnae of their jac-
nS that t£ « irfearn to do well, by this is only femfcd
the extreme difficulty of their reforming ; the great
it. We fo me times fay, 18 .^^^EielSeKl natural
claimed, and find thcn^reco^ iy ^ nlcanjng is not, that there is ,
impclTibilny. ( j w • . ' • r 'There have been inftances
eharafler ^vf/p^neveT be^reduce^ibB^cJ1 ^ThedeVerah i'nftances^pro-
mcceffity of them cont.nutn^ unrefo m d himfelf. Habit
dneed by Mr- F.a wards P. 4;) - ‘ f are wont to call it fecund
^Ev-t confufion in onrjdeaO^
it h mraVy f p c akin g < m p° ^ bj ® ™ ® r ve s 1 h at thong h it be pof-
^rfthsyinEE rZ-- ImptoVble Thus by moral ^
|e mean not a drift neceffity, but prefix tbe'epuhtt moral to pteven,
iuch inference*
I •**» » W* ^
Sect. III. On Neceffity. 4$
lute as natural neceffity. Secondly, That moral events
are owing to the nature of things. Thirdly, that neceffi-
ty, as applied by him to moral fubjeds, is not ufed accor-
djno- to the original defign and meaning of the word.
Here we have occafion to apply Mr. Edwards’s own
words, P. 287. “ ’Tis very evident, that in the metaphy-
“ ficai diftinction between” natural and moral neceffity,
“ due care has not been taken to conform language to the
nature of things, or to any d 1 id 1 n ct clear ideas which
« has occafioned inexpreffible difficulty, contention, error
“ and confufion.” (P. 279.) “ Thofe are a precarious
<c fort of demonftrations, which men build on the mean*
“ ing they arbitrarily affix to a word efpecially when
“ that meaning is abftrufe, inconfiftant, and entirely dh-
“ verfe from the original fenfe of the word in common
« fpeech.” We know of no writer that has ufed words
more arbitrarily , and abftrufely or built more precarious
demonftrations on fuch ufe of them. What is offered on
the article of neceffity feems peculiarly liable to this ex¬
ception. _ ,
To recur to the diftinction of natural and moral .necef¬
fity. The great jumble and confufion of ideas in the a-
fore fa id explanation is to be regretted.
By “ neceffity of connection and confequence” we ob¬
tain no idea of moral neceffity as diftind from natural.
To fay in explanation hereof, that the volitions of moral
agents are conneded Immediately or mediately with what
is neceffary in its own nature, and fo are neceffary by a
neceffity of confequence, (P. 25 ; 2.9 . ) is do tar from help¬
ing us to diftinguifh moral neceffity from natural, that the
attempt to explain doth but confound the dillindion,
which is luppofed to be ofmucn linpoitance. Accoidmg
to this explanation, moral adions are effeds of natural
neceffity, when traced up to their true cauie. Eor fa.th,
Mr. Edwards, “ Things which are perfectly connefied with
“ other things that are neceffary [in their own nature] are
“ themfelves neceffary, by a neceffity of confequence.” The
volitions of accountable creatures not being in their own,
nature neceffary, are fo inafmuch as they are perfedly con¬
ceded with, and certainly follow from, the divine exif-
. _ - . - tence
4^ ®n Neceffity. Sect. III.
terace and perfections. As this is to affert, that God is the
ongmal moral caufe of fin, fo it is finally to affert that fin
arole from a neceffity in the nature of things. Do we yet
perceive any difference between natural and moral neceffi-
t) > on this Hate of the matter ? The divine exiftence is
eternal, and therefore abfolutely neceffary in its own na-
ture. * I he volitions of creatures are perteftly connected
v/ith the divine exiftence and conduit. And are they not
then neceffary with a natural neceffity.
Further, What doth Mr. Edwards mean by a moral
caufe ? X In the paffage under prefent examination, and
through his book, he blends moral motives and induce¬
ments with moral habits, inclinations and difpofitions, as
though they were precifely the fame, and indifcriminatelv
calls them moral caufes. Here are feveral things unintel¬
ligible. &
Firft, The difference between a moral difpofition and a
moral volition fhould have been pointed out. For moral
volitions and actions, upon this fcheme, are immediately
connected with moral habits and difpofitions as their moral
caufe. Or if there be no difference, then it fhould have
been fhewn,
Secondly, How the fame moral habit, which is a moral
volition or aft, is alfo the moral caufe of itfelf— caufe and
effeft at the fame time, and in regard to the fame thing—
the fubjeft of its own efficiency. Were this conceivable, ftill.
Thirdly, How is a moral habit [or motive] before and
previous to itfelf ? How hath it a tendency , by pofitive in¬
fluence and aftion, to move and excite to itfelf ? How is it
the caufe of that exertion , which, by fuppofition, is ex¬
erted before its influence and motion is applied for the
purpofe ?
Fourthly, If motives are nothing diftinft from moral
habits and inclinations, then they are not extrinfic caufes of
fuch
* We enquire not into the caufe of the divine exiftence, which al¬
together furpaffeth our perception. Vid. Examination, Part II. Sedl. I.
t “ VVe give in general the name of moral caufe of an adlion to the
per/on that produced it, either in the whole or part, by a determination
of his will ; whether he executes it himfelf phyfically and immediate¬
ly, fo as to be the author thereof ; or whether he procures it by the
ad of home othe? perfon, and becomes thereby it’s caufe.”
Burbmaqui, Vol. I. Pc 238,
*
V
Sect. IIL On NeceJJityl 47
fuch inclinations and habits, as Mr. Edwards often (tiles
them— -are not the medium of producing fuch habits.
Fifthly, If moral volitions are connected with their
moral caufe by a neceffity of confequence^ then it feems, the
caufe and neceffity are 'prior to the volitions, and that the
volitions themfelves /0//0W, as effects follow their caufes.
But how can they be confequent , if a moral motive be a
moral difpofition, as it is certain a moral difpofition is
a moral volition ? We would, if poffible, dilcover the
peculiar connection which Mr. Edwards fuppofeth there is
between one and the fame thing, fo as to difcern how it is
a moral caufe and a moral effeCt of— itfelf ! We cannot
eafily apprehend what he means by moral neceffity ^ or
perceive where the difference lies, according to him, be¬
tween natural and moral neceffity.
Further, When Mr. Edwards faith, that the nature of
the connection between moral caufes and effects is the
fame as in natural caufes and effeCts — that they differ only
as the terms connected are diffimilar, this doth but en¬
tangle the fubjeCt ftill more : For if there be no difference
in the nature of the connection ; if this be alike indiffolu-
ble in the one as in the other, is not then the neceffity the
fame ? what proper diftinCtion is there between natural
and moral neceffity ? Doth he mean alfo to confound na¬
tural caufes and effeCts as he doth moral ? to fay, in like
manner, that a natural effeCt is the natural caufe of itfelf ?
the objeCl of its own influence and aCtion ? producer and
produced ?
Further, This connection between moral volitions and
their moral caufes is faid to take place in many cafes. If it
ever fails, how is the connection “fure and perfect— ac-
“ cording to eftabliffied laws ? 55 If the connection may in
any cafe be broken, there is no neceffity. 5Tis not as ab~
folute, as unfruftrable as natural neceffity.
Further, As nothing except the divine exigence and per¬
fections is neceffary in itfelf, or in nature •, according to Mr.
Edwards himfelf j when he faith moral neceffity is as ab-
folute and irrflftible as natural, doth he mean that the mo¬
ral volitions of creatures are as neceffary as the exiftence
of God ? Apply this to his own doctrine refpeCting the
origin
\
■i
I
I
I
u;'
i i * I
{
$
4$ On Neceffity . Sect. Ill.;
origin of evil, and either the abfolutenefs of moral necefli-
iy muft be given up, or the moral character of the Deity
difbelieved. Was it Adam’s original bias and difpofition
to rebel againft God ? If it was, he was created a rebel.
And what tho’ts muft we entertain of the creator, from
whom immediately he derived this bias ? Can we diftin-
guifti his being created in fin from natural neceffity ? If
this was not his original difpofition, but the contrary, then
he was far from being under a neceffity of finning, as ab^
folute as natural neceffity— his fall was “not owing to na-
** ture. v3>
Or fuppofe the firft finful volition really neceffary in
the way Mr. Edwards contends for, what effiential diffe¬
rence could there be between a neceffity without the will,
and a neceffity within it ? Evil difpofitions originally im¬
planted in the creature, or infufed into him afterwards, or
proceedin g from the want of divine influence and affiftance,
cannot render the fubjedt thereof criminal, nor can pro¬
perly be called evil as relative to him, as may be fhewn
in the next fedtion. To fay in this cafe, cc 5Tis his very
46 nature •, he is of a vile natural temper, ’tis as natural
for him to adt fo as it is to breathe •, he can’t help fer-
^ ving the devil,” &c. -f would be a full excufe, provi-
ded fuch a nature and temper were originally implanted
or infuled by the creator, or arofe from the want of his
affiftance. And as the firft finful volition was as abfolute-
ly neceffary as any following ones, and the firft in the
ferics determineth all the reft, on Mr. Edwards’s plan—
as the neceffity he pleads for is not even pretended to de¬
rive from the fall, nor the fin of Adam once mentioned
as the fource of it, but took place in his innocent ftate,
and was prior to the fall of angels ; fo we may well ob¬
serve, that in the creature’s original ftate a neceffity in the
will ox without it muft amount to the fame thing. In fuch
ftate, to fuppofe an indifpofition, or moral inability, or op-
pofition of will to holinefs would be to admit as full an ex¬
cufe as any inability extrinfic to the will can be— it would
be a proper natural neceffity— an original defedt of pow¬
ers or advantages to do what was required.
Might
| Edward, p. 304.
Sect, III.
On Neceffity
Might not then the fall of angels and man have been
prevented ? Mr. Edwards has intimated that it might. If
fo, then it is clear, it could not be neceflary with the irre-
fiftible, abfolute neceffity he pleads for. To fuppofe it
was really neceffiary, though in the loweft degree, * is the
fame as to fuppole it neceffiary in the higheft degree, the
event being alike fureon either fuppofition. To illuftrate
the matter by an inftance from Mr. Edwards. Siippofe a
man required to lift a weight of ioi lb. whofe matural
ftrength is only equal to a weight of ioo lb. he is as really
unable to lift ioi as 1000 lb. And it would be as really
contrary to reafon to require him to lift one pound beyond
his ftrength as nine hundred. Was there a moral inabili¬
ty fimilar to this in our firft parents in their primitive
ftate ? In this cafe “ doing wrong with the will” or “ from
O O 7 '
“ the heart,” would be far from being “ the fum total of
“ the matter,” in our eftimation of blame- worthinefs.
(P. 298, 299.) We naturally afcend to the fource and
fountain of this wrong will or heart, and enquire whe¬
ther the fubjed had the neceffiary means of willing othen-
wife ? If the ftate of his will or heart was originally fixed
by neceffity, common fenfe at once acquits him of blame.
Were angels and our common progenitors thus abandon¬
ed of God !
In the firft fin, there was a want or oppofition of will
to what was required by the Creator. Was this want or
oppofition of will neceffiary before the firft fin took place ?
If not, then there was a freedom from moral neceffity at
Jeaft with refped to the firft ad of fin. Or if the firft
difinclination to, and non-compliance with, duty, was
-founded in neceffity, who placed the creature under that
neceffity ? He muft have had power originally to preferve
-his innocence, or the neceffity of his forfeiting it muft have
been a natural neceffity. Which fide foever Mr. Ed¬
wards’s fcheme embraceth, it is fubverted.
' To evince the confiftency of his dodrine of neceffity
with the higheft worthinefs of praife and moral efteem,Mn
-Edwards takes frequent occafion to obferve, that God
poffeffieth the moft perfed liberty, and is notwithftanding
G rteceffaniy
'*■ Mjral neccifKvt Mr. Edwards fuppofeth, admits of degre<*o
Sect. III.
50 On Neceffity.
neceflarily holy, &c. In the fame view he mentions the
neceflity of Chrift’s holinefs. We grant that God is ne-
cefiarily holy— that Jefus Chrift is fo •, but fee not how
this “ clearly and abfolutely determines the controverfy,”
For,
Firft, Mr. Edwards maintains, that th e perfection of the
divine tinder ft anding is the foundation of the immutable
rcCtitude of his will* Now as the moral intellect in crea¬
tures is fo very imperfeCt, there can be no infering the
neceflity of their wills from the neceflity of the divine.
Mr. Edwards would not fay, that the volitions of holy
angels are determined to the right fide in the fame manner
as the divine will is determined to holinefs. For then
their knowledge muft be perfeCt as his. Or if, notwith-
ftanding the imperfection of their knowledge, their wills
always have been, are, and will be as unalterably deter¬
mined to holinefs, then it muft be in fome other way, on
fome other foundation, equally fure and ftedfaft, not yet
pointed out. Should it befuppoled further, that they are
now confirmed in a ftate of holinefs beyond the poflibility
of a defection ; yet we conjecture that they (as well as
other finite beings) have been, in fome part of their dura¬
tion, upon trial in fuch fenfe as implies danger of mifcar-
ryino*. Beings in their fituation once, have actually fallen.
Secondly, We have no objection to the opinion, that
the reCcitude of the divine will is neceffary. But why this
neceflity fhould be called morale by way ofdiftinCtionfrom
natural , we fee not. When we diftinguifh the moral from
the natural perfections of God, we do indeed fuppofe that
the latter would be no perfections were it not for the for¬
mer. At the fame time, there is an evident contradiction
in; fuppofing a being to exift, poflcfled of the attributes,
which for diftinCtion’s fake are called the natural perfec¬
tions of God, without pofiefling perfeCt moral reCtitude.
Holinefs, juftice, goodnefs belong to the divine nature
as much as power, omnifcience, immenfity, &c. He is
by neceflity of nature holy, juft and good, no lefs than he is,
by the fame neceffity, eternal, infinite, omnipotent, omnif-
cient. When it is laid, God cannot do wickedly, this is to
be underftood as denoting a ftrid neceflity. Who ever
.
' --
.
Sect. III. On NeceJJity. 51
fays, ’Tis morally impoffible for God to lie ? as tho’ ic
were naturally poffible. The terms can , cannot , neceffary*
impoffible , &c. as applied to God, denote no lefs a neceffity
of nature than of will. * Admitting this, ’tis not altoge¬
ther proper to apply to the divine moral reditude the dif-
tindion of natural and moral neceffity. For to fay that
God is holy by the neceffity of his will, is the fame as to
fay he is holy by the neceffity of his nature.
It doth not, however, follow, from the neceffity of the
divine moral rectitude above afferted, that therefore God
could have done in no refped differently from what he
hath. In what properly belongs to moral reditude, we
maintain the neceffity of the divine will, ftridly fpeaking.
But did moral reditude require there ffiould be exadly fo
many orders of creatures — fuch a certain number of
each order— brought into exiftence at fuch certain time
and place — endowed with fuch particular powers and
properties — placed in fuch circumftances ? That there
ffiould be exadly fo many grains of fand, drops of
water, particles of light, &c. &c ? The fcriptures tell
us, that God was able to raife up children to Abraham from
the ftones. If he was able, then he might have done it.
For to lay he is able to do what contradids moral reditude,
is to fay he may deny himfelf, which we know he cannot.
Omnipotence cannot do any thing contradidory to moral
perfedion. But this is very different from faying, that
God adually doth every thing that is poffible with him.
“ To fay that God has exerted his power or his wifdom,
ad ultimum poffie, fo that he can proeeed no further, is to
fay a great deal too much : But we may with reafon affert,
that he has difcovered infinite .wifdom and infinite power j
or in other words, that none but a being poffefied of thefe
perfedions in the higheft poffible degree could have crea¬
ted this ftupendous univerfe.” ff
Jefus Chrift the righteous is alfo holy with the fame
neceffity as is above alcribed to God— not a moral neceffi-
ty
0
* “ If it be the very nature of God to aft juftly and faithfully, la
that he cannot will nor ad othcrwife, it may be called, I think, a na¬
tural neceffity, fince it fprings from his nature ; as well as it may be
called a moral one, becaufe it is the aftion of an intelligent and i i ca
agent. ” Dr. Watts.
t Dr. Eliot’s fermon on natural religioner, io, u.
On Neceffity. Sect. Ill,
• r
ty by way of diftinction from natural, but a real and pro¬
per neceffity. Nor was he upon trial in the fenfe that im¬
plies danger or pcjjibility of mif carrying, as finite beings have
been and are.
Now to fay that the holinefs of angels in heaven is, and
always was, as infallibly and unalterably neceffary as the
holinefs of God and Jefus Chrift, is to lay they never were
capable of fining— and is to make them equal with God,
who chargeth the angels with folly \ in whofe fight the
ftars are not clean. To fay, on the other hand, that the
defection of angels which fell was unalterably neceffary, is
to fay they never were able to Hand in their primitive
ffate ; and is to afcribe their fin and deftruftion, not to
themfelves, but to him who is immutably holy, juft and
good.
There is, indeed, a qualified fenfe in which confirmed an¬
gels and perfected fpirits in heaven may be laid to be ho¬
ly by a neceffity of nature ; having paffed their trial, and
being finally eftablifhed in a ftate of moral reCtitude—-
which admits of endlefs improvement. We may fay, ’tis
their nature to be holy— to be like God. Hence it will
follow, that apoftate fpirits, .and luch from among man¬
kind as have died impenitent, having negleCted and abuled
the time of their yifitation, are, by a like neceffity, enemies
of righteoufnefs, and cannot but remain fo. In neither cafe
was the neceffity original , but the confequence of improving
well or ill a time of previous trial.
The fame thing holds, in a lower degree, with refpect
to feme of mankind in this world. There are thofe the
height of whofe moral attainments and whole eftablifh-
ment in the divine life arefuch, that the allurements and
temptations of the world make but a feeble and tranfient
impreffion on them : Whether the regenerate principle be
or be not, in its own nature, indefectible, Calviniftic dk
vines have univerfally maintained, that the promifeof God
ftands engaged to keep them from falling. On the other
hand, there are thofe who appear to be given over to vile
affeftions— or, if not given up of God to their own heart’s
luft, have proceeded fo far in the paths of error and un-
righteoufnefs, their recovery is become fo extremely diffk,
' - . - v • cult
. V. v, i • ,,
I
53
Sect:. HI.
On N'ecejfity .
cult and improbable, that the words of the prophet are ap¬
plicable, to them. Can theethiopian change his flcin, or the
leopard his fpots ? Long confirmed habit is a kind of fe-
cond: nature : So that both the former and latter may be
faid to have fuperinduced on themfelves a fort of natural
neceffity.
This notion of neceffity Mr. Edwards appears to recur
to through his book. Yet he makes no diftindion between
a neceffity fuppofed to be original, or iuch as is formed and
confirmed by cuftomor ufe-, and the neceffity of moral voliti¬
ons under circumftances altogether diverfe. He proceeds,
for example, on the fuppofition of a ftrid, real and abfolute
neceffity in all thefe cafes. The fins of the unregenerate,
under the greateft illumination and convidion from the
fpirit of God, the flips and failings of the regenerate, and
the firft finful volition, areas really neceffary,on his plan,
as the crimes of abandoned finners and apoftate fpirits.
« xhe will is neceflarily determined, in every one of its
ads, from a man’s firft exiftence, by a c.aufe befide [with¬
out] the will, and a caufe that don’t proceed from, or
depend on, any ad of the will at all.” +
Who can believe Adam’s firft fin, or the flips and defeds
of o-ood men on earth, neceffary with the fame neceffity
as the perverfe wickednefs of abandoned finners and re¬
bel angels ?— that the moral inability of all unregenerate
men is°the fame with that of thofe whom God hath given
over to a reprobate mind ? — that the means and affiftances
of ^ race, either produce their effed neceffanly, lrrenfti-
blv] or have no tendency to excite to that which is the
meat end and defign of them ? Did Mr. Edwards believe
himfelf in thefe things ? that laft mentioned especially. *
Preparatory and regenerating grace are the operation of
the fame fpirit. The tranfition from one to the othei is
not very eafily difeerned. ’Tis a nice thing to draw the
line exadlv between common and fpecial g.ace, admitting
a fpecific difference. Can it yet be faid of unregenerate
men, under thofe influences of the fpirit which Mr. Ed¬
wards alloweth to perfons in their circumftances, that their
moral
| p I I ^
* Vid, fcrmon on jareffing into the kingdom of God«
u
i£
U
(
'
*2# jSE&zMv-
"W ;
• " IS**' . ' > '' ' 1 .
. 'r‘ * '•
54 JNeceffity , Sect; III;
moral inability is like that of thole who have long grieved
ajid quenched the fpirit, and hereby provoked God to take
it from them ? -
But whatever moral inability belongs to unregenerate
men by nature, and notwithftanding the means and affiftan-
ces of grace, nothing is plainer than this, that Calviniftic
divines have ever confidered the inability of mankind to
holinefs as the natural and judicial confequences of fin.
They luppofe thefirftfin of Adam to be the fource of
fuch inability in him, and in his pofterity. They fuppofe
it was not natural to Adam, but is to his defendants.
They don’t reprefent this inability in the race of Adam as
vieerly moral, but as both natural and moral. They e-
qually affert the impotency of the underftanding , as of the
will. Were there occafion, this might be abundantly
fliewn. Yet Mr. Edwards, though he maintains the fame
inability in the creature, while innocent, as in fallen
creatures, and afierts it to be of the moral kind only,
all along holds his own doctrine up to view as the doc¬
trine of Calvinifts ; and reprefents the oppofers of it,
through his whole book, as Arminians, Pelagians, Soci-
nians, Jefuits, &c. With what fairnefs, let the public judge.
By his own conceffion Dr. Watts deferved to be ranked
with writers of a very different clafs. Yet the Doftor’s,
effay on freedom of will is as diverfe from Mr. Edwards
on the will as the Chriftian’s bible is from theMalxometan’s.
He afferted, with the whole current of Calviniftic divines,
both the natural and moral impotency of mankind.* How.
Mr. Edwards could deny the former confidently with ad¬
miring total depravity (which he would be fuppofed to.
believe) is utterly inconceivable. And while he affirms it
to be the dodrine of Calvinifts, That 44 there is need of a
u 'phyfical operation of the fpirit of God on the will,” in;
order to regeneration, why doth he reprefent the inability
of the unregenerate as meerly moral? (P. hi ; 232.)
“ 'Idie molt rigid predeftinarians,33 lays Profeffor Beat-
tie, 46 fuppofe freedom of will to be in one way or other
44 confiftent
* Since Mr. Edwards hath (ligmatized Dr. Watts as an Arminian,
&c. in the article of liberty, the admirers of the former have been
liberal in loading the Dr, with this reproach. A character fo respec¬
table for general literature, undiflembled piety and extenfive ufefqU
aefs3 as well as unfufjpe&ed orthodoxy, merited different treatment.
55
Sect. Ill- On NeceJJity *
“ confiftent with eternal and unconditional decrees : If
“ they cannot explain in what way, they call it a myfte-
“ ry ; it furpaffes their underftanding : But it muft be fo ;
« for otherwife the morality of aftions is altogether incom-
“ prehenfible.” *
In our controverfy with Mr. Edwards, there is, indeed,
no occafion to examine the impotency of fallen man; Ac¬
cording to him, Adam in innocence was morally unable to
retain the fpiritual image of God, with which he is fuppof-
ed to have been endowed. (This muft have been, by the
way, a natural as well as moral inability — an inability oii-
ginal to him, no lefs in his underftanding than in his will.)
If he had power to have viewed things in a different man¬
ner, the fcheme of neceffity is overthrown. His firft want
or oppofition of will to what was required of him was his
firft fin. How came he by this want or oppofition of
will ? It was not original to him, if he was created with
the moral image of God. To the efficient caufe we muft
attribute his firft indifpofition or oppofition to his duty,
whoever or whatever that caufe be. 5Tis indeed abfurd
to fay, that after this oppofition to duty was become effect*
he could have annihilated it, or caufed it not to be. But
might he have preferved the fame actual will to worffiip
and obey God after the exhibition of fatan’s temptation,
as before ? Did the extancy of this temptation in his mind
make or conftitute him a finner ? (No furely ; for our
Lord himfelf was tempted by the devil, yet without fin.)
After the temptation was extant, had he an immediate
power to call the motives of religion to view, and refift the
fuggeftions of the adverfary ? If not, how could fin lie at
his door ? Was his moral inability of his own procuring ?
or could he remove it ? If neither, Mr. Edwards’s diftinc-
tion of natural and moral neceffity muft appear trifling.
“ The ftate of the moral world depends on the ufe they
“ make of natural agency, and fo depends on their voli-
“ tions,” (Edwards p. 162.) which volitions are indepen¬
dent of themfelves, and proceed from an cxtrinfic caufe —
even from him who gave them being. On this plan na¬
tural
* Beattie on>truth p. 310. 3d. edit.
•f Edwards, p. 103.
$5 On Neceffity. Sect. Ill*
tural beauty or deformity, fuperior natural underftanding
or the want of common, high or low birth, great wealth or
extreme poverty, bodily health or ficknefs, are as much
virtuous or vicious, in relation to the fubjeft, as any moral
qualities whatever. ' .d
Some European writers of late years have made much
ufe of the diftinftion of natural and moral neceffity : .But
it is manifeft for a pretence only. They plainly fuppoft
natural and moral neceffity do not materially differ •, and
maintain neceffity in fuch fenie as renders the exiftence of
fin, even in their own apprehenfions, impoffible. Particu¬
larly Mr. Hume, and the author of the letters on the origin
of evil. The latter boldly afferts, * that “ omnipotence
was obliged, either to afflict innocence , or be the caufe of
wickednefs ; it plainly hath no other option : What then
tc could infinite wifdom, juftice and goodnefs do in this
£C fituation more confident with itfelf, than to call into being
creatures formed with fuch depravity in their difpofttions , as
*c to induce many of them to aft in fuch a manner as to
tc render themfelves proper fubjefts for neceffary fuffer-
cc ings— juft punifhments ?55 Can this author be tho5t to
be ferious ? Could he believe that creatures formed wicked
' originally may be on that account the objefts of juft punifh-
ment ? With the Pagan orator, he refolves all into divine
neceffity and fatality.
“ The fcheme of neceffity in the aftions of an intelligent
cc being, or that all our volitions, determinations and ac~
*c tions proceed from God, as infruftrable effedh from
4C their proper caufe, hath hitherto been embraced by a
u very few, except infidels , and thofe of the moft malignant
u clafSy who have very confidently given up the doftrine
of future punifhment. In this they difeover that they*
have more juft and honorary thoughts of God, than
« thofe Chriftians, who firft make God the author of fin,
44 and then reprefent him as infiifting eternal punifhment
u on men for it *, for that which is originally, and in ftrift
“ conftruftion, his own aft.55 Mr. Howe calls it “a black
“ conception of God, that he fhould be fuppofed irreftk
bly to determine the will of man to the hatred of his
: : *own
* P. 103, 104.
57
S;ect. III. On Neceffity.
“ own moll blcfled felf, and then to exact the fevereft pun-
“ ifhments for the offence done. We fhould rather chufe”
“ fays he “ to have our fight, hearing, and motive power,
“ or what not befides, difputed or even torn away from
“ us, than even fuffer ourfelves to be difputed into a be-
“ lief, that the holy and good God lhould irrefiltibly de-
“ termine the wills of men to, and punifh the fame
“ thing. ” £
Whether certainty and neceffity are the fame, as Mr.'
Edwards infills, we referve for enquiry under die feftion
on foreknowledge.
'
t Dr. Eliot’s fermon on natural religion, p. 19, 20 ,
H
SECTION
/
- -
( 58 )
•> •
SECTION IV.
On the origin of evil.
MR. Edwards’s opinion on this fubjedt is, that “ fin
“ infallibly followed from God’s ordering man’s
« circumftances when he made him, and withholding or
<*c withdrawing divine influence and afiiitance. This he
otherwife expreffeth by faying that “ fin arofe from the im-
“ perfedtion which properly belongs to a creature, as
“ fuch.” J Again to the fame purpofe, (p. 365.) “ Sin
“ arifeth from the withholding of the adtion and energy or
« the mod High, and — neceffarily follows on the want of
“ his influence” — Men never commit fin, but only when
« God leaves them to themfelves, and neceffarily fin when
« he doth fo”— (p. 403 •, 405.) “God’s own immediate con-
“ dudt is original in the feries of events— in his providence
“ he decifively ordereth all the volitions of moral agents.”
Yet he allows' not that “ fin is the fruit of any pofitive
“ agency or influence of the mod High.” Upon the
whole, he takes frequent occafion to illuftrate his doctrine
concerning the exiftence of fin by obferving, that there is
a vaft difference between the full's being the caufe of light
and warmth in the day, by its prefence and pofitive in¬
fluence ; and its being the occafion of darknels and froft
in the night, by defending below the horizon. _ Hence he
fuopofeth, that “ no adtion of the divine being is the pro-
54 per caufe, efficient or prociucer of tnc evil of men s wills.
In thefe things vve doubt not it may be made to ap¬
pear, that he alike contradidts himfelf, and the foundation
principles of reafon and religion.
Firft, He contradicts himfelf. We fhall take notice on¬
ly of two refpedts in which he doth fo. His own illuftra-
tion of the lubjedt goes upon the luppofition,
V x ) That tiie exiftence of fin is the conference meerly
1 Z . ' • • of
Sect. IV.
53
The origin of evil .
of fomething negative on God’s part, or follows from the
want of his influence, and from this only . Whereas Mr.
Edwards conftantly afierts, that God is the determiner , or¬
der er, and decifive difpofer of this event. ’Tis not fufficient
with him to fay, that God is “ the permitter, or not a hin-
“ derer of fin ;” but he is careful immediately to add, “ and
“ at the fame time a difpofer of the date of events, in fuch
“ a manner, that fin will moft certainly and infallibly fol-
46 low.” (P. 3 57, 367.) Nowfis God’s determinings order¬
ing and actually difpofmg things in his providence, in a deci-
Jive manner, a meer negative ? Doth not his ordering and
difpofmg an event, with all the previous circumftances,
imply fomething more than forbearing to aft ? even his
influence and energy, or aftive providence therein ? Are
the determinations and decrees of God, the difpofitions of his
providence, nothing pcfitive ? Mr. Edwards faith exp refs-
ly, cc To direfit, decide , or determine any thing, is to aft.”
(P. 51.) He connefts the active and permiffive providence
of God— -maintains an efficient determination of, and effi¬
cacious providence in fin.
2. Admit the exiftence of fin to be the confequence, not
of any pofitive influence of the deity, but to follow only
from his forbearing:; to influence and affift the creature, in
like manner as darknefs and froft in the night follow upon
the departure of the fun— admit that God is not the efficient
caufe of fin *, it will then follow, that the finful being him-
felf muft be this caufe. Now to fay that the perpetrator
of wickednefs is the efficient caufe of it, is to eftablifh a
power of f elf -determination, contrary to the principal defign
of Mr. Edwards’s book. Pie muft either maintain the
pofitive energy and aftion of the deity in the introduftion
of fin into the world, or elfe admit that it arofe from a caufe
in the mind of the finner— -in other words, that he was felf-
determined. And tho5 this would involve his fcheme in
the abfurdity he fpeaks of, p. 7. that the will “ afts and
“ produceth effefts upon itfelf, and is the objeft of its own
influence and adtion,” yet there is no evading it. The
attor, agent, or doer of fin, as Mr. Edwards fpeaks, can¬
not, according to him, be the efficient caufe of it. Either
then.
g© . i the origin of evil Sect. IV.
then the deity is, in this fenfe, the caufe and author of fin,
or it hath no proper caufe at all. *
Secondly, His doftrine is repugnant to the fundamental
and moft important principles ot reafon and religion. It
is afcribing fin as really, and in as obnoxious a fenfe, to
God, as to affirm, his pofitive agency and efficiency herein.
Mr. Edwards would have been more confident with him-
felf, had he embraced the latter opinion. His fcheme can
hang together on no other fuppolition. And on this lup-
pofition, the moral perfections and government of God,
and revealed religion, muft be difbelieved.
But his doarine refpefting the manner of fin’s coming
into exiftence ffiall be examined fomewhat diftin&ly.
If fin arofe from God’s withdrawing his affiitance and
influence, it will then follow that the creature had origi¬
nally fuch influence and affiftance as was fufficient to 'pre¬
vent apoftacy, Otherwife this would not be the confe-
quence of the withdraw of divine influence, but more pro¬
perly the confequence of the deficiency of fuch. influence.
And the cafe of the fun’s departure from our horizon would
be very impertinently ufed to exemplify this event. For
fuppofe the creature never had fufficient divine influence
and afliftance to fecure his primitive rectitude, his date
would have been analogous to primitive darknefs and e-
ternal night. And becaufe he did not walk in the light
of the fun, without having ever enjoy’d its enlivening,
beams, he is configned (or obnoxious) to blacknefs of
darknefs forever.
If therefore there is any pertinency in the inflance Mr.
Edwards
* Bv the caufe of a moral volition, Mr, Edwards faith he fome-
times means only an antecedent or occafion of fuch volition^ not
th'.nr? “ which has a pofitive efficiency or influence to produce i t-— d
adduceth the beforementioned inflance of the fun in illuftration.
When he affirms that thehigheft motive is the caufe of, and necelianly
determineth volition, doth he mean that it is a caufe in the fame lenfe
only as the departure of the fun is the caufe of darknefs and froit in
the night ? Doth be mean by motive nothing pofitive ? nothing that
moniu the mind determined by it? nothing that influenceth, order etby
meat and dijpojetb volition ? Or if he really means by it fome
influence ^ (which furely he dpth) would he admit that the conduit o,
tr(e Deity determined the cxiflence of fin in this manner ? If not Wittt
(determinate meaning hath the word caufe, as ufed by him ?
r, y * J ' »
Sect. IV.
"The origin of evil.
Edwards brings, the creature once had fuch light, influ¬
ence and afliftance as might have forever fecured his in¬
tegrity. Confequently, the apoftacy might have been pre¬
vented. The only enquiry is, whether it were owing to
God, or the creature. Mr. Edwards maintains it was ow¬
ing to the former. Let us fee whether his opinion be re-
concileable with the wifdom, holinefs and goodnefs, or e-
ven ju Alice of God.
To fay that the apoftacy was the confequence of God’s
forbearing to communicate his influence and afliftance,
yet that it was a blameable thing in the creature, is notlefs
glaringly falfe and impious than it would be to fay, that
God requires a rational conduct of thofe whom he hath
not endowed with the natural underftanding of men—
or that he requires moral exerciles and behaviour of the
brute creatures— or requires a creature to live after he hath
taken away the breath of life. Either would be contrary
to reafon and juftice— to demand more than was given —
contrary to that fixed rule of divine government, To him
that hath fhall be given, and he fhall have abundance.
Again, we might much more confittently fuppofe, that
God would have put an end to the exiftence of a rational
creature, than have continued fuch an one in being
and withdraw^ his influence, previous to any diredt
forfeiture on the creatures part. The latter would imply
injuftice : But the former might not. Exiftence being a
free gift at firft, the continuance of it would have been
fo, had the creature not finned. The creator might have
difcontinued it without doing any wrong, even fuppofing
fin had not taken place. But to continue the creature in
being, and withhold divine influence from him, in confe¬
quence of which he is neceflarily plunged into a ftate of
fin, mifery and defperation, would be to give and con¬
tinue being on terms worfe than not to be at all. If there
is no reafon for the former fuppofition j much lefs is there
for the latter.
This dodtrine gives us fuch an idea of the parent of the
univerfe as ftiocks the firft principles of reafon, and con¬
tradicts the cleareft notices God has given of himfelf by
the light of nature and fcripture. Moral agents are the off-
fjPri”S
6 2 2lfo wf*# (9/ m7. Sect. IV.
fpring of God., Now is it indeed true, that th t father of the
whole family in heaven and earth calls off his children be¬
fore they have done any thing to forfeit his paternal care,
or incur his fatherly difpleafure ? Is their forfaking him
tiie confeq uence of his firft leaving them ? Doth he expofe
them defcncelefs, and call them off as orphans, that they
xnay, in confequence of his dereliftion, forget and forfake
him, and then be thruft out from his family, and treated
as baftards and renegades ! Is this to reprefent the parent
of angels and men in an honorable light ! Can fuch a
thought fit eafy on the mind ! Do not reafon and re-
« • « _ »
hgion turn from the hideous fight with abhorrence ! Is
this the reprefentation given us of God in the holy fcrip-
rures ? Do they inftruft us, that he firft forfook his rati¬
onal offspring, and that, as the confequence of this, they
foriook him ? Do they not, on the contrary, teach us,
The Lord is with you, while ye be with him ? and if ye feek
him , he will be found of you j but if ye forfake him , he will for¬
fake you ? As a father pitieth his children, fo the Lord pi-
tieth them that fear him. Yea, earthly parents may for¬
get ^ yet will not he forget : For his compactions fail not.
Fhefe things confirm our natural apprehenfions ot God ;
and fhew, that there could not be the lead danger of God’s
withdrawing his influence and afiiftance from the creature,
had not the creature firft departed from him.
Mr. Edwards’s fuppofition, that creatures 44 never com-
cc mit fin, but only when God leaves them to themfelves,
cc and neceffarily fin when he doth fo,5’ leaves no room
for a diftindiion between the cafe of an innocent creature ,
and that of thole from whom God withdraws the affift-
ances of his grace in confequence of obftinate impiety and
wukednefs , and as the punifhment thereof •, whom he is faid
to give up to their own hearts lull, to walk in their own.
counfel— Or that of rebel angels, whom he hath referved
in chains under darknefs, unto the judgment of the great
day. Surely there is a difference, and one of great im¬
portance, in thde cafes. Can we fuppofe that the off-
tpring of God, in their primitive ftate, were left to them¬
felves in that awful manner which abandoned finners and
devils are ? But what difference is there3 if we admit Mr.
Edwards’s.
Sect. IV.
^he origin of evil . 63
Edwards’s fcheme ? Can we think of the prefent ftate of
rebel angels, with the judgment that awaits them, and
believe that their fall, their prefent condition, and the
torments to which they are deftined, are the confe-
quence of God’s firft departing from them-— withdrawing
his influence, fupport and energy, and leaving them
to themfelves ! To fuppole that fin firft came into the
world through the want of divine influence and afliftance ;
and then reflect on the terrible punifhments of it in this
and the eternal world, exhibits fuch a charatfter of the
creator and governor of the world, that univerfal fcepti-
cifm is preferable to fuch a fcheme. We mean not to “fet
“ forth this dodtrine in colours” more “ fhocking to the
<c imagination, and moving to the paflions,” than it de-
ferves. ’Tis impoffible. We mifreprefent it no other-
wife than in not painting it in it’s true horrid colours.
This will be allowed, if it can be fhewn, as we now pro-
p°fe,
That to aferibe the origin of evil to the want of divine
influence and afliftance is not materially different from af-
cnbing it to the pojitive energy and efficiency of God. For
Mr. Edwards connedls with “ the want or withholding of
iC divine influence,” the divine determhiation , ordering and
difpofal of fin, with all the cireumftances leading to it, fo
as infallibly and neceffarily to bring it to pais. He afierts
an efficacious ptrmiffion of fin-— and fuppofeth that a train
was laid from the beginning of the world to bring to pafs
the firft fin, and, in confequence of that, every one that
hath fucceeded, cr fhall fucceed, to the end of time. His
“ own immediate conduct is original in the feries, either
“ his adting, or • forbearing to ad.” * On
* Mr. Edwards faith indeed, “ G )d don’t will fin as fin.” It is
above our comprehenfion, that the Deity fhouid will, orde. and deter¬
mine that a&ion in the creature, whi'ch cannot be done without fin,
and not at the fame time will the fin of it — as Juppofe theft, adultery,
murder, blafphemy. Efpecially as the a6t<on is fuppokd to be nscef^
f&ry > and this neceffity inapofed by the Deity — and the perpetrator of
the wicked deed wills it no otherwife than as luch a will is produced
in him by an extrinfic caufe. But admitting this dillindlion, Mr. Ed¬
wards’s fcheme will be (till embarrafled. For on this fuppofition,
how many efledls are there without a caufe ? as many as there arc fins
of men and devils. For they,, it is fa<d, “ will fin as fin.” But God
doth not determine, order, difpofe, defign or will this wicked will of
theirs, Confequenfly, in willing fin at Jin moral agents are felFdc-
tcr.mine<'.
64 The origin of evil Sect. IV,
On thefe things we obferve, that divine communicatF
ons were as neceiiary to preierve innocent beings in a ftate
of rectitude, as they are to fupport and perfect the fpiri-
tual life in the regenerate, who are kept by the power of
God. But if the creator not only withdrew his influence
and afliftance from upright beings, or forbore to aft in
their behalf ; but alfo in his providence fo ordered and dif-
pofed the circumftances previous to the apoftacy, as deci-
fively and neceffarily enfured this event, what fhall we fay ?
Will it not follow, that there is unrighteoufnefs with God ?
For the fame duty was required after the withdraw of
divine afliftance ; as before. The confequence of which
is, that the duty required of beings in a ftate of reftitude
exceeded their abilities. For the creature might as well
continue to live, after God taketh away his breath, as
continue holy after the withdraw of divine influence. We
might juft as reafonably fuppofe him to be culpable for
that aft of God which puts an end to his life, as for the
forfeiture of primitive righteoufnefs through an aft of di¬
vine forbearance, in withholding the afliftances of grace.
The reprefen tation Mr. Edwards’s fcheme gives us of
the wife and good governor of the univerfe is fummarily
this, By the fufpenfion of divine influence, beings made
holy become unholy, no longer capable of holy exercifes—
every imagination of their hearts only evil continually —
dead in fin— obnoxious to all the difmal effefts of God’s
wrath in this world and that to come— and an innumera¬
ble
termincd, or not determined at all. They are themfelves the caufe
of the <ivickednefs of their wills, or it hath no caufe. But how is this
reconcilcabie wuh that decifive determining providence refpedling
every event, which Mr. Edwards undertakes to defend? Moral events
he mnntains, confjlt not in the fortnal a<ft ; but in the internal dif-
pefition and Jlate of the <w'dl. Therefore, if the Deity wills only the
material adions or vicious moral agents, then he does not will moral
evil, or fin. He cannot will fin at all, unlefs he wills the inward ex*
erciics ot the hyrrt, feparate from which fin hath no exigence. Is
the finfuinefi of trie volitions of moral agents a thing which God wil-
Jeth ? an event which he determineth ? If it be, where is the difference
between this, and his willing fin, or being bimjelf the fubjett of a
hnfu! volition r If he that willeth fin doth not will its finfulnefs, hovy
can fin then exifl ? On the contrary, if the finfulnefs of the volitions
of moial agents be not an event which God willeth or determine^
then he doth not will or determine any moral events of this kind.
Sect. IV\ The origin cf evil. &5
b!e progeny involved with them in the fame deplorable cir-
cumftances. — All in confequence of being forfaken of theif
creator and father, before any thing had been done by
them to expofe them to fuch a dereliction. This derelic¬
tion was the next and immediate caufe of the frrft fin of
mankind, and by confequence of all after fins.
No reafon can, indeed, be given why divine influence & af¬
fiftance fhould btwithdrawntrom men and angels antecedent
to their fall, which would not equally juftify the governor of
the world had he never imparted fuch influence and affift-
ance to them. And fuppofe the cafe had been fo, would
their departure from righteoufnefs have been their fault,
when they never had the neceffary means of attaining to,
or continuing in it ? To fay that their defection “ arofe
“ from the imperfection which properly belongs to a
6C creature, as fuch,55 wou’d not at all relieve the difficulty-
For this wou’d be faying that fin properly arofe from the
creature’s original frame. And if it arofe from a defeCt in
this, who but the author of his frame could be in fault ?
The creature cannot be anfwerable for more than he hath
received. This way of accounting for the origin o f mo¬
ral evil is very Angular as well as impious. ’Tis to ac¬
count for its exiftence in a way that denies the poffibility
of its taking place in the creation. Now where is the dif¬
ference between faying, that the want of divine influence
and affiftance was the ground and reafon of the apoftacy *,
and faying, that fuch influence and affiftance was from the
beginning denied the creature ? Is there a difference that in the
leaft affeCh any doCtrine of religion ? On either fuppofl-
tion the Deity is made the pofitive caufe and fountain of
moral evil— or it hath no proper caufe — or it doth not
exift. The firft of thefe Mr. Edwards's fcheme embrac¬
ed!, while it feems to deny it : And this is what we ron-
teft with him. He denies that moral agents are themf elves
the efficient caufe of their own vicious volitions *, as it is
certain this would imply a power of felf-determination in
them : Now if they are not the efficients or their own fins,
the Deity muftbe*, elfe fin would have no efficient caufe
at all— every fin would be an effedt without a caufe— to
fay which, we agree with Mr. Edwards, would fee abiurd.
I Admitting
66
Sect. IV,
T’he bright of evil
Admitting then, that God is the efficient caufe of fin,
mediately or immediately, what is this but faying that he
is xhz producer 2.n<\ author of it ? Is not the efficient caufe
of an effect the producer and author of that effeCt ? And
can we fay that God produceth fin without attributing to
him the fin produced ? If the perpetrator of wickednefs is
only the fubjeCt of certain effects from the operation of
the fupreme caufe, how can we aferibe moral blame to
him ? This doCtrine of the efficiency of God in moral evil
deftroys his own moral character, and renders it importa¬
ble that the creature fiiould be a moral agent. It is to aferibe
the fin of man to God in fuch a fenfe as we cannot attribute
it to the devil, without bringing a railing accufaiion againjl
him . For he can only tempt men to fin : He is not the
efficient or producer of it— -has not power over their voli¬
tions and actions— cannot command their choice. Thefe
are referved in their own power, notwithstanding the fol-
licitations of the devil. Every man is then tempted, when
he is drawn away of his own lufts and enticed . Shall we then,
by faying that God is the efficient caufe of fin, reproach
our maker in a manner which a good man would not re¬
proach even the enemy of all righteoufnefs ?
When Mr. Edwards faith, that “ fin arofe from the im-
“ perfection which properly belongs to creature, as fuch
we fuppofe he means the fame as when he faith it arofe
from the want or withholding of divine influence and al-
fiftance. If by imperfection no more had been meant than
the want of abfolute perfection-— or had he only meant to
fay, that the creature was not made incapable of fining*
\ve fiiould have had no difpute with him on this point.
But if by imperfection be intended a want of original pow¬
ers and advantages ;o do the duty the Creator required, we
by no means admit this, and deny that fuch “ imperfection
“ properly belonged to the creature as it would be
to aferibe arbitrary requirements to the moft High, all
v/hofe ways are judgement. Yet Mr. Edwards mult be
fuppofed to aflert the creature’s imperfection in this fenfe,
inafmuch as he connects herewith God’s “ fo ordering his
circumftances” in his innocent ftate, “and withhold-
6f in^r. divine influence,” that herefrom “ fin infallibly and
“ necejfarily followed.” It
SlCT. IV.
The origin of evil. &7
If the creature originally had fufficient divine influence
and afliftance, we may lay, that to continue holy was “what
properly belonged to him as ” a creature. This may
be faid with more evident propriety than the contrary.
For this was his duty . He had a capacity and advantages
for it. It was the end of his formation in the image of
God. It would have been his perfection, glory and felici¬
ty. The degradation of his nature and turning his glory
into fhame, did not properly belong to him . What properly
belonged to him muft have been his perfections not his im¬
perfection. Sin did not properly belong to him. It was
contrary to his nature and bias confidered as endowed
with the fpiritual and moral image of God. Angels and
men were made perfeCt in their order > as creatures, howe¬
ver capable of improvement, both intellectual and moral.
They were, in this fenfe, perfect, till iniquity was found
in them. God’s work (what is properly his) is perfeCt—
that part efpecially which he created in his own image. Sin,
therefore, could not proceed from any defect in his co-n¬
it itution— from unavoidable imperfection. The imper¬
fection of the creature, as fuch , i. e. as a creature, is una¬
voidable, in a natural as well as moral fenfe. If therefore
“ fin arofe from the imperfection proper to the creature,
“ as fuch,” then it was neceflary by a natural neceflity—
which on all principles of morality and religion (even on
Mr. Edwards’s) is a full excufe : That is, fin could not
have been at all on Mr. Edwards’s plan. For what fully
excufeth, and takes away all blame, is inconfiftent with
the being of fin.
What fhall we then fay to a fcheme which makes the
exiftence of fin the inevitable confequence of the deficiency
of that nature the creature received immediately from God,
and of thofe circumftances wherein he was originally plac¬
ed ? Wherein doth it effentially differ from the fuppofiti-
on that men and angels were flrft “ made with a fixed pre -
“ vailing principle of fin in the heart ?” Man never had
fufilcient divine influence and afliftance in order to his be¬
ing and continuing holy, according to Mr. Edwards’s opi¬
nion of original imperfection. For tho’ he feems to fup-
pafehe had3 by attributing fin to the withdraw of divine
influence
63 • The origin of evil Sect. IV.
\ 'r' ~ *
influence ; yet he immediately denies it by faying, that fin
arofe from the imperfe&ion properly belonging to the
creature, as a creature : That is, as a creature he was de¬
ficient to the purpofes of holinefs, both in refpedt of ori¬
ginal powers and divine affiftance ; and God, by his effica¬
cious providence, fo ordered his circumftances, that he was
under an original necefiity of fining— a neceffity refusing
immediately from a defeat of nature and advantages _
that is, from God the author of his nature ♦, and dilpofer
of his circumftances. Now what material difference is
there between forming an intelligent creature fo, that from
the imperfedion properly belonging to him, and the cir¬
cumftances he is placed in, the want of divine affiftance3
he neceffarily fins * and creating of him with an evil difpo-
fiuon ? If there is no material difference, and if on the lat¬
ter fuppofition the Creator muft be the efficient and foun¬
tain of fin, then this is alfo the confequence on the former
fuppofition. To fuppofe fin really proceeds from God, is
to fuppofe he is the author and caufe , whether it be fup-
ppfed to proceed from him diredtly or indirefrly— imme¬
diately, or mediately and remotely. To fay that it pro.
ceeds from him in either way, is to fay he is the efficient
and fountain of it— the adlor and exercifer of wickednefs.
Mr. Edwards allows, that “ the caufe which produced!
wickednefs may be wicked : A caufe may be to
blame for being the caufe of vice.53 g
On the whole, his dofrrine, while it acquits the creature
from all blame, impeacheth the Creator as the pofitive
caufe and fource of the revolt of angels and mankind, and
ultimately fixeth all the criminality in the imiverfeon him.
How infinitely reproachful muft that fcheme of doctrine
be, which involveth fo horrid and blafphemous an imputa¬
tion on the fupream creator and governor of the univerfe,
who will he juftified when he fpeaketb , and clear when he
judge th ! Por if men and devils are indeed deftined to do
.fcll their abominations, how then Jhall God judge the world ?
Doth he exert as real an influence in moral evil, as in na¬
tural good and evil— as in the confervation of natural life ?
Why then are not moral . agents culpable for continuing
■%
Sect. IV. Thd origin of evil. %
to exift becaufe God’s vifitation prefer ves them, as for
going on in fin through his energy and influence ? Did
he, who at firft commanded the light to fhine out of dark-,
nels, in the fame manner produce a contrary effeft in the
moral world, by the withdraw of his prefence, and faying*
“ Let there be fin,” involving the moral creation in black-
nefs of darknefs ! What a defiance muft fuch a fuppofi-
tion be to the firft dictates of reafon ! What a contradic¬
tion to the holy fcriptures ! where we are taught, God
cannot he tempted with evil , neither tempteth he any man.
Shall any man then prefume to fay, when he is tempted , /
am tempted of God ? But what lefs doth the dodtrine before
us amount to than this, that God fecretly defigns all moral
evil ; placeth temptations to it before his creatures in an
irrefiftible manner ; and deferts them in the hour of dan¬
ger ? What impiety is this ! Were fuch things fpoken
againft God by the openly profane and ungodly, the injury
and reproach would be comparatively fmall. But when
they are faid under a notion of honoring his name and go¬
vernment, by the profeffed friends of religion, we muft
beg leave to think, that the utmoft candor can find no
fufficient excufe for thofe who are bold and pofitive herein.
Humility and mcdejly in difquifitions of this kind will al¬
ways be applauded by the wife and good ; but cffuranct
and confidence in aflerting, that God is the caufe and pro-
f ducer of moral evil ; accompanied v/ith uncharitablenefs
towards thofe who cannot believe fuch dcxftrine, muft be
very forbiding. Holy and reverend is his name. When
we fpeak of his counfels and determinations, the ends and
reafons of his government, it fhould be with much diffi¬
dence— -with jealoufy and godly fear, left we fhould re¬
proach and difhonor him, whofe glory is above the hea¬
vens. Counfel may be darkened by multiplying words*
and ignorance and temerity manifefted rather than know¬
ledge and piety. Behold ! God is great, and we know
him not. How fmall a proportion have we heard of him ?
Canft thou by fearching find out God ! 'This , however, we
clearly know, that God cannot do wickednefs, and hath
nopleafure therein ; but delighteth in exercifing judgment*
nghteoufnefs and loving-kindnefs in the earth.
Some'
Sect. IV.
The origin of evil.
tc
(C
Some, with a view to exalt divine fiovereignty , may have
detracted from the moral perfections of the Deity, which
are his glory. Is it not far more honorary to his glorious
name and character to conceive of him as the parent of
the univerfe ? to reprefent him like a prince who is the
father of his people, and accounts it his glory to advance
their happineis— rather than a tyrannical, arbitrary prince,
who aims only at his own grandeur, and the difplay of his
own power, inftead of the good of his fubjefts, having no
other meafures of governing than caprice and licentious
will ? If the former reprefentation excites the greateft re¬
verence, efteem and confidence in an intelligent mind, it
Is moft worthy to be aferibed to our maker.
Mr. Edwards agrees with the writer of the letters on the-
origin of evil in rejecting the ufual folution, which derives
fm from the abule of free-will. And when the latter puts
the queftion, Can it proceed from a wile, “ a juft, and a
u benevolent God ? Can fuch a God form creatures with
difpoficions to do evil •, and then punilh them for acting
in conformity to thofe evil difpofitions” ? the reader
will Hand amazed at the anfwer, which is in the following
words : “ Strange and aftonilhing indeed mnft this appear
to us, who know fo little of the univerfal plan ! but is
far , I think, from being irreconcileable with the juftice of
the fupream difpofer of all things— Omnipotence is oblig-
“ ed to afflict innocence, or be the caufe of wickednefs *, it
hath plainly no other option.” * We lhall take the li¬
berty, having had frequent occafion to quote this author,
to give the reader a concife view of his general fcheme.
Taking his lead from this principle, that all evil, natu¬
ral and moral, political and religious, arifeth from the ne~
cefiary imperfection of creatures, he endeavours to ihew*
that all government among men is founded in violence and
corruption , and all religion in delufion and abfurdity — that
our vices are the lupport of government, our follies the pre-
fervationof religion f— that religion, particularly Chrifti-
anity, is deficient in every principle requilite to its anfwering
fts own end J — that natural evil was unpreventable by
God’s power, and moral evil expedient in confiequen'ce of
natural-
a
* P. ioi, 503. f Ibid. 89; ; 138. J Ibid. p. i 64.
• -N- ' - •'***,'*
v n. .
SECT. IV.
The origin of evil
7l
natural~~that with regard to God, vice is the confequence
of mifery — that God is, and muft be, the author of fin , as
the contrary would be to fay, that fomething exifts with¬
out any caufe at all — that he is the author of all natural
evil, and in the fame manner , on the fame principle , the author
of all moral evil— that he made creatures with morally evil
difpofitions * — This fcheme, the author affirms, is the only
one, on which the dodtrines of original fin, predeftination
and redemption can be vindicated— that Chriftianity can
be defended on no other plan, -f On the fame general
principle, the necefiary imperfedtion of the creature, this
writer endeavours to eitabliffi the dodtrine of tranfmigration. ,
and an eternal fuccefiion of fiates. (P, 55, — 75.) What
friend he was to Chrijlianity ', or even to natural religion , let
the reader judge ! £ But this author’s principles will have
a firm fupport,. if once we admit thofe of Mr. Edwards
on the fame fubjedt. It is a matter of notoriety, that fome
writers in Europe, who have of late years diftinguifhed
themfelves in the caufe of irreligion and fcepticifm, (both
before and fince Mr. Edwards’s book appeared) have
built on the fame foundation of neceffity. ’Tisto be la¬
mented, when the friends and public teachers of religion
adopt and fet themfelves to defend, a fcheme of dodfrine
which gives countenance to infidelity. There are thofe a-
mong ourfelvcs who have the confidence to infult the re¬
ligion of their country and the bible, by publickly deli¬
vering the fame dodtrine, for fubftance, as the aforefaid
author, with little relerve. There is feafon to apprehend
people may foon be taught from the pulpit, in fo many
words, that almighty God firft infufed wickednefs into
the creature. It is unhappy Mr. Edwards’s book lias gi¬
ven
* Ibid, p, 11 ; I©},— 109. f Ibid. p. 112, — 120.
I This writer has, however, been kind enough to caution us a-
gainft inhering, that the necefjuy of vice and punifhment make any
alteration in their natures with regard to man” — and lays, it ‘4 doth
** not in the lead extenuate men’s guilt. Men may be made Mined
“ t0 ?jce' ,n order to ^nder them proper objeds of fuch a degree of
“ ropery as — was previoujly determined for the fake of public "ood _
•‘that though fin in us is evil and puniftuble ; in God it is not fo.”
(P. 107, 108 ; I 10.) Mr, Edwards’s ditlin^uiftiing the nature of fm
from it s cauie~h,s faying that God wills fin, bur roc as fin— that
fin u tor the bell, are equivalent pefitions*
;?3:;
. -
The origin of evil. Sect. IV.
ven fo much countenance to this profane, blafphemous
tenet. It feems better not to believe a God, than to enter¬
tain fuch an opinion concerning him. Whether this be
not the refult of Mr. Edwards’s fcheme, we are content
the impartial fhould determine.
We have now offered the reafons of our diffent from
Mr. Edwards refpe&ing the origin of evil. We are fully
perfuaded it did not, could not, come into exiftence in the
Way he fuppofeth— Yet how it in fact came to pafs, that
beings made upright have fallen, we acknowledge is to
us incomprehenfible — and apprehend it is fo to any hu¬
man underftanding •, not excepting theirs who have at¬
tempted to account for it. There is a fenfe in which it
is doubtlefs true, that fin “ arole from the imperfedtion
“ of the creature ; ” that is, the creature was not made
incapable of fining. He was originally endowed with a
freedom to holinefs or fin : He might have chofen the for¬
mer, though eventually he chofe the latter. His felicity
Or mifery was made to depend on his own election. There
Was no want of original powers and divine communica¬
tions in order to his continuance in a ftate of moral recti¬
tude. It therefore remains, that moral evil arole from a
negleft or perverjion of the powers and divine communi¬
cations he had in innocence. Angels and men might have
continued holy •, but mifimproved the gifts of God, and
thus forfeited his influence and friendihip. So fai feems
clear : And this is fufficient to vindicate the providence
of God in permitting fin and mifery to enter into the world.
How it came to pafs, that liberty was originally abufed,
feems to be a matter of unprofitable fpeculation. To
t’nofe who rejedt this folution of the mattei, and obj cct,
that fin could not ariie from the abufeof liberty, fome
farther reply may, however, be made in the ninth lection,
N. B. In our examination of Mr. Edwards, (p. 64.;
it was incidentally noted from him, that God decifivel/
orders all the volitions of moral agents by a pofitive in¬
fluence”— he adds in the place refered to, “ or permiffion.
We truft it has been fully Ihewn, that he intends an effica¬
cious permiffion— to “ decide, determine, dired, is to aft.
i
73
Sect. IV. The origin of evil.
as he faith himfelf. At the fame time he makes a diftinc-
tion, it fhould feem, between an efficacious permiffion, a
decifive efficient determination, and pofitive influence. This
diftindion we had not fo particularly attended to. And
though we lee not the lead room for it, and have no doubt
but what he has faid clearly implies a pofitive influence of
the Deity in fin •, yet on reviling the aforefaid quotation
we find he meant hot to exprefs it. We readily take this
opportunity to corred the undefigned mifreprefentation,
and wifh we could fay his dodrine doth not contain the
thing, which was not meant to be explicitly affirmed;
Some of the advocates for his fcheme maintain a pofitive
influence of the Deity in finful volitions, and fay it was
his real opinion, that God is the efficient caufe of fin.
c
SECTION
safes E&
i ■ i
t, v r
• ( 74 )
; • ' * C - ** •
SECTION V,
► < *»
On the connection between the nature and
caufe of volition.
>• 1 » j ■ • • ». 1 j.
IT is a favourite diftinction with Mr. Edwards, that
“ the offence of vertue and vice lies in the nature of
“ volition, not in the caufe We before took fome flight
notice of the futility of this diftinction. We knew, in¬
deed, that the coniiftency of Mr. Edwards’s fcheme de¬
pended not a little on the propriety of diftinguifhing the
nature ot moral actions from their caufe : But had we re-
prefented fuch a diftirfetion as really important, upon his
plan, poflibly it might have been efteem’d invidious.
However, we are now conftrained to fay, fuch a reprefen-
tation wou’d have been the exaCt truth. And though we
ftill think the diftincftion futile and evaflve, yet we have a
reafon, which we had not when we wrote before, for giving
this matter a particular confideration. Our having been
publickly called upon (not in very obliging terms *) to
point out the weaknefs of this diftinction, will excufe us
with the reader, fhou’d he think more notice is now taken
of it, than it really deferves.
We fhall firft examine the merits of this diftinCtion—
and then remind the reader of the importance of it on Mr.
Edwards’s plan.
Firft, Of the merits of it. To fay the effence of virtue and
vice lies in their nature , is only faying, that the nature of
them confifts in their nature. Or the proportion might be
tranfpofcd thu3 : The nature of virtue and vice lies in their
ejfence. The word nature needs explaining as much as the
word effence. To ufe the former as a definition or ex¬
planation of the latter, wou’d not be lefs trifling than to
attempt to explain the term necejfary , by the words muft ,
can , cannot , of which Mr. Edwards takes notice. (P. 18.)
We don’t advance one ftep in our underftanding of the
fubjeCt by fuch explanations. Shou’d any one afk, where¬
in doth the effence of virtue and vice conflft ? and receive
for
* ElFay on moral agency, part I. feet. 4.
f
75
Sxct. V. The connckUen betweenK &e-
for anfwer. It confifts in it’s nature— wou’d he think the
anfwer lefs impertinent, or be lefs difpofed to laugh at him
that offers it, than if upon afking an explanation of the
word neceffity, he ffiou’d be ani'wered, that which is necef-
fary, muff and cannot but be ?
We defire no logical proof that the nature of virtue
and vice lie in the nature of a virtuous or vicious difpofi-
tion. We allow that fuch a difpofition is what it is and
think there was no occafion to fill the page with proofs
of this fort. For who is fool enough to difpute the thing !
But doth this fhow us what confiitutes the nature of virtue
and vice ? what it is that makes any particular action or
difpofition virtuous or vicious ? Or doth it follow, from
admitting that “ the nature of vertue. and vice lies in their
« nature/’ that therefore their nature is fep'erable from their
caufe ? or that one can be judged of detach'd from the o-
ther ? Were vertue and vice, as effects in the natural
world, produc’d by the efficiency of fome caufc extrinfic
to the fubjeft, and in which he is but a paffive recipient,
then, indeed, we might detach their caufe from their nature.
But this is beging the queftion. It ftill remains to be
proved, that vertue and vice in rational agents are the pro-
duftion of a caufe extrinfic to themfelves.
This diftinftion of Mr. Edwards’s is, therefore, fubtil
and evafive, as it carries in it an intimation, that his op¬
ponents deny the effence of volition to lie in it’s nature,
and maintain it lies in it’s caufe by way of diftinftion from
it’s nature. But when or where have they affirm’d the lat¬
ter, or deny’d the former ? Again, this diftinftion is evafive,
inal'much as it takes for granted, that if the efience of voli¬
tion lies in it’s nature, then the nature of volition may be
feperated from the caufe— which confequence is by no
means admitted. It is evafive alfo, as it takes for granted
that the caufe of moral volitions is not in the mind of mo¬
ral agents. For if it be indeed true, that the caule ot fucn
volition is in the mind or agent willing, we prefume, in
this cafe, no one wou’d attempt to disjoin the caufe and
pature of volition. Leaft of all could Mr. Edwards.
To treat of moral caufes and effefts in the lame manner
as a philofopher wou’d difcourfe on natural caufes, is a
method
j 6 The connection between Sect. V,
jnethod of handling moral fubje&s altogether improper,
but much ufed by Mr. Edwards — With what advantage
to his own fcheme ? For in this way of reasoning we af-
cend from the effect to the cayfe. <Q The caufe muft be
“ proportionable and agreable to the effedt, nor can there
cc be more in the effed than in the caufe,35 * as Mr. Ed-
wards hath obferved. Admit then that vertue arid vice in
moral and accountable creatures are the production of a
caufe extrinfic to their own minds, have we not ffiewn,
that the caufe which produceth wickednefs, is wicked ?
The fubjedt in whom vice is thus produced cannot be vi¬
cious at all. Or to fpeak more properly, the fuppofition
that a creature can, in this way, be the fubjeft of a vicious
difpofition, is a palpable abfurdity. A difpofition thus
produced cannot partake of the nature of vice, viewed in
relation to the fubjeff, however it doth as view’d in relation
to the caufe and. producer of it. If then this caufe be God,
(as on Mr. Edwards’s fcheme we have fhewn it muft be)
who woti’d not fh udder at the confequence !
That the nature of moral evil cannot be detached
from it’s efficient caufe, we prefume will clearly appear
from ftating a few cafes. And fince it is the origin of evil
we are ultimately enquiring after, thefe cafes ffiall be ftated
upon the different fchemes of accounting for the introduc¬
tion of moral evil, which have been embraced by divines
and philofophers. The firft ffiall be Mr. Edwards’s own.
Suppofe then the exiftence of fin arofe from the imper¬
fection properly belonging to a creature, as fuck, and from
God’s withholding or withdrawing his grace. On this
plan can the firft fin of angels and man be disjoined from
the caufe ? If the creature had not original abilities and
communications from God adequate to the duty requir’d
of him ; or if thefe abilities and communications were fuf-
pended or withdrawn before any forfeiture was incur’d •,
cou’d the moral evil of that difpofition, which the firft fin
involved, be attributed to the fubjeft of it, any more than
if he had been created with it ? Or any more than if it had
been infufed by the positive influence of fome other agent ?
Mr. Edwards wou’d admit, that if a moral agent was
firft
P. 6z,.
«
Sect. V. the nature and caufe of volition. 77
“ firft made with a fountain of evil in his heart,15 or had
a vicious difpofition afterwards produced in him by the
efficiency of the Deity, this wou’d be to make God the
aftor and doer of wickednefs. Now hath it not been
fhewn, that his own fcheme runs up to this ? Doth it not,
therefore, follow, even on his own doctrine, in the cafe we-
are now fuppofing, that the obliquity of fin cannot be
feperated from the caufe— though (fhocking to mention !)
he makes the Deity himfelf that caufe ? Doth this fcheme
give us an idea of the moral governor of the world at all
different from what the feriptures give us of the arbitrary
prince of Egypt in the time of Mofes, who demanded of
the Ifraelites the ufual tale of brick, after he deny’d them
ftraw ? Or of thofe who bound heavy burthens , and grie¬
vous to be born , and laid them on mens Jhoulders , but the?n-
felves wsidd not move them with one of their fingers ? Should
a mafter require of his fervant fuch a talk as he cou’d
well perform, having proper tools to work with— but ne¬
ver allow him fuch tools, or for no fault of the fervant’s.
take them from him, fo that he necejfarily fails of the per¬
formance ofhistafk: Wou’d any body pronounce fuch
fervant wicked and fiothful— accufe him of idlenefs and
want of refpect to his mafter ? Wou’d not everyone pity him
as having an hard, and unreafonable mafter, and attribute
all the blame to the latter for denying his fervant what
was requiflteto his performing the tafk required ? But is
there fuch unrighteoufnefs with God ? There are, indeed,
but a very few divines of eminence, if any, who account
for the exiftence of fin in this way which Mr. Edwards
doth.
Suppofe in the next place, that the pofitive agency and
efficiency of God was the caufe of fin’s firft enterance into
the world. Can we disjoin the nature of fin from the caufe.
In this cafe, and in this fuppofition ? Wou’d not this be
to make the creature anfwerable tor the aft of God ?
Are moral agents only the fubjefts of certain effefts from
divine agency ? Wherein then do they differ from ma¬
chines ? And if there is no material difference, wherein con-
fifts the. moral evil of any difpofitions in them ? But what
an horrid impeachment of the moft High doth this doftrinc
contain ?
contain ? This is, indeed, the clear confequence of Mr.
Ed-wards's fcherae, though he chofe not to affirm it in
words. ’Tis more direftly to arraign the perfections and
government of almighty God : And hence many, who
Iiave thought favourably of Mr. Edwards’s doCtrine, re¬
ject this with pious indignation •, and did they fuppofe his.
doCtrine was reducible to fuch a confequence, wou’d im¬
mediately give it up. But as this afcription of the firft fin.
Of all fin, to the influence, energy, agency or efficiency of
God, differs nothing effcntially from the next cafe we Avail
ftate, we will proceed direCtly to
Suppofe moral agents created with vicious difpofitions — .
Suppofe a creature formed with the temper of Lucifer — ;
fuppofe he himfelf had been created with his prefent tem¬
per. Such a temper is, in it's own nature , exceeding odi¬
ous. But cou’d it be fo efteem’d feperate from the cre¬
ating caufe ? Wou’d it fatisfy any rational man to be told
in this cafe, that the having fuch a difpofition argu’d the
high criminality of the fubjeCt of it, without our being o-
bliged “ at all to conflder how he came to have it-— that let
“ him come by it how he will, he is fully and perfectly
<« free in exercifing of it, and therefore deferving of blame
“ and punifhment.” Wou’d not this be to make the crea¬
ture culpable for the conftitution and temper he receiv’d
immediately from the forming hands of the Creator ? Might
we not asjuftly fuppofe it, a culpable thing in any human
beino- that he is not formed witn the capacity of Gabriel ?
or in° ideots, that they have not natural underftanding ?
or in brutes, that'they are not endowed withreafon ? Can
the thing formed be anfwerable for the aCt of the former
of it ? What is properly God’s conilitution cannot be the
fin of the creature. Confequently, in the cafe now put,
the having the malignant difpofition fuppofed, would not
infer criminality in the fubjeCc, however deteftable fuch
difpofition is in itfelf ; But the criminality, if any there
be, muff be afcribed to the immediate author and- efficient
of it — that is, to the creating caufe. Nor is the fuppofiti-
on of a creature made at firft with fuch a difpofition ma¬
terially different from Mr. Edwards’s opinion concerning
the introduction of fin, view’d in it’s natural confequence •,
as we truft hath already been proved. * W hether,
t
Sic?: V. the nature and caufe ef volition.
Whether, therefore, we fuppofe that fin arofe from thfc
want or withdraw of divine influence and affiftance, Of
from divine agency and efficiency, or that creatures were
made wicked at firft, the nature of fin cannot be feperated
from it’s caufe. Now except thele opinions concerning
the origin of evil, there has been no other that deferves to
be mentioned but that maintain’d by the generality of
moralifts and divines, that it arofe from the abufe of frce-
will— in other words, from acaufeinmoralagentsthemfelves.
Before we difmifs the inftances above adduced, we wou’d
fubjoin this further obfervation, that if that energy be an
holy energy, which angels and faints are ‘ the fubjects of,
then that is a Jinful energy, which devils and wicked men
are the fubjects of, or thro* which their wills are inclined
and determined to vice — That if one moral agent (whether
creature or creator) is foppofed to be the pofitive caufe of
fin in another, fo much fin as is to be attributed to the
efficiency of the former, is to be taken from the crimina¬
lity of the latter, and fet to the account of the caufe and
producer of it. *
We go on to obferve, that as moral agency involves
acconntablenefs to a moral governor, fo the laws of God
have refpedt to the inwar d and outward man. They re¬
quire not only fuch inward principles and affections as
correfpond to his perfections and gifts to us, and the rela¬
tions we ftand in to our fellow-creatures ; but alfo exter¬
nal acts of devotion, juftice, charity, felf-government. The
matter and fubftance of morality and religion are as much
the fubjedt of command, as the internal principles and af¬
fections of heart, which fhou’d regulate and influence to ’em.
Now the nature of an external action is the fame, whether
perform’d by a good or bad man. The prayers and alms
of a Pharifee, in themfelves confidered, or as to the matter
of tfiem, are as commendable as thole of the moil approved
Chriftians. Mr. Edwards infifts, that moral good or evil
lies in the ftate and difpofition of the mind, and allows bf
no vertue or vice in external actions, detach’d from their
caufe— the principles they proceed from, the ends aim’d
at. But why are internal exercifes then disjoined from their
caule ? It is as evident a truth, that material actions are good
or
eft tauf a tjl eft am utufa caufafL
8o ube connexion between • Sect. V\
,or bad in their own nature, as that the inward principles
and aftedions are fo. External ads are what they are in
their own nature, not depending on the lentiments and vo¬
litions of the agent. Though in a relative view and efti-
mation they vary, according to the temper, circumftances
and advantages of the agent •, yet their nature is unaltera¬
ble. Men’s doing things in their own nature right, with an
evil intent; or doing things in their own nature very evil,
meaning to do God fervice, doth not alter the nature of
the things done. Therefore let us conned: both internal
exercifes and external actions with their caufes, or neither..
Again, The fame fin may be very differently aggravated
in different perfons, or in the fame perfon at different
times. But any fin is in it’s own nature the fame, by what¬
ever moral agent committed, or however circumttanccd.
The precife definition of fin is a nomia — i. e. without
law, or a non-conformity to law. But to determine the
degree of guilt in regard to any particular fin, befides the
general confideration of the nature of the vicious affection
or aft, the advantages , opportunities and circumftances of tne
tranfgreffor muff alio come into confideration. Moral
writers have ever kept up this diftindion. Befides maintain¬
ing thatfome crimes are more heinous than others view’d
in their own nature, they have alfo maintain’d, that “ fomc
“ are more heinous than others by reafon of feveral aggra-
“ vations.” The fame fin admits of a variety of circum¬
ftances, which either aggravate or extenuate the guilt of
it : Thefe diftindions are carefully preferved in the facred
writings. Now the particular aggravation and circumftan¬
ces of crimes are as different from their nature, as one fin is
different from another— (as different as blaiphemy is from
fome idle word men may fpeak) and therefore ought to
come under a feperate confideration. But Mr. Edwards s
doctrine precludes this plain and important diftindion.
For if the feperate confideration of the nature of any vici¬
ous volition in itfelf be all that is neceffary to determine
. the matter of criminality, then the lame crime muff be e-
qually heinous in every perfon that commits it, and in the
fame perfon at all times. Difference of circumftances can
have no weight, as they do not belong to the nature of any
particular vice— they only make a gradual, not a fpecif.c dir-
r : ference.
%
JJNfeNM
Sect. Vv /W tAtife of Volition. Si
ference. Blit the former, it feems, h of no effirnationl
In other words, there i$ nothing that can either heighten
or extenuate the fame tranfgreffion. *
The foregoing obfervatioris may be fufficient to fhew,
that commendation or blame is not to be operated from
the caufe of a virtuous or vicious difpofition, and to expofe
she weaknefs of that diftincfion of Mr. Edwards's, oh
Which we have been remarking. It is at leaft true with
reipeft to the origin of evil, that it's nature cannot be fe~
perated from it’s caufe, nor even in idea conceived to be fo*
Having examined the merits of the diftiridtion itfelf, we
promifed, in the next place, to remind the reader, that
however futile and evafive it really is, yet on Mr. Ed-
watds’s plan, aild in his view, it was of much importance .
The ferife he had of it’s importance appears from what
he has wrote on this point-f-parricularly Fart IV. Sett. i.
L Nor
* Suppdfe the wills of moral agents are derived from the author
of nature, (which by implication w a? Mr. Edwards’s doctrine) au<I
We might apply to the general fubjed of this fe&ion fuch inltarice*'
as the following. A good man is, by the aft of divine providence ;t
reduced to a (late of infanity— in confequence of which he is full ofc,
the mod implacable hatred, malice arid malignity ssgainft his neareft
kindred and bed friends— yea, blafphemeth his Maker. This dif¬
pofition is in it’s own nature exceeding vile. But is it to be fo con-
fid ered in him } It is, on Mr. Edwards’s principles. His having and
indulging the aforementioned malignity of temper, hi i voluntarily
ottering blafphemy, afecnough to prove him a malignant perlon, and
3 blaiphmcr i without confidering at all how he cabte by fuch a difpo-i
firion— whether it proceeded from a caufe extrinfic or intricfic. Foe
the madman may proceed as deliberately, voluntarily and dcfignedly in
thefe things, as one who hath the ufe of rcafon. In the abovenamed
jpftances a he doth wrong, and dbth fo from his hearth Andwhac
more is wanting to conftitute him a moft vile and abandon’d finner i
nothing— -except that his fentiments and difpofition are not under h i
Own command, during the delirium. His will is, indeed fully in thefe
things— His internal exercifes are voluntary— his external a&ions are
spontaneous exertions— he afts leifurely, according to the prefent dif¬
pofition of his hearts he is under no other necefSty than what is his
will’s prefent propenfity. But then he is incapable of dire&ing and
governing his own volitions and actions— therefore not the canfe of
thereformot blameabld.
P^nCiple, that agents are blameabie for any particHa^
difpoiiuon interwoven with their Original frame, we might argue,
that t e brute’Creatures are vicious. The fiercenefr of the tv^er, rhii
ravening difpofition of the bear and wolf, the venom of the' ferpent,
might be adduced as i examples of a difpofition mod odious in it’s
own nature j Tnerc 13 no oppolltion in their wills to it — they Cxef-*
die it freely — us their nature,
►‘-\4
a
i
82 <fbt connexion * between, &c. Sect. V.
Nor did he mif-judge, provided this fundamental principle
in his fcheme be true, that moral agents do not originate,
in any cafe, their own actions--- in other words, provided
the caufe of their adions be not in themfelves. For on
this principle, one or other of thefe things muft follow —
either that vertue or vice is not predicable of moral agents,
or that the eflence of them depends not on their caufe.
The firft Mr. Edwards wou’d by no means admit •, the
other he faw was a plain confequence of his principles.
He therefore let himfelf to defend it as well as he could,
that he might exempt the Deity from the charge of being
criminal, while, by fuppofition, he originates the volitions
of his intelligent creatures.
Hence appears the occafion Mr. Edwards had to fepe-
rate the nature of vertue and vice from their caufe. This
is very much a turning point in the controverfy on liberty
and neceffity,' as he hath Hated it. Whether the diftinc-
tion can be vindicated as juft and proper, we leave the
reader to judge.. If it cannot, one or other of thefe con-
fequences muft follow — either iirft, that there is no fin in
the world— or fecondly, that God himfelf is the only cri¬
minal being— or thirdly, that the caufe of fin is in the
mind of the (inner. Either of the three fubverts Mr. Ed¬
wards’s fcheme. The laft is the only eligible opinion.
Mr. Edwards’s fubjed naturally led him to be explicit
On this queftion, Whether God or the creature be the pro¬
per caufe of moral evil ? It muft have been full in his
view while writing every part of his book. But we don’t
recoiled: that he has once laid, or io much as hinted, that
the creature is the efficient caule of fin-, though he hath
laid many things which imply that God is the efficient.
Whether he declined being explicit from a convidion,
that though his fcheme made God the caufe of moral tur¬
pitude, the minds of Chriftians were not yet prepared to
receive this aftonifhing dodrine, we (hall not fay. It is
of vaft importance, who is the caufe of fin. We could
wifh Mr. Edwards had not evaded a dired anfwer to a
queftion, which his fubjed, in every part of it, required
him to anfwer in clear and determinate language.
— - SECT10N
f
!■ . . ijAMfl.
ML .
. IHk.T' v — ■*** — mu.'ip-SS
jaemsmm a
Sm**,.-- -.yen *«
( §3 )
SECTION VI.
Moral evil not beft for the world.
a
BELIEVE,” faith Mr. Edwards, cc there is no per-
_ 44 fon of good underftanding, who v/ill venture to
44 lay, he is certain that it is impoflible it fttould be beft---
cc that there ftiould be fuch a thing as moral evil in the
44 world.” Be it fo : Is his inference juft ? 44 It will cer-
44 tainly follow, that an infinitely wife being, who always
44 chufeth what is beft, muft chufe that there fhould be
44 fuch a thing. ” ft Many intelligent perfons apprehend
there is a medium between being peremptory on either fide.
While their modefty and humility prevent their faying,
they are certain moral evil is not for the beft, they
make as great a fcruple of faying, they are certain it is beft
fin has taken place. It would be no difficult matter to
fhew, that the latter affertion is as daring as the former,
altho5 Mr. Edwards has 4 ‘ventured” to affirm the one, and
to impeach the goodnefs of their underftanding who may
affirm the other, or chufe not to exprels themfelves with
the affi: ranee he doth. Whether it argues 4 4 good under¬
ftanding,” or prejudice and confidence, that he is fo 44 ex¬
ceeding peremtory in this opinion (as he is in every opi¬
nion which he maintains in this controverfy with the”*
deniers of neceffity) we leave to others to judge.
To one that enquires, 44 Why did God permit fin r” it
would be a proper anfwer, You have no right to know :
3Tis fufficient that he is not the cauj'e of it. The reafons
and ends of the perrriiflion of fin, as well as of other events,
the Father hath referved very much in his own power.
3Tis not for us to know them. Whatever the confequences
of fin are, or might have been, had no redeemer been pro¬
vided, God and his throne will be guiltlefs, if the fall of
angels and men is laid at the right door. Our duty is
to blefs God who hath not permitted the human apcftacy
without the provifion of an all-fufficient favior, in whom
whofoever believeth fhall notperifh, but have 'everlafting
life—
t P, 169, 170, 171 , * p* 108,
CC
cc
SRj
b*
4
Sect. VI.
84 Moral evil not bejl far the world.
life — * who hath made us partakers of his gofpel and grace
in Chrift ; and to give a praftical affent to this faithful
faying, that (Thrift Jefus came into the world tofave Tin¬
ners. for thus only can we befavedfrom the wages of
fin, and become the fubje&s of that grace which reigneth
through righteoulhefs unto eternal life, by Jefus (Thrift
our Lord.
The queftion refpefting the reafons of the divine permit
fion of fin, being ufelefs and impertinent at leaft, if not
prefumptuous, we would only take occafion to obferve,
that “ it is the 'inevitable refult of the nature and condition
* > xr • *
of created free agents, that they may poffibly err, and act
contrary to right j. and the placing them in fuch a poffibi-
lity is by no means to be imputed to any deficiency of
wifdom and goodnefs in God. For example, fuch a crea¬
ture as. man, compounded of fieffi and fpirit, mull have a
variety of affections ; fome higher, and fome lower •, fome
which determine him to purfu.e the proper perfection of
his fuperior faculties as the chief end of his being, and o,
thers which, attach him to the inferior part of his. confti-
nition ; which muff alfo be preferved by his care, during
the time appointed for his fufefiftence, Since then, there
are fuch different tendencies in the nature of man, and
liberty alfo cffential to him, he muft be capable of aiding
differently according to the different direction of his in-,
ftindts and affections •, and his a£ting always right could,
not be absolutely fecufed, or the poffibility of moral evil
avoided, without fuch an interpofition of almighty power,
as would import an effential change in his frame and his,
fcate. In other words, if the divine perfections required
that fin fiiould be abfolutely prevented, or not at all per¬
mitted, they required that fuch a creature as man in a ftate
of probation, fhould not be created : Which fcarcely any
confiderate perfon, will have the hardinefs to affirm..” J
Mr, Edwards, it will be remembered, proceeds upon
this fuppqfkion, that the infinite creator, before the world,
was, haying in contemplation all poflible iyftems, gave the.
preference to one including moral evil, as beft calculated,
{0 manifeft his perfections,' Hynes he af5r;m,s it to be.
' part
$ Abcrcsthy,
'l
Sect, VI.
Moral evil not b eft for the world. 85 •
part of God’s own infinite fcheme of things to cbufe what
he bates , and what is in itfelf, as man’s ad, difagreable
to his heart, (p. 380.) He accordingly inftrufts us to view
the world, with all the wickednefs that ever was, is, or
will be in it, as the projection, ordination and production
of that glorious being, who hath not pleafure in wicked¬
nefs, with whom evil (hall not dwell. Nothing has ever
taken place but in profecution of his original plan : Mo¬
ral evil is a necefiary means through which he effects his
defigns, : and (it is intimated p. 163,) hath not“mar’d
his fyftem,”— nor indeed can this be fuppofed, if fin is fo
eflfential and material “ a part of his infinite fcheme of
things.”
Now were it admitted, that moral evil is for the be ft,
as Mr. Edwards declares be is certain it is ; this would by
no means be a bottom broad enough to fupport his doc¬
trine i that it came into exiftence through the divine de¬
termination and decifi ve difpofal. For if he “ difpofeth the
mind to ” moral evil, then he “ caufeth the mind to be dif-
pofed to, and to will ” it ; “ and that is the fame thing as
to be the caufe of” moral evil (p. 136.) Again, Mr. Ed¬
wards infifts, that the determiner of volition is the caufe of
it. So that to fay (as he does through his whole book)
that God determineth every volition of moral agents front
their firft exiftence ; is to fay, he is the caufe of every finfui
volition. But enough has been offered on this head. The
opinion, that moral evil is for the beft, is much more ten¬
able on the principles of thofe who alcribe caufality and,
felf-determination to the creature, and fuppofe fin a role
from the abufe of free-will, maintaining no influence or
difpofal of the divine being in it, but only his permiffisn of
it, or fujferittg it to come to pafs— than on the principles;
of thofe who afcribe moral evil to his efficiency. The for¬
mer opinion flhews a re lp eft to the moral charafter of God :
The advocates for it fay, he taketh occafion to bring good
out of evil — to over-rule the exiftence of fin for the beft.
The efpoufers.of the latter opinion feem boldly to fay, that
God doth evil, that good may come. Can a being of.
perfeft moral excellence give exiftence to fin by his influ¬
ence? Gan it be faulty in thcfubjeft, and yet proceed from
86 Moral evil not heft for the world. Sect; VI.
him as the caufe ? We prefume it has been made evi¬
dent, that neither of thefe things can be true.
-Scheme under examination fuppofeth God to be
the cauie of every thing, and confequently of fin _ hence
fin is mfered to be belt, becaufe it is fuppofed to proceed
from God in this manner. Were moral agents left to de¬
termine themfelves, then it is pleaded, the events depend¬
ing on their determination would be contingent, and might
not come to pafs ; which is fuppofed to be irreconcileable
with the prefcience and decrees of God — the plan of his
government. Moral evil being part of his plan, to render
it’s exiftence certain , he determined, it is faid, to effect it
by his providence — by his own pozver and agency ■, as much
as he determined to create the world by an exertion of his
power. The difficulty from divine prefcience ihall be
examined in it’s place. But if the above mentioned foun¬
dation be falle, the inference, that fin is for the beft cannot
be fupported by it, even granting the thing infered to be
true in itfelf.
On his principles Mr. Edwards (with good reafon) fup¬
pofed it would be objected, that God may do evil that
good may come. But how hath his anfwer removed the
objection, if it be indeed true, as he teacheth, that moral
evil is a part of God’s infinite fcheme — an effed of his
determining and difpofing — and therefore beft ? If fo, is
it unfit and unfuitable in it’s nature, or of bad tendency ?
Can that be a neceffary means of the greateft good in the
divine fyftem, which is upon the whole either unfit and
unfuitable in it’s nature, or bad in it’s tendency ? In order
to accompliffi his own holy and benevolent ends, is infi¬
nite wifdom compelled to make ufe of unholy and male¬
volent means ? means unfit and unfuitable in their nature,
and in their tendency bad ? How can fuch things ftand in
the relation of means to the propofed end ? Mr. Edwards
mult either lay, that God cloth evil that good may come,
or eife that moral evil is a thing fit in it’s nature, and good
in it’s tendency. For to be the caufe of an evil effect is
evidently to do evil ; and though fuch evil be improved
as a means of great general good, the end will not faneftify
or alter the means. No being can, with a good intent,
* , x 5- ' ■
i ' r^ii -| — i minim -tl mi
Sect. VI. Moral evil not bejl for the world. 8 y
be the defigned caufe of moral evil. Vet it is infilled on,
that moral evil is determined and defigned by God _ “ a
part of his own infinite fcheme.” And if it is his deter¬
mining aft, then he is the caufe of it. Plain common fenfe,
unperverted by metaphyfics, teacheth the world, that holy
means only are adapted to an holy end ; and that no lup-
pofeable reference of moral evil to a good end can juftify
any moral agent in having recourfe to it to effeft his de-
figns — much lefs can a being of infinite perfection, who
can be at no lofs for proper means to accomplifh his own
ends, firft be the caufe of wickednefs, that by this, as a ne-
ceffary means, he may bring to pafs the purpofes of his
holinefs and goodnefs. The nature of the means will be
the fame, whatever be the end in view. After all the fo-
phiftical pains that have been taken to ffiew, that moral
evil, though infinitely hateful in it’s nature and tendency,
is yet a neceffary well-adapted means of the greateft good,
and as fuch firft effefted by the deity, and then improved
by him to advance the greateft happinefs in his lyftem, it
yet remains problematical, or far from being proved that
unipotted purity can be the author of fin. If we ftiould
gi ant it to be beft that moral evil hath come into exiftence,
will it therefore rollow, that it is an effeft proceeding from
divine efficiency ? or that it is beft the fupreme caufe
mou d be the author of it ? “ They who think and talk
in this ftrain ought to remember” that they have no reafon
to complain, if the world efteem it “ an inftance of the
greateft arrogance” and audacious impiety.
“ 1 hough the aftual permiffion of evil,” fays biffiop
Butler, “ may be beneficial to the world : (that is, it would
“ ,have been more mifchievous, not that a wicked perfon
“ had himfelf abftained from his own wickednefs,*#/ that any
one had forcibly prevented it, than that it was permitted •)
Yet notwithftanding, it might have been much better
« -kt t^C ^orld’ ^ tb‘s very evd had never been done.
„ 1C clearly conceivable, that the very com-
million of wickednefs may be beneficial to the world
“ 1 If’ ?at r W0U.ld be infinitdy more beneficial for
« n “ refrainfrom 1C- For thus’ In the wifc and good
- conftitution of the natural world, there are diforders
“ which
((
U
<c
~c ip'c&Z
■
'fait-#
Sect. VI.
<
Moral evil not heft for the World.
44 which bring their own Cures ; difeafes, which are them-
“ felves remedies. Many a man would have died, had it
44 not been for the gout or a fever *, yet it would be tho’t
44 madnefs to affert, that ficknefs is a better or a more per-
44 feCt ftate than health *, though the like, with regard to
44 the moral world, has been afferted.”
With moft Chriftians it might be laid down for a
j poftulatum , that the knowledge, imitation and enjoyment
of God were his end in the formation of moral and ac¬
countable creatures. Whence it will follow, that the
greateft good of the intelligent creation is to fall in with
that inftruCtion in the oracles of truth •, (contrary to ma¬
ny in modern metaphyfics) Let him that gloriethy glory
in this , that he undetfiandeth and knoweth me> that I am the
Lord , which exercife loving-kindnefs, judgment and righteouj-
nefs in the earth : For in thefe things I delight , faith the
Lord . This clearly, points out the Creator’s view and
defign in giving being to moral agents — what his own
fcheme is- -what fhould be their firft and laft end, and re¬
garded by them as the one thing needful— ftiewing them
how they may fall in with the defigns and exertions of in¬
finite wifdom for the advancement of their holinefs and
higheft happinefs, and thereby attain the end of their cre¬
ation. To live without remembrance or knowledge of
God, in contradiction to the above mentioned moral per¬
fections, which he difplays in his own government of the
world, and propounds to the imitation of the fubjeCts of
his moral government— -to fin againft him without fear---
we need not fcruple to fay, this would be to oppofe his
defigns. If his end in the creation of moral agents was,
that they might be conformed to him and bleffed in his
likenefs and friendfhip *, perhaps it may be infered, that
he had no fecret defign contrary to this. Perhaps it may
follow, that he did not make rebel angels at firft with this
view, that he might be the caufe of their rebellion, and
them punifh them eternally for what was the effeCt of his
own determining aft, as a means of difplaying his holinefs
and juftice and mercy, of eftablifhing his dominion and
authority, of promoting and fecuring the moral reCtitude
of their tellows. 4C They who talk or think in this fttain.
I
Sect. VI Moral evil not heft fir the world. 89
ftem not to underftand what they fay, nor whereof they
affirm. Such things publifhed by unknown authors would
be generally fuppoled to proceed from difbelief of religion^
natural and revealed.
From what has been obferved, it follows, that moral
evil was not God’s end in the creation of moral agents \
and confequently, that it was not part of his icheme to
bring them to the enjoyment of himfelf, or fecure to them
this felicity, by means of moral evil. They who fay fo
ought to prove thefe two things, firft. That moral evil
is a neceffary means of qualifying moral agents for the
enjoyment of God, or of their everlafting fecurity of his
friendfhip. Secondly, That he hath prefcribed it as the
true medium to this end, and determined it’s exiftence with
this view. In other words, that fin is the appointed me*
dium of holihefs and happinefs— neceffary to the moral
perfedtion of the intelligent creation. We are toofenfible
what fort of employment he muft have who undertakes
this, to fpend time in expofing the abiurdity of fuch a
fcheme.
That holinefs is the greateft good of the moral world,
we beg leave to take for granted. We don’t defire to
maintain a controverfy with thofe who deny it. This prin¬
ciple being admitted, the enquiry is, what hath the di-
fedteft tendency to promote holinefs ? For that is for th<£
belt, which hath this tendency. Now we may appeal to
common fenfe, whether moral evil is moft eligible in this
view. Whether that which (lands in direct oppofition to
holinefs hath the moft diredt tendency to it, or conduceth
to the higheft degrees of it. Do contraries promote and
advance each other ? Is greater happinefs attained by a
partial temedyof an evil, than would be by preventing
it ? Which is moft honorable to the infinite Creator, to
lay, that the original powers and affiftances imparted to
the creature were fufficient to his continuing upright, and
that his fall arofe from the abufe of them ? Or to fay, that
his fall arofe from a defedt of original advantages, or the
withdraw of divine influence ?
Natural evil appears- plainly to be the confequence of
moral, and not moral the confequence of natural, as a late
M ~ writef
5°
Moral evil not bejl for the world. Sect. VI,
writer fuppofeth. * Evils of the former kind are the judi-
cial as well as natural confequence of the latter fort, and
de ign.J to correct and amend them— the evil of punifh-
mentor afflidhon is defigned and adapted to cure the evil
o m—Oi to lead finners to repentance •, and promote a
reformation in them.- — So that moral evil fuppofeth their
deviation from the greateft good, from what would have
been belt for them. And if their reftoration to righteouf-
nels is beft, let any one fhew that their departure from
righteoufncfs was for the beft — that their original perma¬
nency in it would not have been the greateft good— that
the permanency of the whole intellectual fyftenT, as well as
apart of it, in holinefs, would not have been beft.
Mr. Edwards fuppoieth, that all events which have taken
place may therefore be inferred to be agreable to infinite
wifdemi and goodnefs and part of the fcheme of the fuperin-
tenaent or the univerfe — and that all events which ver
wid take place fall within his plan and defign, for the fame
reafon. Whence it follows, that whatfoever hath not , or
void net come to pafs , is difagreable to him, contrary to his
fcheme of government. For were it agreable to his wif-
dom and goodnefs, he would chufe it *, and if he chofe,
he would determine it j and if he determined it, he would
bring it to pafs, Confequently,he chufeth and defireth not
the repentance or fuch. as die impenitent. For this would be
cnule lornething in contravention of his infinite fcheme.
Coniequently, he hath not commanded them to repent *
or if he hath, then he hath commanded what is not a-
greable to his wiidom and goodnefs. Or if his defire is
exp re fled in his commands, then the thing defired not
taking place ; he muft be infinitely crofted and grieved,
m proportion to his infinite love and deftre of righteouf-
nefs, and hatred of wickednefs, E or this is Mr. Ed¬
wards's own inference, if any thing is fuppofed to come to
pafs which God chufeth and defireth not— -or fails of com-
mg to pafs Which he chufeth fhould come to pafs. Doth
lie therefore not chufe (notwithftanding the frequent de¬
clarations and aftevertaions in his word) that impenitents
(finally remaining luch) lliould turn and live ? Are the rich¬
es
* Letters on the origin of evil.
e
Z-Z
Sect. VI.
Moral evil not left for the world.
91
es of his goodnefs and forbearance, in the day of vifitation,
not defigned to lead them to repentance ? Is it not quef-
tionable, upon the whole, whether he is a lover of holinefs?
For how much would the renovation of impenitents add
to the fum total of holinefs in the univerfe ? But this is
not a thing chofen and defired, becaufe it doth not come to
Ms--- and for this good reafon it would not be belt. Or
will any undertake to Ihew, that the impenitency of ’ great
multitudes is a means of proportionably more holinefs in
other beings--that the holinefs of a fmall number com¬
paratively is fo amazingly increaled by this means , that the
amount of holinefs and happmefs in the fy Item will be great-
greater fhfn If*' had ^ led t0 rcPentance ?
Or admivS- k free-aSents had continu’d holy ?
Or admit this, the confequence then is, that the imoeni
pan ofthe Miand Cternal PUnifhment of the greateft
whicfthe ,gent f f UOn is a necefIa,T means, thro*
n f‘ J governor of the world effeds the ends of holi-
fa dandBS0r0drfS Wlth .refPe£t “ a remnant that lhall be
laved. But it yet remains to be fliewn, that fuch means
"whofc. ofthe grcaKft holi,,rfs ”d
<c “ If ™oral evil> and the punilhment of it are necelfarv
« PHomotmg univerfal good, then the more wick-
ed men are, the more they promote that a00d • md the
“ yanCd‘hP'ra'e, ™th,tWr Creator T„ compfeatiig
Ills great and benevolent plan of univerfal hapninds ”
It is argued, that fince “ mifery brings with it it:s uri I ;< ’
“ why may not wickednefs ?» 8 U S utdny>
“ &?°™s and,frthqUakes break not heav’ns defnm
C£ Why then a Borgia ora Cataline ?”
<c .fhat though fin in us, who fee no farther than the
tc ovik it produced), is evil, and juftly punilhable vet in
God, who fees the caufes and connexions of ad « th;no-s
good ^Ceffityn k’S admiffion ” « is not fo, bui vS
“ benefit of he5’ r wbery difperfe ufelefs boards to the
“ humor too into many' families' where ^ tlfy^ 8,°od
“ wife have been wanting } and murder free ^ ^
" tyrants and oppreflbrs. Luxury maintains itsTcIpf^
“ and
'A
02 Moral evil not iefi for the werld. Sect. VI.
« and vanity its ten thoufands. Superftition and arbitrary
“ power contribute to the grandeur of many nations, and
“ the liberties of others are preferved by the perpetual
“ contentions of avarice, knavery, felfifhnefs and ambition.
“ Thus the word of vices, and the word of men, are of-
“ ten compelled by providence to ferve the mod benefici-
« al purpofes — and thus private vices become public be-
“ nefits.”* Therefore thefe vices are for the bed — and by
conlequence the vicious perfons fome of the mod benefi-
ci?d members of fociety. Theuniverfe would by no means
be fo happy without them as with them. Why then do
the miniders of religion warn the wicked, and call upon
them to turn from fin to God ? why befcech them to be
reconciled to God ? Why do they not rather wink at their
crimes, and even encourage them therein ?' For though by
their hardnefs and impenitency they treafure up to them-
felves wrath, yet their inccrrigiblenefs in fin, and their
eternal punidiment for thofe vices to which they were de¬
termined by providence, being necefiary to advance the
holinefs and happinefs of the univcrfal fydem, they may
be excited and exhorted to pcrfift in fin by the motive of
public benevolence ^ and may have this confolation, under
the aoorehenfion of that indignation and wiath, tiibula-
tion and anguilh, which await them, that their dedru&ion
foul and body in hell, is for the good of the univerfe !
Suppofe the minifters of the gofpel were to preach to
their people, that the converfion ot the many who live a-
bandon’d and die impenitent is not what God chufeth or
defireth, not agreable to his infinite wifdom and goodnefs-
that it ’is a defireable thing they fliould live and die in
fin— that God hath pleafure herein— and that, to render
the event infallibly certain and necefiary, he “ actually ef¬
fects bva pofitive agency and difpofal of his own,” or by
his “ cletermining providence,” the “ hardnefs of their
hearts” _ and this as a necefiary means ox mamfefting his
perfections, and advancing the greateft good, in the eter¬
nal falvation of a fmall number, whofe fecunty in holinefs
and happinefs depends on their reflecting, upon the tor¬
ments of the damned. — Would not people juftly fay, “ v e
arc
^ Letters on tic origin of evil, p. 36, 87 ; 109, no,
" +.J
\
H&P
, • S „*
• T£-.V S'^"'
'
i^Sy \ V |
Moral evil not befi for the world. "
% , • -■
Sect. ,-YIg
are delivered to do all thefe abominations !” When they
hear the words of the curie, will they not blefs themfelye$
in their hearts, laying, “ We will walk in the imagination
of our heart : We ftiall aft in lubferyiency to God’s infi¬
nite fcherne, and promote the holinefs and happinefs of.
the fyftem, by doing every one what is right in his own
eyes. We will rejoice and be exceeding glad in the addi¬
tion we make to the public good by our vices, and will
make ourfelves $iore vile.” Indeed, he is an enemy to
the world, who doth not take fatisfaftion in moral evil,;
a‘pd praife God for it’s exiftence, if the doftrine we are ex¬
amining be true. For hath it contributed fo much to the
perfection and happinefs of the moral world ? could not
the divine character have been manifested to the creatures
to good advantage without it ? is it’s exiftence the effeft
of divine determination ? and doth it become us to la¬
ment or repent of that which was a neceffary means of
the greateft poflible good ? Shall we grudge the happinefs
of the moral world ? Shall we bewail ourfelves, or call up-,
on others to bewail, that which is the grand fecurity of the
virtue and happinefs of moral agents ? the only means of •
illuftrating the divine perfections to angels and men, and
of eftablHhing his dominion and authority over them ?
And if moral evil be an effeft of divine operation, why
are we not as much obliged to celebrate his praife for the
produftion of this, as for his other works which declare
his glory— efpecially fince MORAL EVIL MORE IL¬
LUSTRIOUSLY DISPLAYS HIS NAME THAN
ALL HIS OTHER WORKS ?
Upon what evidence, by what reafoning, do men fix
down in this conclufion, that the moral reftkude of holy
angels would have been peculiarly endangered had there
been no apoftates, the terror of whofe punifhment is fup- *
pofed to fecure the inhabitants of the world above in their
allegiance ? How does it appear that holy angels would
have reverenced their maker and father lefs, or been lefs
apprehenfive of his authority, had moral evil never taken
place ? Whither will this doftrine lead, that the divine
perfections could have been exhibited to the intelligent
creation only through the intervention of fin ? Apply it
to
If!
SSiliS; !•
re . " r -- 'rawn ■ ■
94 Moral evil not heft for the world. Sect : VI.
ve rd CT m ^ * r f!f *" ju^ and benevolent earthly fo-
and his" true Vl 1Cctncs bis government be attained,
the rebellion nfT r’ k-0^? t0 aPPear> °nly by means of
that refneS- ^ ! Is « ^ceflary to fecure him
sreat nfr rever“ce to which he is intituled, that a
lunifted i rt15 People “d revolt, and be capitally
For it is dmihd'f k'n- ^ aw e^s’ rcbels, and traitors !
s doubtlefs belt the character of fuch a fovereinn
and ier "f Ure ,°f hi? adtniniftration, fliould be known’
d that the ends of his government fliould be effected!
rL r:dl W‘! a°\ the n°ftrine bcforcus terminate in
human a V*3- C dieic biotild be no law or government
pu u °r • !Yln5 'n -Por better no law or government than
ch as it is beft fliould be violated and contemned. Yet
rit^Th5 t!’at fr°m nUCh v,olation aPd contempt of autho-
1^1 C rue excellence and dignity of government is to
be learnt, and it s ends anfwered ; and from hence only.
How fagacious are the reafonings of fome men, who mea¬
gre the Deity by themfelves ! ’
5Tis well that the underftandings of the generality of
mankind are not perverted by metaphyfical fubtilties.
Common people have no manner of doubt but fin is an
evil thing and a bitter— the fource of all mifery. They
have no doubt but it had been well for the world had this
accurfed thing never entred into it. They never once
imagine that God hath pleafure in it ; that he is the caufe
°t it, or determines moral agents to it— they fuppofe that
moral evil is a thing to which creatures are determined of
themfelves, agreable to the plain fenfe of the apoftle’s
words, ‘‘Let no man fay, when he is tempted, I am tempt-
ed ^rod : For God cannot be tempted with evil, nei-
ther tempteth he any man. But every man is tempted,
“ when be is drawn away of his own luft, and enticed.”
Common people have penetration enough to keep up a
difti notion between God’s being the caufe of natural good
and evil, and his being the caufe of moral evil— They rea¬
dily admit a pofitive influence of the Deity in holinefs, but
not in wickednefs. If fome modern metaphyficians’ had
the fenfe and difeernment of the vulgar in thefe matters,
it would be happy for themfelves and the world. The
common
Sect. VI. Moral evil not bejl for the world. 95
common people have been educated in the belief of fuch
things as thefe ; that the mod exalted motives to holinefs
are a confideration of it’s intrinfic beauty and excellence,
it’s tendency to dignify the intelligent nature, to advance
the divine glory and fecure his approbation. They have
believed that the fear of eternal punifhment is but an infe¬
rior principle of a&ion — a fpirit that ruleth in (laves, not
in fons. Are thefe mere vulgar errors ? So it fhould feem,
if it be true that the punilhment of devils is what fecureth
the perfevering holinefs of angels and glorified fpirits, and
eftablifheth the divine authority in their hearts.
Mr. Edwards hath no where faid, that moral evil might
not have been prevented, but rather intimated the contra¬
ry. Nor hath he denied but the human apoftacy might
have been permitted without the provifion of a faviom
However, on his principles neither of thefe things may be
fuppofed. For he hath ventured to fay, he is certain
that moral evil is for the bed— and that an infinitely wife
being mud therefore chuie it. Whether it follows or not
from the hints that have been given, that moral evil is not
bed for the world, we are by no rrieans very follicitous,
becaufe we chufe not to be peremptory and confident.
Yet we apprehend enough has been faid to create fuch a
degree of fufpicion whether it is indeed bed, that few “ per-
fons of good underdanding will fay, they are certain it is
bed. Or thus much at lead we fuppole will follow from
the things that have been obferved, that the advantage of
moral evil to the world is not proveable in the way jMx.
Edwards has attempted to prove it— the refult of which is^
that God may do evil, that good may come. Two pro-
pofitions appear to be mutually afiumed by him to prove
each other : One while he makes a podulatum of this, that
whatever i§, is therefore bed ; and proceeds to argue, that
God determines moral agents to fin. At another time,
making a podulatum of this lad pofition, he proceeds to
argue, that fin mud therefore be infinitely beneficial to the
world. What part foever of his difcourfe be examined, the
plain confequence appears to be this, that God is the caufe
of all wickednefs.
SECTION
)
(
SECTION VII.
On Foreknowledge.
Others apart fat on a "hill retired.
In thoughts more elevate, and reafon’d high
Of Providence, foreknowledge, will, and tit6.
Fix’d fate, hce will, foreknowledge abfolute,
And found no end, in wand’ring mazes loft.
Paradife Loft. Lib. II.
O queftionon the fubjeCt of morals hath more per-
^ plexed the learned than this. How is divine prefer¬
ence reconcileable with liberty in the creature ? While
moft (and among thefe the wifeft of men) have modeftly
confefled their ignorance, and looked upon the qUeftion
as unanfwerable by an human underftandmg ; lomc few
have attempted to folve the difficulty. But the attempt
hath been executed in luch a manner as hath rather evi¬
denced the folly and arrogance of the undertakers, than
bleared the fubjeft. The reader will hence conclude,
that the folution of this difficulty is not what we propofe
in the prefent fcCtibn.
' But llncc foine gentlemen feem to fuppofe, that prefei-
ehce and liberty cannot both be firmly believed unlels the
mind of man can reconcile them— fince Mr. Edwards
items to think his own fcheme altogether clear or this dif¬
ficulty ; and fince from the divine prefcicr.ee he infers his
doctrine of neceffity •, thefe things ffiali be briefly exami¬
ned in this place.' _ .
To fay that prefcience and liberty are abfolutely irre-
concileable, becauie we ourfelves cannot leconcile them,
would be to take the dirnenfidns of the divine mind from
our own. An infinite underftanding may be able to re¬
concile them, when a finite cannot. If any fubjeft in¬
volves difficulties, which we cannot, folve, we may not
immediately infer a contradiction in it. For what fubjeCt
can be mentioned that doth not involve fuch difficulties?
If we determine to believe no doClrines, till we fee bow
thefe tiiincs can be, this will land us in abfolute fcepticiim,
“ Dgi
97
Sect. VI L
rmknowleigL
Do we believe nothing but what we can give a rationale
of ? ’Tis manifeft then, that we do not believe the di¬
vine exiftence, nor that of any other beings or things—-
not even our own exiftence. For who pretends to know
after what manner God exifts ? or to be acquainted with
the eflences of other things ? The divine eternity, infinity,
omnifcience, &c. tranfcend all our conceptions. We are
wholly ignorant how our own fouls and bodies are united-
are loft in the contemplation of our own frame. The tri¬
nity and fatisfaftion \ are inexplicable myfteries. The
fcheme of Chriftianity, and the whole moral government
of God, are incomprehenfible. Nor would they be other-
wife, and be worthy of him who is perfect in knowledge.
His judgments are unfearchable, and his ways paft find¬
ing out. As the heavens are higher than the earth, fo are
his thoughts and ways above ours. Although we have
fuch evidence in general of the truth and reality of the
things above-mentioned as in a manner compels our be¬
lief; yet when the queftion is put, How can thefe things
be ? we difeern infuperable difficulties— at the fame time
we are confcious infidelity would involve us in difficulties
ftill greater*
With relpedt to the queftion before us, if the voice of
feripture or reafon be hearkned to, we muft admit both
prelcience and liberty— -and that they are confident, tho’
after a manner inconceivable by us. For we cannot be¬
lieve evident contradictions.
. We ule the term foreknowledge in accommodation to
our own narrow views and way of conceiving things. In
an infinite underftanding, there is no before or after-
no fucceffion of ideas. To him who calleth things that
are not as though they were, and with whom a tlioufand
years are as one day, the knowledge of futurity isprefent
knowledge. How then can a finite mind conceive the
manner of his knowing futurity ? Is there any thing in
viable creation that affords a rcfemblance of what we call
prelcience. When we undertake to fpeak on a fubjedt fo
high and too wonderful for us, it becomes us to be dif¬
fident of ourfelves, and very fparing of words, remember¬
ing that we are of yefterday— Tliofe feem not aware of
/ N * their
A
r
$$ Foreknowledge. Sect. VlF
ignorance, and the danger of fpeaking of God
the thing thiit is not right, who attempt to explain this
matter although by fearching they could find out God
--although he had taken couniel with them. Haft thou
Heavrd -the fecret of God ? And doft thou reftrain wifdom
tb thyfdf ?
’ 'Some men are apt to depart from evident truth out of
regard to abftrufc fpeculations. They turn afide from
the plain road of common lenfe, difdaining a beaten track,
and are carried away with the error of the wicked, under
pretence of new and important difcovejies. If any truth
be plain, this is, that man is free. Next to the confciouf-
nefs of our own exiftence is that of our moral freedom.
Yet a truth fo obvious is called in queftion by fome men,
becatife they cannot make it agree with the idea they have
formed of God’s infinite knowledge and eternal counfels.
“ As to the manner of God’s foreknowing certainly
*c contingent future events, that is, which have no necei-
fary caufe, nor are to be accomplifhed by his own power,
“ and the determination of his will, but produc’d by other
free agents ; this feems to be incomprehenfible by the
£C human underftanding. That any mind fnould forefee
cc with certainty a diftant e vent, which does not neceflfarily
proceed from the nature of things, nor is fix’d by the
“ purpofeof a voluntary agent, is wonderful to us and far
iurpaiTeth our conception. For as our knowledge of
“ futurity can only reft on one or other of thefe founda-
“ tions, we can form no diftindt notion of any foreknow-
“ ledge without them. It is probably their apprehending
“ the divine prefciencc after the fame manner, and limit-
“ ing it to the fame grounds, which has occafioned fo
cc much perplexity in the minds of men, and involved
“ their fpeculations upon this fubjedt in fo much confufi-
“ on. Some imagining that contingent events could not
“ otherwife be fo afeertained, as to be infallibly known,
“ have iuppofed peremptory eternal decrees concerning all
<c of them, even the freeft adtions of men ; and not only fo,
“ but a previous divine influence on the adtive powers of
“ rational creatures, exciting them to adtion : But others
judging this to be utterly inconfifteat with human liber-
“ ty.
Sect. VII.
cc
cc
cc
cc
Foreknowledge.
“ ty, and, with refpect to evil adions, inconiiftent with.
“ the Parity and goodncfs of the divine nature, yet dill
“ adhering to the fame limited foundation of foreknow-
ledge, have denied the doctrine of prefcience altoo-ether
“ or doubted concerning it I believe the belt way for
us to get rid of thefc difficulties is wholly to negled
the hypothefes, which have been invented to account
tor the manner of the divine prefcience, acknowledging
that it is to us inexplicable, and yet concluding diac
this is no fufficient objection againft a dodrine, other-
wue well confirmed. ” *
^ admire, fays Dr. Eliot, “ the modefty, as well as
gOodnefs of heart, difcovered by the great Mr. Locke
“ « one of his letters to Mr. Molineux f “ I freely own”'
; fay,S he’ “ the \veaknds of my underftanding, that though-
it be unquefbonable, that there is omnipotence and om-
„ niJcience in God our maker, and I cannot have a clearer
perception of any thing than that I am free ; yet I can-
« no^ make freedom in man confident with omnipotence
tt ai]d omni.cience in God, though I am as fully perfuad-
« ot both f of any truths I mod firmly afleqt to, and
<4 j!ierefor(!.1 have long fince left off the confideration of
Mr T r>U^ T r n^ ie ld°ftor iubjoins to thefe words of.
lVJr. Locke the following pertinent and feafonable reftec-.
.°* ou.r m°dern reafoners, who have not a
tenth part or his underftanding, had a little more of his
« 'I™"11?* ,the wrorld WOuld be free from thofe anmy
„ difpijtes about fate and free-will, liberty and neceflky, .
« of rhofePU hZ e the ieads’ but leldom mend the hearts,
or thole who engage in them.” f
Mrl 0Fdw0CT> : Prf !ence is a difficulty, that encumbers
Mn Eidwards s.own fclieme no lefs than that of his opoo-
“ themfelves hf’ ^ 1 lcre muft be a certainty in things
.fflrmM0'6 t]iey are certainly foreknown,” and
affirm that the former « is the foundation” of the latter.
<Y ,tve,ntJ have “ a Axed certain futurity
them cotfonf r kn°rW-edf’ and this antecedent neediityof
foreknown S WlPf‘1S eCal!fe °f their being certainly.,
foreknown. What is meant by the certainty in things
* Abernecby’s difeourfe on a;„- v • themielves*
t Dl Eho[ 5 fermoa 0ii «a;ura 1 uigain, 2I, ZZk
/•,»
W
f
l
Foreknowledge.
Sect. VII.
loa k
themfelves prior to their exiftence, is as unintelligible as
his opinion, “ that there is in the nature of things a foun-
« dation for the knowledge of the being of God, without
any evidence of it from his works of which notice
was taken, Examination, p. 36. marg. If by this certainty
be meant any thing different from the divine decrees and
determinations, then his argument will ftand thus : The
certainty there is in things themfelves is the foundation of
the divine decrees ; the divine decrees are the foundation
fsft foreknowledge • and foreknowledge is the foundation of
St neceffity winch belongs to all events in the natural
and moral world. This feems to be arguing in a circle.
On the other hand, if by this certainty in things themfelves
be meant the fame as the divine decrees and determinations,
then thefe being the fuppofed foundation of foreknow¬
ledge, the latter cannot be the caule of events, as Mr. Ed¬
wards reprefents, but the former. Neceffity is the caufe
of the knowledge of events, and not the knowledge ot
them the caufe of their neceffity. . ,
Further, If the purpofes and decrees of God, or his de¬
terminations as to futurity, be antecedent to foreknow¬
ledge, and the foundation thereof, then his will is deter¬
mined “ at random, by blind contingence,” without defign
O’- fnrcTmht _ “ guided by no wifdom, no motive, no in tel -
lio-entdi&ate whatever— he only acts by an Hobbiftical
■ fatality.” (P. 33°, 334-) To fpeak ot the divine will
is determined prior to knowledge, is plainly to fuppole it
determined without counfel and wifdom, undirected by
knowledge and intelligence. And what holinefs can there
be in fuch determinations ? It was finely through want or
reflection and refearch” —through inattention to his own
fcheme that Mr. Edwards grounds the certainty of fore¬
knowledge on an antecedent neceffity of events anfing
from the divine counfels and purpofes He reprefents the
opinion of thofe who teach that God’s foreknowledge is
antecedent to his decrees, as a fervile fubjeftmg the Deity
to fatal neceffity ; and faith, it argues inferiority and fer-
vitude unworthy of him, and comports with the heathen
notion of fate ns above the gods •, becaufe this is to iup-
pofe, faith he, that events have a fixed certain futun^°
tc
Sect. VII.
Foreknowledge .
IOI
a
which the divine volitions and defigns are fobjeA, and
mu ft be accommodated, (p. 352, 353.) ’Tis not a little
furprizing, that Mr. Edwards did not perceive this objec¬
tion was much more applicable to his own doArine, than
to that of his oppofers. Befidcs, How do thefe things
agree with his own words, p. 325. “We muft conceive of
the perfeAion of the divine underftanding as the foun¬
dation of his wife purpofes and decrees.” As he is not
herein reconcileable with himfelf, fo his principles are not
confiftent with the admiffion of forkenowledge. To fay,
the certainty of things, or divine determination of events,
is antecedent to his perfect knowledge of futurity, is to deny
prefcience , and only to aferibe after-knowledge to God. So
that while Mr. Edwards fuppofeth his own Icheme of ne¬
ceffity clear of all difficulty from the head of fore-know¬
ledge, it appears not only to militate with itfelf, but utterly
to preclude that prefcience from which he infers the necei-
fity of all events.
We will now enquire, in the laft place, whether pre¬
fcience implies neceffity. Mr. Edwards ufeth the terms
certainty and neceffity, as tho’ they were perfectly fynony-
mous ; and faith, “ Philofophical neceffity is nothing dif-
“ ferentfrom certainty.” (P. 22.) It is granted by all
who believe fore-knowledge, that this really implies the
certainty of all future events— not only that they will come
to pals, but alfo that they will come to pafe in iuch a cer¬
tain manner. But the inference is not, that they will come
to pafs necejfarily becaufe fore-known— that they are indif-
folubly conneAed as effeAs with prefcience as their caufe.
Now it is in this fenfe that Mr. Edwards maintains necef¬
fity. If fore-knowledge infers neceffity (in his fenfe of the
word neceffity) then it implies an irrefiftible determination
of the wills and aAions of moral agents.
Prefcience has no caufality in the coming to pafs of thefe
things which are the objeAs of it. So far is it from hav¬
ing any efficiency to produce them, that it hath no influence
to their produAion by way of motive or excitement. For
a motive is fomething extant In the mind’s view. Now
can any moral agent know, previous to any given volition
or aAion, that he Ihall certainly be determined to fuch vo.
m . . ~ lit ion
A
%
1
X02
Foreknowledge .
Sect. VIL
lit, on or action ? If not, then he cannot know that fuch voli-
S,” wte For this would ke to
Andfnrl 7 "eVer become may t* foreknown.
“ themfejves, then foreknowledge cat
nfluence in determining their adions For whar
f not perceived cannot excite or move to adion • or d-
ternnnethe wills of moral agents ; nor confeaVenl £
c nfidered asthecaufe, ground, or reafon of their being de
“ onindte'e ” ‘''at' , “ N°IhinS ” Mr. Edwards^
<c can 1,ndl!ce °,r Invlte the mind to will or aft any thing
any further than it is perceived, or is fome way or other
in the mind’s view.” (p, 8.) To fay that prefcience is
in the view of the creature’s mind, wou’d be to aferibe ar
incommunicable attribute of the Creator to a creature
foreknowledge, then, has no influence in bringing any
moral volitions to pafs-nor is it even an occajon of thZ
becoming effed. It doth not Hand in the relation of a
caule, motive, reafon or occafion to the exiftence of things
r°-efemehas fTrC °Ur k"owled§e of things paft w
„ Edwards s concurrence, p. 175. « I freely allow
;; that knowledge don’t prove a thing to be necefiary,
• anJ morc; than after-knowledge.” Now doth our know¬
ing that a thing is already come to pals imply that it came
to pafs neceflanly ? If not, then neither doth foreknow¬
ledge of a future event imply that fuch event muft come
to pafs by neceffity. That we know certainly an event
lath ah Cady taken place, doth not imply that the nature of
that event or the manner of it’s coming to pafs, are d^
termined by our knowledge. No more doth divine pre¬
fcience affed the nature of events, or the manner of their
coming into exiftence.
. 1VJ! - Edwards, as hath been obferved, makes the di
vine determination, and decifive ordering and difpofin*
(n all events, the ground ol their being foreknown— he
nippoieth the divine determinations alike concern’d in
moral volitions and adions, as in thole things which are
the mere work or God— that it properly belongs to him
w dllMe> nx ajKi determine the wills of all moral agents.
Sect. VII.
Fcrthtowhdgt
103
in every a£t, from the beginning of their exiftence. And
though he afferts not in words a pofitive agency of God
in evil a&ions ; yet the thing in effect is afferted, as hath
been fhewn. * Upon his fcheme God is the author and
caufe of fin ; no lefs than of natural good and evil — the
author and caufe of men’s vices, no lefs than the giver
and upholder of life, and fountain of their natural endow¬
ments and external advantages and enjoyments — the au¬
thor of evil difpofitions, no lefs than of holy and virtuous
ones. But do not reafon and feripture fiiew us, that there
is an important difference between his being the author of
the former and his being fo of the latter--? that his ope¬
ration, his determining and difpofing providence, cannot
extend to moral evil ? |) Doth foreknowledge infer fuch
neceffity ? We need not fcruple to fay that the certainty
of events, which foreknowledge implies is as diverfe from
Mr. Edwards’s philofophic neceffity as truth is from falf-
hood, or light from darknefs. To fupport his inference
from foreknowledge, it was incumbent on him to fhew,
that tnis is an extrinfic efficient caufe, whofe influence and
operation brings into effe£t the things foreknown. To
lay, that foreknowledge is an antecedent , and the things
foreknown confcquents , is but trifling, unlefs it can be
mewn that^ the latter are indiffolubly 'conneded with the
former as the caufe of their exiftence. Mr. Edwards may
* c ♦ TTr claim
* Se&ion iv.
II Every good gift, and every ptrfeft gift, is from above , and cometh
down from the father of lights. But God cannot hi tempted -with f moral!
*?‘ 9 n“tb*r temputb he any man . James 1. 13 ; 17. compared. AH
natural good and evil proceed from God as the proper caufe. /,
and' 11 TdttrCr 15 n° Z*dtwith me * 1 kill> «** I mak* alive : I wound,
Z m thln that can dtUcvtr out W (Deuc.
nrncp?H r K he °W Can naturaI evil, any more than moral,
mer is the™ a]g°°Ci caufe ' ufual anfvver is fufficicnt, that the fer-
beina t^Pei!S con/e<luenceofl the latter. The difference betwecnGod’*
founfa n r r °/ and of ^oral-between his being the
S riur'r and is. f0 °bv!ou‘ a"d important, and fo
.xcufe himfrlf?-1" fc"Ptur,e> that’us difficult to fee how any man can
‘Mary caufe .« C^f°Un1ding “ The .fifcj of necef-
«c cnaj creat U operly (peaking, God's own works. And rati-
«. ers are d “rived t' V abfol,uti.e ^ependanceon him ; all their pow-
Yet it *bv no mpd f ?b!In’ and Supported wholly by his providence.”
vice is to be imoute/^T5’ the det" ® ‘nation of their wills to
the determiners^/ their h'm 38 ‘ihe C,aafe that tber are ao< diemfclves
. nuners of thetr own evil volitions and aifions.
I
claim the honour of being the only author that attributes
caulation to foreknowledge.
“ Foreknowledge,55 faith an excellent writer, cc has no
influence at all upon the nature of things, to make
the leaft alteration in them. The events which are
“ neeeffary are foreknown as neeeffary, and thofe which
“ are contingent and voluntary, are foreknown no other-
wife than as contingent and voluntary. — The futurity
64 of contingent events is real, though we cannot tell the
cc caufe of it, or upon what grounds it is to be known. A
4C free aCtion now done, was yefterdav, or in any preceed-
“ ing point of duration, as truly future, as it has to day
4C actually come to pafs ^ therefore it is not impoflible (for
our minds can difeern no contradiction in it) that an
infinite underftanding fhould foreknow fuch events,
though, that knowledge i s too high for us , or perhaps
any finite mind, we cannot attain to it. And here we
4C may fafely reft, as we find ourfelves obliged to do in
tc our enquiries concerning the other perfections of God,
which are evidently proved to belong to his nature, and
cc therefore believed, though to us incomprehenfible. —
“ We cannot indeed believe contradictions, and to impofe
“ them upon us is to affront the rational nature-, but it
44 is no abfurdity to believe the exiftence and properties
44 of a being, whom we cannot by fear ching find out , nor un-
44 derftand to perfection.” J
To fupport his peculiar notion of divine foreknowledge
and decrees, Mr. Edwards denies moral agents all liberty
except what is merely external , and the refulr of necejfity in
the mind. What pity is it that men, otherwife difeerning,
are tenacious of favorite hypotheles, tho5 moft abfurd and
prejudicial in their confequences ! If intelligent creatures
are not free in a fenfe different from the inferior animals,
they cannot be faid to be moral agents— the accountable
authors of the things done by them : What they do muft,
in a moral eftimate, be confidered as the aCtion of iome
other being. There muft be felf-determination, or free¬
dom, fomewhere, in fome one being at leaft. And is it
not very bold to aflert, that God is the producer of all the
wickednefs
X Abernethy’s difeourfe cn divine ©innifcience*
Sect. VIL PorehiQwledgL 105
wickednefs in the world, by his agency ? He that main¬
tains this principle, that all onr volitions and aftions are
neceflary, would foon be convinced of his folly were he
to reduce the principle to pradtice. For mankind will
think he is free— that his actions/are his own— and will
treat him accordingly. He muft foon become intolerable
to fociety •, and from the reception he meets with, he may
clearly infer, that his fellow-creatures univerfally look up¬
on him as a moral agent, and fuppofe he might have a di¬
ed otherwife. And he muft be a ft range creature indeed,
if, finding the opinion of necefiity in the moral aftions of
men (when reduced to praftice) difavowed, with one voice,
by mankind, it doth not create in him fome fufpicion
wherether it be true, Ipeculatively confidered.
“ It is a conclufive argument againft iuch a fatal ne-
“ ceffity as lome men plead for, that it is contrary to the
“ perceptions of the human mind,— we liave a confciouf-
“ nefs of liberty, we perceive no external influence, we
“ have a moral fenfe, we pafs a judgment on our own
u a&ions, approve or difapprovc ourfclves and others.
“ It fhows the difficulty, to which a very fenfible writer*
“ of the prefent day is reduced, who allows this inward
“ perception, that we are necefiitated to think ou riel ves
“ and others free •, and yet denies the reality of liberty.
u God has, according to him, implanted a deiufive fenfe
“ in us, our feeling is deceitful, the God of truth
“ doth continually by a pofitive influence deceive and
“ delude us. What ilrar.ge notions have fome men of
c‘ that glorious being, all whofe ways are truth, and who
“ is righteous altogether ! Is it not better to fet limits to
“ our enquiries, and to fuppofe there may be a miftake
in fome curious fpeculations, than to entertain fenti-
“ ments fo diflronorable to God, and fo entirely fubverfivc
of all moral government ?” -j-
* Eflays on the principles of morality and natural religion,
f Vid. Dr. Eliot’s excellent diicourfe on natural religion.
*
• • -r." . W , 7 . •
O
SECTION
.( #66 )
' .
SECTION VIII.
On texts of fcripture mifconftrued.
IF from what has been faid it fhould appear, that Mr.
Edwards’s fcheme of neceffity may juftly be charged
with making an holy and good God the proper caufe of
lin, (which is the leading objedtion we have all along had
to his book on the will) it can be to every little purpofe to
alledge texts of fcripture in fupport of it. A dodtrine fo
repugnant to our natural apprehenfions of God and his
providence cannot be fupported by any pretence of autho¬
rity from him. The holy feriptures were not given to
contradidt and fubvert thofe notions of his moral perfecti¬
ons and government, which God hath given us by reafon
and the light of nature ; but to confirm and improve them,
as well as to afford us important inftrudtion in things
which unaflifted reafon would never have difeovered. If
any, therefore, fhould bring this dodtrine to us, that God
is the caufe of moral evil, the diredtion given to the Ifra-
elites, in the cafe of being enticed to idolatry, * is for our
learning, and may ferve to regulate our condudi. We
know not what right the advocate for fuch a dodtrine can
have to any other anfwer. His appealing to the word of
God to fupport what he advancetn is not very confiftent.
For if a dodtrine of fuch a nature be true, what faith can
be had In any fuppofed revelation from God ?
Yet it may be of ufe to fome readers to take notice of
the feriptures which are adduced to confirm the aforefaid
fcheme. As it would be tedious minutely to examine -e-
very particular text, we lhall feledt two or three only, on
which the principal ftrefs is laid. Should thefe be found
not to favour the fcheme they are brought to fupport, the
argument will conclude a fortiori with refpedt to other
texts, which are fuppofed to have lefs weight. The paf-
fages in the facred writings made ufe of by Mr, Edwards
may be reduced to three general heads. Firft, Such as re-
prelent the taking place of moral evil to be by the deter-!
minate -
* Deut. xiii. i, — 4.
i
Sect. VIII. Texts of fcripture mifeonftrued. *°7
minate counfel, prefcicnce and ordination of God. Second¬
ly, fuch as fpeak of his hardening moral agents in fin..
Thirdly, Such as are fuppofed to favor the opinion of the
advantage of moral evil to the univerfe.
Firft, Of fuch texts as reprefent the taking place of mo¬
ral evil to be by the determinate counfel, prefcience and
ordination of God.
Under this head, fuch texts are chiefly infilled on as re¬
fer to the crucifixion of the Lord of glory. * Now
thefe texts either imply an efficient determination of the
Deity in this event, or they do not : If they do not, they
are nothing to the purpofe for which they are produced
by the advocates for neceflity. On the other hand, if it
can befhewn that they really imply a divine efficiency on
the minds of the murderers of our Lord, influencing and
neceffitating them to this horrid deed *, then we fhall not
hefitate to admit, that every fpecies and degree of wicked-
nefs proceeds from the fame efficiency. For if God may
be fuppofed to effeX by his agency a crime of fuch enor¬
mity, what fliould hinder our believing that all moral evil
is the produX of his aXion and influence ? But let us com¬
pare fpiritual things, with fpiritual, and form our judg¬
ment frofn fuch a companion in the prefent cafe. Hence
it may appear much clearer, that an efficient determinati¬
on is not, intended, than, it will from thefe texts taken by
themfelves that fuch a determination is intended.
There is a twofold fenfe in which thofe moral events,
which imply blame in the agents, may yet be faid to come
to pafs by the determinate counfel, fore-knowledge and or¬
dination of God, without implying any aXive concurrence
qr efficiency of divine power herein.
Firft, Whatever comes to pafs agreable to the prediXi-
onsofhis word, may be faid to take place by his determi¬
nate counfel and foreknowledge : Such events may be cal¬
led what his hand and counfel determined before fliould be
done.
Secondly, Such events as he determines not to prevent
by the interpofal of his power, may alfobe faid to come to
pafs in the fame way. As all poffible futurity was fore¬
ver
* Particularly Luke xx.il 21, 2 2. A&s ii. 23, iii, iy, 18. iv. 27, aJL
'
*//! ' • » ' / .■* '
- .
ii.- , -■ >
toS ffkv/j of feripturt mifconftrued . Sect. VIII,
ver known to God, it hence follows, that in this ienfe the
exiftence of all moral evil is by his determinate counfel and
foreknowledge : Nor is there any other difficulty in apply¬
ing this fcnpture language to all moral evil that hath taken
place, or ever will, than in the application of it to the par¬
ticular cafe to which it immediately refers in fcripture,—
viz. the fufferings of the holy one and the juft.
What one evangelift hath delivered thus.. The fen of
man goeth as it was determined— -f- another expreffeth in
thefe terms, The fon of man goeth, as it is tvritten of him.
^ To the fame purpofe faith St. Peter, Thofe things which
God before had Jhewed by the mouth of all his holy prophets^
thatChrift fhould fuffer, he hath fo fulfilled, * So AXs
xiii. 27. They that dwell at Jerufalem, and their rulers,
becaufe they knew him not, nor yet the voices of the prophets^
which are read every fabbath-day,they have fulfilled them,
in condemning him. Seealfo ch. xvii. 2, 3. Luke xxiv.
25, 2(5. Thus it was the determinate counfel of God, that
Chrift fhould fuffer •, and in order to this “ it was necef-
fary God fhould35 permit him “ to fall into the hands of
wicked men, (for they could have no power over him,unlefs
it were thus given them from above) and that he fhould
lay no reftraints upon them, Torn executing their malici¬
ous ddjgns upon him ; and this unreftrained permifi
fion is all that is, or can be fignified by God’s delivering
up Chirft into their hands — His power could not afinally
concur , or effectively incline them, to the crucifixion of the
holy Jefus.” For although cc the hand of God is joined
with his council, and applied” to this event ; yet “ the
hand of God relates not fo much to his power, as to his,
wifdom and providential difpenfations.” |j
The conftruXion Mr. Edwards’s fcheme fixeth on the
feriptures under confideration precludes all diftinXion be¬
tween the afiive and peryniffive providence of God— a dif~
tinXion which hath hitherto been efteemed important by
the Chriftian church. A writer who fpared no pains in
eolleXing the fentiments of criticks and commentators, an¬
cient ano modern, upou the feriptures, and hath difeovered
equal judgment and learning in this ufeful undertaking,
; has*
:v I.ijkc xxii. zz. 1 Matt. xxq. 44, * Ads iii, 18, |1 Whiffy,
Szct. VIII, 'texts, of fcripture mifeonfirued. i©9
. «. ! '» V . . V U - i
has given ps. thefenfeof Chriftians on this point with fo
much perfpicuity and precifion, that we ffiall take liberty
to make the following extract s. Conjiitutnm eft aterno Dei
conjilio , et in S. S. declaratum. , &c.
In Englifh thus : It was appointed in God’s eternal
counfel, and declared in the holy fcriptures. Though
God forefaw, and decreed to permit, Judas’s betraying
Chrift, yet it is not faid that God determined Judas ftiould
betray , but that Chri fkjhouldgo. There is indeed a divine
decree refpeding the fins of men ; but then God only
permit and over-rules for good, their fins, and by no means
wills or determines their commiffion of them — ( Lucas Bru -
genftsi) If we enquire concerning the 'actions of Judas,
Pilate and Herod, it is certain, indeed, that they did not
happen without the father, inafmuch as a fparrow doth not
fall to the ground without him. But the will of God re*
Ipecling them was permijfyve, not efficient ; which diftinfti-
on is more agreable to fcripture, and the judgment of all
the primitive Chriftians, than their opinion who would
difcriminate actions from the vicieufnefs that is in them.
This, in regard to many adions, contradicts the nature of
things ; for inftance, theft, adultery, and the like, the very
naming of which is unintelligible, if the idea of finfulnefs
be feperated therefrom. Thofe alfo are equally unworthy
of regard, who fay, that the Deity impels men to fuch ac¬
tions for a good end . For the end alone cannot make fuch
adions right, or juftify thofe decrees which antecedently
impofe an abfolute neceffity of committing them. — It may
be added, that the name of fin is abfurd, according to the
hypothefis lome proceed upon. For we cannot commit
fin in thofe actions, which infinite goodnefs, by a decree
fubverfive of the liberty of our will, determ ineth we fliould
do, ’Tis more juft by far to fay with St. Paul, (Ads 14.
16.) God permitted the nations to walk in their own ways ;
and if there are any obfcure pafiages ellewhere in fcripture
to expound them in this fenfe * which all the antients did.
(Clemens Origen, Alexandrinus, Origen, Cyprian, Chryfof-
tom, Salvianus.) Agreably all the antients conftantly affirm,
that divine prefcience impofeth on men no neceffity of adion ;
which
no Texts of fcripture mifconjlrued. Sect. VIII.
» ' t f
which were unmeaning, if foreknowledge, itfelf be fuppof*
•d dependent on efficient decrees*
Origen, in his deputation, Whether what is foretold
muft be done ? accurately diftinguiffieth neceffity from
permiffion, thus : If the meaning be, neceffiarily done, we
declare for the negative for it might not have been done,
nor was there any neceffity that Judas ffiould be a traitor.
On the other hand, if no more is meant than not hindering
the eyent, which yet might not have become effeft, we are
for the affirmative. *
P. 362. of Mr. Edwards’s book. Dr. Doddridge is in**
troduced in a manner which may lead the reader to fup-
pofe his opinion was the fame with Mr. Edwards’s.. Only
the firft part of the Dr’s note on Luke xxii. 32. is quoted,,
In the latter part of the note on that text, the Dr. has taken
particular care to guard that part Mr, Edwards has quoted
againft fuch a conftru&ion as this partial view may induce
the public to fix upon the Doftor’s words. If the reader
turns to the place in Dr, Doddridge, it may give him a
different view of the Doftor’s fentimeots from what Mr..
Edwards’s quotation exhibits.
In his note on A6U iv. 28. the Dr. faith, 46 It is- — rati¬
onal — to explain this determination in fuch a manner, as to,
make it confiftent with th zfree agency, of the perfons con¬
cerned. When Gocfs hand and counfel are faid to have
determined thefe things, it may fignify God’s having point¬
ed out this great event fo wifely concerted in his eternal
counfels, and marked beforehand as it were all the boundaries
of it — in the prophetic writings .”
What the Doctor’s opinion was refpefting the neceffity
of moral actions, as proveable from the prefcience and de¬
crees of God, we further learn from the following paffages.
Jude v. 4. “ Who were regijtered to this condemnation . The
word [ Progegrammenoi ] may well, fignify deferibed and put up¬
on record ; that is, whofe character and condemnation may
be confidered as deferibed in the puniffiment of other noto¬
rious finners, who were a kind of reprefentatives of them.
Which interpretation I prefer to any other, as it tends to,
clear God of that heavy imputation which it muft bring
' f . . ■ " \ on
• Foil Synopfis in Luc. xxii, 23.
Sect. VIII, Texts of fcripturt mifconfiruei. 1 1 1
on his moral attributes , to fuppofe that he appoints men to
Jin againft him, and then condemns them for doing, what
they could not but do, and what they were, independent
on their own freedom of choice, fated to. A do&rine fo
pregnant with gloomy , and, as I fhould fear, fatal confe-
quences, that I think it a part of the duty I owe to the
word of God , to refcue it from the imputation of contain¬
ing fuch a tenet.”
Rom. ix. 13. “ Thefe words in their connexion with
the proceeding and following, do indeed prove, that God
adts with a fovereign and unaccountable freedom in the
difpenfation of his favors.— Neverthelefs it is certain, the
apoftle does not here fpeak of the eternal Jlate of Jacob and
EfaUy (whatever fome may fuppofe deducible from what
he fays,) nor does he indeed fo much fpeak of their pcrfons,
as of their pofterity j fxnce ’tis plainly to that pofterity that
both the prophecies, which he quotes in fupport of his argu¬
ment, refer. Gen. xxv. 23. Mai. i. 2, 3. His laying wajle
the heritage of the Edomites for the dragons of the wildernefsy
is fo different a thing from his appointing the perfon of Efatt
to eternal mifery by a mere a£t of fovereignty, without re¬
gard to any thing done or to be done by him to deferve it ;
that I will rather liibmit to any cenfure from my fellow-
fervants, than deal fo freely with my maker, as to conclude
the one from the other.”
Rom. ix. 22, 23. “ Every attentive reader will, I doubt
not, infer for himfelf the great difference of phrafe, in which
they whs are veffels of wrath , and they (who are veffels of
mercy, are fpoken of : It being faid fimply of the former,
that they were fitted for deftruttion ; but of the latter, that
God prepared them for glory. A diftindtion of fo great im¬
portance, that I heartily wifh we may ever keep it in view,
to guard us againft errors, on the right-hand, or on the left.”
Secondly, Of fuch texts as fpeak of God’s hardening
moral agents in fin. A Angle inftance under this head
may ferve inftead of many. The cafe of Pharaoh is much
infifted on, of whom it is repeatedly faid, that God har¬
dened his heart.
As Mr. Edward’s fcheme infeperably connedh the adtive
and permifiive providence of God, fo unlefs it can be
fhewn
xA Texts of fcripture mifconflrued. Sict. VliL
fhewn that God a finally effeSls the hardnefs of finners* Hearts
by a pofitive agency and influence, the fcriptures produced
under this head by no means help his caufe. Now that
God did not, could not, thus harden Pharaoh is manifeit
from the clearefl notices we have of the divine moral per¬
fections. The oracles of infpiration and reafon inflrudl
us, that God hath no pleafure in wickednefs, that evil fhall
not dwell with him ; that he is of purer eyes than to be¬
hold it — that there is no unrighteoufnefs with him. There¬
fore, let no man fay when he is tempted, I am tempted of
God : For God cannot be tempted with evil, neither
tempteth he any man. Is God the caufe of that in which
he hath no pleafure ?— to which he hath an infinite averff-
on ? Doth he produce and effect by his pofitive influence
that which the eyes of his purity cannot behold ? Will he
punifh with eternal torments that which is the production
of his own agency on the creature, and is there yet no un-
fighteoufnefs with him ? can the judge of all the earth do
right notwithftanding ? Doth he determine men to, and
by his own operation effedl in them, what he cannot be
tempted with, nor entice his creatures to perpetrate ? In¬
deed, to eflfedt by his power and influence fuch difpofiti-
ons and actions in the creature as involve all moral turpi¬
tude, is more than merely to tempt moral agents. They
may be tempted, and refill the tempter. But to lay fuch
difpofitions and adtions are produced in them by the a-
gency of the Deity himfelf, is to charge him, not merely
with being acceffary to, but the author of, what we call
fin in the creatures. It mull forever be impoflibie to fe-
perate the moral turpitude ot fuch difpofitions and adtions
from the producer or efficient of them. T- he fcheme or
neceflity excludes, indeed, the pofiibility of fin. For fin
is oppofition to the will of God. But fuppofe creatures
determined thereto by divine efficiency, this “ would ei¬
ther be a mere paffive obedience to the will of God, or
an adtive compliance with it > but neither way a contra¬
diction to it.” ’ i
If then God could not harden Pharaoh by a pofitive m-
fiuence and efficiency, it remains that he hardened him ho
otherwife than by flittering or permitting him to harden
himfelf
see*'
Sect. VIII. Texts of feripture mifconjlritcd.
himfelf not interpofing by an irrefiftible influence to pre¬
vent his obduratiom~or withdrawing divine influence and
affiftance from him after enduring him with much long-
fuffering, and ufing various means to humble and reform
him. The riches of divine goodnefs and forbearance, im
tended and calculated to lead him to repentance, hardened
Pharaoh, as evidently appears from the feripture account
of this matter. Agreably we read, Pfalm Ixxxi. u,
But my people would not hearken to my voice, and Ifra-
el would none of me. SO I gave them up unto their own
hearts’ lufl^ and they walked in their own counfel.
Worthy of remark is the note in Mr. Pool, on Exod.
ix. 12. In quinque precedentilus plagis, &c. In the five firfb
plagues, the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart is aferibed to
himfelf ; in the five laft, to God. As many times as he
.hardened his own heart, God hardened it lor punifhment.
(Lightfoot’s Spicilegium.)
The fuppofition of the divine agency in the obduration
of finners, is, upon the whole, incapable ot lupport from
the lacred waitings. So grofs a contradiction to reafon, fo
glaring a repugnancy to the general ‘dodrine of the bi-
ble, fo blaiphemous a refledion on the divine author of
the feripture, is implied herein, that it is not a little aftonifh-
ing any perlons who have a veneration for either fhouid
embrace a fcherne of dodrine which contains it, and at¬
tempt to defend iuch fcherne by the word of God. It
leaves no room for a difference between phyfical and mo¬
ral neceluty. It fuppofeth that God may deceive us. For
it is allowed that we ad with the convidion of being free
agents, and that tne Icriptures confider and treat us as
fuch- when in truth.we are neceffary agents, all our voli¬
tions and adions being determined by divine agency.
One writer affirms, that though man is a neceffary a-
gent, having all his adions determined by fixed and
immutable laws ; yet this is concealed from him— Who
conceals it ? Does the author of nature conceal it, and
this writer dilcover it ? What deference is not due to
the judgment of a metaphyfician, whofe fagacity is fo
irrefiftibly (I had almott laid omnipotently) penetrat-
ing! But, good fir, as you are powerful, you fhouid have
merciful. It was not kind to rob poor mortals of
P “ this
tv
a
4%
m
y
-
'Texts of fcripture mifconftrtted. Sect. VIII.
if
twf
Mf
:g^,
“ this crumb of comfort which had been provided for
“ them in their ignorance •, nor generous to publifh fo
“ openly the fecrets of heaven, and fo baffllc the defigns
“ of providence by a few ftrokes of your pen. If the laws
“ of nature, after maintaining their authority for fix
“ thoufand years, are fo little able to Hand before him,
“ who knows what havoc he might have made among
“ them in the infancy of their eftablilhment.”*
Laftly, Of fuch paffages of fcripture as are fuppofed to
favor the opinion of the advantage of moral evil to the uni-
verfe. Whether moral evil is really for the bell— efpecial-
ly whether it be fo in that way which the fcheme of neceffity
fuppofeth, has been already examined. (Sedlion VI.) And
what was offered on this head has in a good meafure luper-
feded the occafion for a particular reply to the texts pro¬
duced here. Jofeph’s being fold by his brethren, and the
crucififtion of Chrift, are particularly alledged as proofs
from fcripture of the beftnefs of moral evil.
It is granted, that the wiltlom of divine providence is
many times confpicuous in bringing good out of evil—
particularly in the inftartces mentioned, over-ruling for
great and important good, what was in its own nature, and
in the intention of the authors thereof, exceeding vile.
The means wicked men and devils employ to bring to pafs
their devices, under the fiiperintendency of the wife and
oracious governor of the world, are made to anfwer bene*
ficiai purpofes, which they thought not of, and contrary
to their defigns. He taketh the wife in their own crafti-
nefs, and carrieth headlong the counfel of the froward.
But what is this to the purpofe of proving, that their wiclc-
tdnefs is for the bell ? How doth it hence appear to be
bell, that God fhould effett this wickednefs by his own
agency. Unleis this confecjuence is ihewn to follow, it
will be remem bred, that the inftances rexered to prove no¬
thing to their purpofe who maintain the neceffity of moral
eyil.0 It may be bell God fhould not interpofe to over¬
rule and neceffitate the wills of moral agents ; and yet it
might have been bell that they themfelves had refrain’d
from fin. It may be bell that God did not prevent the
exiltence
* Beattie on truth, p. 334, 33;.
Sect. VIII.
T’exts of fcripture mifconftrued. i 15
exiftence of fin by an irrcfiftible influence ; while yet it
might have been beft had fallen angels and men never
abufed their liberty, but perlevered in virtue.
That moral agents fhould be neceflitated to be vicious,
as a means of the greateft holinefs and happinefs, is a
Arrange pofition.
To recite fcripture teftimonies in oppofition to this hy-
pothefis would be needlefs, the whole tenor of the bible
being in direct contradiction to it. When the fcriptures
defcribe fin as the accurfed thing, which leperates the crea¬
ture from the Creator — the root of all bitternefs— the ruin
of individuals and communities— the wages whereof is
death temporal and eternal— Shall any undertake to lhew,
notwithftanding, that it is for the good of the world— a
rheans of advancing the divine glory, and therefore the
production of his power — and attempt to fupport fuch a
doCtrine by the oracles of truth' ? In order to this, they
mull prove from thefe oracles, that God prefereth fin to
holinels — that the apoftacy of men and angels will be mat¬
ter of eternal praife in heaven — that we Ihould fin greedily,
that grace may abound — that fin is not oppofite to the
will ot God, nor to his moral reCtitude— that the leaft fin
is yet infinitely oppofite to God, and therefore an infinite
evil — that infinite evil infinitely promotes God’s glory, and
therefore is an infinite good — that his wifdom and holinefs
require he fhould be concern’d in it by an efficient decree
and aCtive providence — that the divine influence and agen¬
cy are alike concern’d in the vices as in the virtues of his
creatures. — Wlien thefe and finnlar difficulties are cleared
up, it will be foon enough to anfwer arguments, formed
from texts of fcripture to prove, that moral evil is for the
good of the univerfe, through divine efficiency.
In the next fucceeding feCtion, fome things will be of¬
fered, which may be applied in this place. We only add
here, that while the friends of revelation exhibit fuch an
idea of it, its enemies triumph. The author of the let¬
ters on the origin of evil, proceeding on the fame founda¬
tion, takes occafion to burlefque the doClrine of the gcf-
pel in the following manner : “ This principle of the ne-
c^lfity of moral evil, and its pun'fhment, is the foundati-
n6 ‘Texts of fcripittre mifconjtrued. Sict. VIII.
<c on on which the whole fabric of the Chriftian difpenfa^
cc tion is erected ; the principle itielf is avowed by the
author of that difpertfation in clear and exprefs Words r
“ It mujl needs be that offences come ; but woe unto that man
“ by whom the offence comet h : That is, ft is neceflary to-
“ wards cornpleating the defigns of providence, that fome
“ men fiiouki commit crimes ; but as no individual is
<c compelled by neceffity to commit them, woe unto all
ct Wnoare thus [i. e. necefiardy] guilty.— The expediency
<c of moral evil, arifing from the neceffity of natural,— is
<c a rnafter-key, which will, I am certain, at once unlock
all the myfiefious and perplexing dodlrines of that a-
“ mazing inititution, [Chriftianity] and explain fairly,
*c without the leaft affiftance from theological artificey all
<c thofe ahftrufe fpeculations of original fin, grace and
cc predeftination, and vicarious punilhments, which the
moft learned, for want of this clue, have never yet been
*e able to make confiftent with retffon and common fenfe—
“ all evils owe their exiftence folely to the neceffity of
their own natures, by which I mean they could not pofi
fibly have been prevented without the lofs of fome fit-
perior good, or the permiffion of fome greater evil than
“ themfelves.” * This author’s view, in attempting to
evince the neceffity of moral evil, appears to have been no
other than the utter fubverfion of natural and revealed
rehgiori.
* P. if ; m, 113 ; 119, 1 to.
SECTION
% if
( **7- )
SECTION IX,
Objedtions conlidered.
i
IF the book which hath been under examination really
concludes in this principle, that God is the efficient
caufe of fin ; but few of our readers will think it needful
to fpend much time in confidering objections. Whether
this appears to be the true conclufion of Mr. Edwards’s
principles, from each of the foregoing feCtions taken fe--
perately, or from the evidence exhibited in them all taken
together, muft now be left to the judgment of the reader.
Some of his friends acknowledge the conclufion we have
drawn, adopt it as a principle, and undertake to defend it.
Can God then be the caufe of that which is acknow¬
ledged to be contrary to his nature, law and government?
Muft it not be afruitlefs employment of any man’s time
to attempt to make the negative more manifeft than it al¬
ready is to fuch as “ have plain fenfe and can follow it ?”
If the above-mention’d conclufion is clearly faftned on
Mr. Edwards, it is fuch a redulfio adahfnrdum as muft be a
full confutation of his doCtrine before believers, either
Chriftians or Theifts. Such as adopt the conclufion, and
undertake to vindicate it before the world, fhould openly
declare on the fide of atheilm, and fcepticifm, before they
can reffonably expeCt any reply.
46 But if it is taken for granted, that Mr. Edwards’s
4< fcheme concludes in nothing fliort of the divine effici¬
ency in moral evil, why then is this fedion devoted to
the confideration of objections ?” Our aniwer (or ra¬
ther apology) is, to cut off occafion from them that leek it.
Though all who believe in God may well take for granted,
that there can be no real weight in any reafoning adduced
to prove, that moral evil is an effeCt proceeding from
him as its caufe ; or in any objections to the contrary
principle — that whatever fubtilty and deception there may
be in fuch reafoning and objections, there can be no va¬
lidity therein— And though we are by no means fully fa-
tisfied, that any objections, which can with propriety be
made
u
<4
■"V
*
' z ■■ ■
.
r A 'ir 7/ ■ Xu !*
1 VSffiSB.
1 1 ^ Objections confidered. Sect. IX.
made on the footing of the divine agency in moral evil,
merit attention ; yet we lhall take notice of two objecti¬
ons principally, pafijng others which cannot fo properly
e made on the prefent hypothecs ; or if they could, are
5 s confiderable. We fhall, for inftance, excufe ourfelves
from particularly confidering this objection : That to fay
nioial agents might in any inftance chufe or aCt otherwile
than they do, is to fuppofe an effeCt without a caufe— an
objection which has no weight, if moral agents in any cafe
determine themfelves, or are the caufe of their own voliti¬
ons — as we truft hath been ftiewn.
W e fhall alfo pretermit the objection, that the opinion
of felf-determination makes the creature independent on
the creator— yea, brings the creator into aftate of depen-
dance on the creature. The reader mav, moreover, find
the jeeming weight there is in thefe objections removed,
p. 77, 7 8. of the examination, in a note.
It muft further be added, that fome objections Mr. Ed¬
wards has made to the fcheme of liberty in oppofition to
neceffity are fully anfwered in that effay of Dr. Watts’s,
which he had before him. Mr. Edwards hath propofed
the objections anew without taking notice of the pertinent
anfwers the Dr. hath given them. If the reader will turn
to the 6th feCtion of the Doctor’s effay, he will there find
many objections fully anfwered.
The firft of the two objections propofed to be confider-
ed, and which Mr. Edwards much infifts on, is, That
on the principles of thofe who affert felf-determination,
46 the will of God is infinitely croffed by every aft of fin
“ that happens— that he endures what is infinitely difagre-
“ able to him— -infinite grief or pain from every fin” —
that creatures have it “ in their power to thwart and fruf-
1C trate the defigns of the creator,” and to “ make him
c; infinitely the moft miferable of all beings.” This, he
lays, certainly follows, if fin be not, upon the whole, a-
greable to the divine will, and what God chufeth as part
of his infinite fcheme. *
To this we fay, firft, It is acknowledged that moral evil
is in its nature infinitely contrary to the perfections, law
and
* P- 37T
Sect. IX.
Objections confidered .
1x9
» * - * • *
and government of God. Now we may with as much
feafon fay, he is fruftrated, grieved and pained by the ex-
iftence of it viewed in its nature , as that he chufeth and is
pleafed with it viewed in its confequences—even admitting
it is for the belt, all things confidered, that moral evil
hath taken place. So that if it follows from the opinion
of felf-determination, that God is “ infinitely eroded and
“ grieved by every individual fin ;3’ the fame confequence
follows on Mr. Edwards’s own principles. Should it be
granted, that every a<£t ©f fin is, in one view of it, agreable
to the will of God, what he produceth by his efficient de¬
termination ; yet, in another view, it is admitted, that it is
infinitely contrary and hateful to him. Doth it not then
follow, on Mr. Edwards’s principles, that God mud needs
be infinitely pained and grieved by it, in proportion to his
hatred of it ? He vieweth it in its nature and te?idency\ as
well as in its conferences. Muft he not then be “ infinitely
“ the mod miferable of all beings, as his hatred of fin is
“ infinite ?”
Secondly, It would be conformable to the advice of a
wife man of old * to reply to fuch an objeftion, that there
are plain and pofitive declarations from God himfelf, that
he is grieved and repenteth at the fins of his creatures.
W e read, that it repented the Lord that he had made man,
and it grieved him at his heart — that he is angry with the
wicked every day — that they weary God by their iniqui¬
ties — vex and grieve his fpirit — walk contrary unto him.
We read of his heart being turned within him, and his re -
pentings kindled together. Now which ffiall we admit
for truth— theie exprefs and clear declarations of feripture,
or the conjectural reafoning on which the objection pro¬
ceeds ? If it be faid, Such fcriptures are fpoken after the
manner of men. . The anfwer is. They who thus object have
no right to this plea. For their own reafoning (if reafon-
mg it may be called) reprefents that as a reality , which
the Scriptures doubtlefs mention figuratively , and by way
of accommodation to our way of conceiving things. If
their notions of the ends of providence in the permiffion of
fin are not admitted as indubitable truth, they immedi-
* Prov, xxvi. 4, 5, ^1/
%
*
Sect. IX,
ately infer, that the Deity muft needs be affected in the
fame manner that human beings are, when any of their
fchemes are -fruftrated— -that he is thwarted, pained, griev¬
ed, and made infinitely miferable.
Thirdly, This way of objecting, to fay theleaft, is high¬
ly irreverent and unbecoming, It has the appearance of
an inclination to bring down to a level with man that is a
worm, that being whofe glory is above the heavens. It
is treating the character and government of the Lord God
omnipotent with left deference than is fhewn to an earth¬
ly potentate. Such leveling notions introduced into reli¬
gion are of molt pernicious confequence. Is the infinite
God to be treated with a familiarity, which we fhould fcarce
prefume to ufe with a fellow-mortal, who happens to be
elevated a little above us ! Under a notion of doing honor
to his facred name and government, fhall we fpeak of him
as though he were altogether fuch an one as ourfelves ! Shall
yre fubjedt the afifolutely perfect fpirit to human paffions
and feelings ! Would it be left abfurd, or left prefumptu-
ous and reproachful, to fuppofe the Godhead like to gold ,
filver , or Jlene , graven by art and man's device ? Doth it be¬
come a creature to fpeak with fuch freedom ot the high
AND LOFTY ONE WHO INHA$ITETH ETERNITY, W^OSE
name is holy ! Angels, who excel in ftrength, and on
whom he fhines with the full beams of his glory, confefs
their ignorance in the deep things of his nature and pro¬
vidence. They acquiefce in the will of him who is won¬
derful in counfel— whofe ways are paft finding out— and
humbly adore his unfearchable wildom in his works and
adminiftration. Yet man, inftead of imitating thefe fons of
God above, would be wile beyond the meaiure of his,
capacity, and rank in the leale of beings. With the fhort
line of his own realon he would fathom the abyis of the
Deity— and is wpnt to view him through the dark medi¬
um of human prejudices and paffions. Can God approve
our taking the ineafure of his nature from our own ? Can
he be pleafed with being brought to a level with creatures,
who dwell in houfes of clay, and wdiofe foundation is in
the duft.? Hath he not admonilhed us, My thoughts qri
not your thoughts \ neither are your ways my ways* faith tv?
* 1 r.Vfi
Sect. IX.
Objections covji&erH.
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For /fo heavens are higher than the earth., fo are
my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your
thoughts. ,
What we have further to offer in reply to this objection
will properly enough fall under the other objection refered
to above ; and which we fhall therefore proceed to confi-
der. The objection is this : To fuppofe moral evil is an
effcCfc of free-will abufed, or of internal caufation in the
ere a; ure, is the fame as to fuppofe God himfelf the caufe
of it, fince he ti lifted this matter with the creature, who
hn km w would abufe liberty. And fince “ the moft im-
L' p or tart t meal ures of his conduCt towards mankind, all
Known to him from the beginning, were formed upon
the iuppofition of the being of moral evil, which he
could have prevented, how can the permiffion of it con-
fift with the moral perfections of the Deity,” any more
than the fuppofition of his efficiency in it ? “ It muft eter¬
nally be the fame thing whether a Creator of infinite
power and knowledge created beings originally wicked
and miferable, or gave them power to make themfelves
fo, fore-knowing they would employ that power to their
“ own deftruCtion.” *
It is indeed a dilmal dilemnla, that God muft either for¬
cibly prevent wickednefs, or be himfelf the caufe of it.
The former he hath not done : For it is certain that wick-
ednels is in the world. Muft we then embrace the other
part of the dilemma ? Is it the nioft rational way of ac¬
counting for the exiftenee of fin to lay, that God createth
beings originally wicked, or infufeth wickednefs into them
afterwards ? What relief can it be to the mind of one who
really believes aGod to fay, that fin proceeds from him as die
caule? Whataniwer can the maintainer of this principle make
to thcatheift ? F or whether is better, to fay there is noGod ?
or to fay there is a God indeed, but that he, and he only, is
the caufe of wickednefs ? Suppofe moral evil is for the
, j. IC ls 5!1. a moft daring affertion to fay, it was beft
the divine efficiency ffiould bring it into exiftenee.
Some argue, if fin is not for the beft, it would certainly
have been prevented, fince God foreknew and might have
prevented it. On thefc premifes they conclude, that fin
* Letters or th* origin of
A*
4
122 Objections conjidtrei. Sect. DC
muft be an -effect of divine operation and production. — A
confequence which by no means follows •, and which in¬
volves fuch impiety, that no fuppofeable difficulties attend¬
ing the exiftence of moral evil fliould compel us to admit
it. To embrace this confequence in order to rid ourfelves
of one difficulty, would be to involve ourfelves in a far
greater— -an inextricable one, abfolutely irreconcikable with
the moral perfections of God. And when he is rob’d of
tbefe , his glory is taken from hirn : The name of a Deity
may be retained, but no mere.
On the hypothefis before us, how is it poflible to know
that God is holy ? that he loves righteoufnefs, and hates
wickednefs ? For can he hate the effects of his own pro¬
ducing— the operation of his own power— his own afts ?
By fuppofition all fin is his aft— the fruit of his agency or
efficiency. Why then is not fin very good, as much as
any part of the Creator’s work ? If the difpofition in aban *
doned finners andapoftate lpirits, no lefs than the contrary
temper in faints and angels, is the produft of divine energy,
by what rule can we determine that holinefs is pleafing,
and wickednefs offenfive, to hirn ? Though the operations
of our own minds clearly declare to us, that moral evil is
contrary and odious to God •, yet what elfe can we con¬
clude than that thofe perceptions are a deltifion ? And if
our own feelings are delufivc, this particular impreffion or
idea, that there is a God and moral governor, may be fo.
The fuppofition of the exiftence of matter or fpirit may be
adelufion. Our own confcioufnefs may be fo. We may
be deluded in fuppofmg that we ourfelves exift, though
the very fuppofition clearly implies our exiftence. No
paradoxes were ever brought forth by the moft abjeft
64 fuperftition, or the moft frantic enthufiafm, more in-
credible” than the wifdom of the prefent age hath pro¬
duced. To fuppofe that the alwiic Creator and governor
of die world cffcfts by his own agency what is infinitely
repugnant to his pure and holy nature,, is as marvellous a
paradox as was ever published. We might rather fay, that
Ihs wifdom required all rebels fhcfuld periili everlaftingly*
than fiy, that an holy God firft effefted by his own ener¬
gy their rebellion, as the medium of difplaying his own
perfections.
\
V ■> > - . X
.
ainai
»*«i >->n{>raii
3ect. IX.
Objections conjidered.
perfections, and communicating the greatefl happinefs to
the universal fyftem. We might with as much appear¬
ance of reafon fay, that the happinefs of the univerfe is not
the care of the infinite Creator and parent of it, as fay,
that he produceth moral evil as a neceffary means of this
happinefs. As well might we fay, that wifdom required
God fhould not create the worlds- -fhould not form crea¬
tures capable of moral evil. What weight, then, fhould
be allowed to objections which proceed on a fuppofition
fo reproachful to that being whofe work is perfeCt--? a
God of truth, and without iniquity ? A fcheme founded in
a principle fo horrible, fofhockingly abfurd and impious
as this, that an holy, wife and good God is at the fame
time the efficient of fin, and an avenger to execute wrath
upon the fubjeCts of it, neither demands, nor will admit
any other anfwer than that in the book, of Job, Far be it
from God that he fhould do wickednefs , and from the Almighty ,
that he fhould commit iniquity . No man fhould fuffcrhim-
fclf to be in the leafl ftaggered by objections formed on
the fuppofition of the truth of fuch a fcheme, whether he
is able diftinCtly to anfwer the objections or not. An at¬
tempt to fupport fuch a fcheme delerves to be rejected
with contempt and abhorrence. No poflible objections
founded on fuch a bafis can have any weight by reafon of the
terribility of the hypothefis itfelf. The public will not
think there is occafion for, or even propriety in, taking up
time to confider objections ftated on this bafis, ’Tis^fuf-
ficient to fay with the excellent Mr. Howe, “ That God
doth by an efficacious influence move and determine men
to wicked aCtions, I moft refolvedly deny.55
Some feem to fuppofe, that the “ goodnefs of God, or
“ his reCtitude, require the exertion of his utmoft power
“ for preventing evil.55 But this “ is not to be imagined-
1 he wifdom of God requires that his operatiomfhould
be according to the order which he has. eftabliflied, and
to the nature of things which he has wifely framed to
be preferved inviolable. As in the government of the
inanimate ci eatures, he aCts fuitably to their natures, mov-
mg and difpofing of them by the irrefiftible determina¬
tion, of Ins fovereign will, fo his influence on moral a.
cc
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124 Gbjeffions conftdered. Sect. IX.
<c agents is iuch as does not deftroy the cffential powers
“ which he has given them.”
u Let it be more particularly confidered, firft, that
perhaps there is not, nor can be, any being of a limited
underftanding above the poffibility of being milled in its
moral condud ; and all the orders of created free agents
mull: naturally be in a ftate of trial, till by a right ufe of
liberty their integrity is confirmed — Every im perfect a-
gent, having, a variety in his frame, mull have propenfi-
ons to particular objeds which are adapted to the indi¬
gence of his condition ; which propenfions in a regular
moral conftitution, are under the government of confid¬
ence ; but their being does not depend upon it. They are
excited by the prefence of their fuitable objeds, or per¬
haps without it •, and though their firft motions, and per¬
haps their continuance in the mind for fome time, may be
innocent, yet it is eafily conceivable that they may de¬
mand a gratification, in circumftances and degrees, which
confidence forbids,”
“ Here then is a tendency or temptation to evil, from
which the creature by the right ufe of its own powers
may efcape, and thereby be more confirmed in virtue ;
but a poffibility of falling and corrupting itfelf feemsto
be infeperable from every finite nature ; and even the
danger of it ieems naturally to attend the ftate of all finite
moral agents, during fome part of their exiftence — We
know that v/e are capable both of doing right and wrong
and our moral powers fo conftituted, with fuch a freedom,
we cannot help thinking a very high privilege ; whereby we
are raifed above the condition of many other beings, and
have the effential foundation of noble enjoyments.”
“ Secondly, The human mind neceffarily appears to
itfelf the caufe both of the moral good and evil which is
done by it— The capacity is derived wholly from God,
and is preferved by him ; the particular determination is
from ourfelves y only influenced, fo far as is confiftent
with cur free agency, by fetcing before us fufficient mo-,
tives to good. Yet the mind has natural power of making
a wrong choice. We rnuft then be condemned by our
c\yn hearts, in charging the human conftitution as defec-
: * ' rive
125
Sect. IX. Objections con/tdered.
tive to the purpofes of virtue, and thereby of happinefs,
and impeaching the goodnefs of its author ; fincc we are
confcious to ourfelves, that we are. furnifhed with all that
is neceffary, and know of no power that is wanting to our
doing good and efchewing evil.”
“ Thirdly, Whereas it is alledged that fince God fore-
faw men would abufe their liberty,—- goodnefs requir’d
that the occafion of fuch an abufe fhould have been pre¬
vented. The anfwer is,— that the futurity of the actions
of free agents, of which themfelves are the foie caufes, is
no more determined by the divine appointment, than the
aCtual production of them is affected by his power.”
“ Fourthly, It muff be acknowledged that, ftriCtly
fpeaking, God — could have created moral agents much
more perfect than men are ; given them a greater meafure
of knowledge ; fet the motives of virtue ia fo ftrong a light
before them, as more effectually to fecure their attach¬
ment to it— could have placed them in a ftate much
more free from temptations, and confequcntly in lefs dun-
ger of making defection— could have prevented the con¬
juncture of circumftances in which he forefaw liberty could
be abufed. But — (hull we take upon us to fay, that the
order of the creation, and the ends for which it was made,
did not require, or even allow, that there fhould be fuch a
rank of beings in it, conftituted as we are, with under¬
standing, liberty, and moral affeCtions, but capable of fin,
tempted to it, and thereby in danger of becoming unhap¬
py through their own fault? or that the prefent conftitu-
tion, in this branch of it which relates to free agents, is
inconfiftent with the wifdom and moral perfections of the
fupreme Being.” *
* Abcrnethy’s difcourfes on divine goodnefs.
wnmy.
SECTION
L
( 126 )
SECTION X.
On metapliyfical reafoning. *
Hie labor Hit dcmu<t et inextricabilis error.
j A^NEIB, LIB, Vi.
WE mean not to fpeak contemptibly of metaphyfics,
as fuch, and properly applied. There is probably
no feience but may (in addition to its advantages in other
refpefts) claim fome merit as being fubfervient, more or
lefs, to the elucidation and confirmation of religion and
morals. Logic, natural philofophy, the mathematics, po¬
lite literature have been greatly ierviceable to mankind in
tms view. And pofiibly metaphyfic hath been of fome
fmall advantage in . the lame refpeft : Though the injury
which the mifapplication of it hath done religion, at
onetime and another, if put into the oppofite fcale, might
far outweigh it’s advantages.
Admitting
‘ worc3 mtaphyfsc, according to vulgar ufe, is applied to
al! difqoiiitions concerning things immaterial. Ia this fenfe, the
piaineit account of thefaeulties of the mind, and of the principles of
moral and natural religion, would be termed met aphy fie; , Such me,
tapbyfic, however, we are fo far from defpifmg or cenfuring, that we
account it the fu'blimeftand molt ufeful part of fcience.
Thofe arguments alio and illuflrations‘in the abftrad philofophy,
which are not obvious to ordinary underflandings, are fometimes cal¬
led met aphyjical. But as the principles of this philofophy, however
v-ell expreiled, appear fomewhac abltrufe to one who is but a novice
in the ftudy ; and as very plain principles may feem intricate in an,
author who is inattentive to his expreffion, as the beft authors fome¬
times are, it would be unfair to rejed, or conceive 3 prejudice againft,
every dodrine in morals that is not perfedly free from oblcunty.
^ et a continved obfeurity, in matters whereof every man foould be, a
competent judge, C3nnot fail to breed a fufpicion, cither that the doc-
i/me ?s tauiry, or that the writer is not equal to his fubjed.
The term metapbyjical, in thofe pafiages of this book where it is
exp'emveof cenfure, will be fouAnd to allude to that mode of ab~
iixfid inveiligation, fo common among the modern fceptics and khooK
men, which is fupported, either wholly by no ambiguous and indefi¬
nite per ajeoiogy ox by that inconjundion with a partial experience ; and
wntch fcidom fails to lead to tuch conclufions as contradid matter
cl lad,, or truths of indifputable authority.”
Beattie 01? truth, p. 401, 40$.
\
Sect. X*
Metaphyfical reasoning.
12 7
r
Admitting metaphyfics may be profitably applied to
religious fubjecfts ; yet (without undertaking to prefcribe
the exacft limits) it will doubtlefs be granted
— — Sunt certi denique fines, ;
Quos ultra ciiraq\ nequitconfifiere reffum. Hor*
It may be fubmitted to public confideration, whether'
firft principles can, without danger, be brought to the
, teft of metaphyfics. The being of a God we call one
of thefe principles 5 the immediate confcioufhefs mankind
have of liberty and accountablenefs, another *, and fince
the fuppofition that God is the caufe of fin wholly robs
him of his moral chara&er, we venture to add, that the
negative of this is another firft principle. The works of
creation without us, and the witnefs for God within us,
inftantly atteft the truth in thefe points, as foon as they
are mentioned* *Tis very queftionable whether metaphy¬
fics have been, or can be, ufed to any advantage, on
thefe manifeft points, even againft the fophiftry of infi¬
dels. We fee not why a philofopher and metaphyfician
is not obliged to take up with that evidence here which
affords clear conviction to men of plain underftanding.
When believers in God have refered the fophiftical reafon-
er againft his being and perfections to that inconteftible
proof of them which the vifible world exhibits, they have
done their duty— all that is required, or that can indeed
be done. Abftra£t reafoning, it may be prefumed, will
afford no conviction, where the conftant attcftations to
the being of a God in creation and providence do not.
The oppofing metaphyfics to metaphyfics will keep the
infidel in countenance. It is an intimation to him, that
he has fome reafon for his incredulity. For he pretty
naturally concludes, that the being of a God would not
be brought into the field of debate by thofe who believe
it, were there not fome reafon to doubt it. Principles
manifeft on firft propofal, if men will open their eyes, nei¬
ther need nor can receive any affiftance from metaphyfics ;
and thofe who would make them undergo the peril of a
metaphyfical fcrutiny may find they have expofed them
to be rejected.
The other two principles mentioned above are as evident
<"4
m
1
k
as the being of a God, and require no metaphyfical proof—
viz. God cannot be tempted with evil, and tcmpteth no
man ; (or, in other words, is not the catife of fin :) and
that mankind are not necefiitated or deftined to chufe and
ad in every inftance as they do, but might chufe and ad
otherwile— at leaft in fome inftances. Metaphyfics have
been fo far from ftrengthening the evidence of thefe ob- J
vious truths, that, on the contrary, hereby they have been 'tm
perplexed and made dubious— yea, fome feem to think
they have demonftrated them to be falfe.
Not one in an hundred of mankind can- apprehend a
metaphyfical proof of religion— a fubjed in which all ranks
are alike interefted. Common people are, indeed much
better phyficians, than metaphyfickns. Nor is every good
natural Philofopher (killed in moral philofophy or verfed in
the abftrad nature of immaterial beings. It is fometimesfaid,
that phyficoftner kills than cures. Such is metaphyfic to the
mind. Where it prevents or removes a flight moral indifpo-
fition in one inftance, it probably brings on a fatal diftem-
per in more inftances. Nor is a corrofive ever eligible
when a lenitive will anfwer the end.
The plaineft and mod important principles of revelation
would not endure a metaphyfical difquifition. At leaft,
the facred writers have not ufed fuch reafoning — not thofe
of them who were beft able to reafon in this manner. Mofes,
Ifaiah, Ezekiel and St. Paul have not. Unparralleled fam-
ples of eloquence and the fublime have been often produced
from their writings ; but we don’t call to mind that any
inftances of their metdpbyficcil reafoning have been adduced.
Inftances of ftrong reafoning their writings abound with
particularly St. Paul’s. But he difclaims metaphyfics— not
iurely as being above his abilities; but asofnoufe onthemoft
eflential point of religion — rather injurious than helpful.
As he is the principal new-teftament writer, we beg leave to
make a few ftridures on his charader and writings, with a
more immediate view to the fubjed of the preient fedion.
He was poflefied of an “ amazing force of genius, as
well as invincible courage, and a ljpirit of patience, which
no fatigue could overcome, and which no. fufFerincxs or
trials could exhauft. He was verfed in the learneef arts,
and
Stef. X.
rta
l2f
r - * • • 4 » > v*' r* •'*'
and able to combat the Jewifti dodtors and Pagan philo-
fophers with their own arms.” * His noble birth, added t6
his natural genius, literary acquirements, ardent zeal and
Unlhaken firmnefs of mind, feemed, even in the eye of the
world, to qualify him for a principal inftrbment in the
defence and propagation of the gofpel* Bid then the Au¬
thor of Chriilianity, in the appointment of St. Paul to this
bufinefs, proceed on maxims of worldly wifdom ? By no
means-. Thefe accomplilbments, which diftinguifiied St*
Paul from his fellow-apoftles, were the rnoft powerful ob-
ftacies to his embracing Chriftianity-. They were em¬
ployed to root out the gofpeL. No one periecuted it more
furioiifly than he— no one defpifed it more. But when it
pleafed God to reveal his Son in him, his fhining talents
were fervently applied to the purpofe for which they were
given, and became eminently fubfervient to the furtherr
ance of the faith, which once he deftroyed. Let us refteCL
a moment in what manner he ufed them as an apoftle of*
Chrift— as his example is for fucceeding minifters.
Here we have many ftriking inftances of his zeal, elo¬
quence and reaforiing. We mean to take notice of the lad
more efpecially— his reafoning with Jewifh doctors and pa¬
gan philofophers— -on the principles of natural religion:
and the revelations of God to the Jews* He Well knew
what expectations of a magnificent temporal prince the
doftors of the law had raifed in mankind— how oppofite
the Chriftian fyftem was to the reigning philofophy of the
world — particularly what exception the pride of the Gre¬
cian philofophers took to it on account of its plainnefs
and limplicity. He would naturally alfo call to mind his
own prejudices a'gainft the gofpel on theie accounts.
And as he had frequent occafion to confer with men of
this character at Jerufalem, Rome, Athens and Corinth,
it may be worth while to enquire in what manner he rea-
foned with them ? Metaphyfical reafoning would have been'
bed accommodated to their tide : And if ever there is a
propriety in introducing this kind of reafoning into reli-‘
gion, Paul had occafion for it, and was able to manage it
to advantage. It might particularly be co'njeCluredAhat
- • **■ R a
* Moiheinq Vol, I, P, 25*
§
$
[ 9
i
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Ml jhWmA > vi — i r
‘ . xACRJVflBtif
130
Metaphyfical reafonin ?.
J <3>
Sect. X.
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I
a man of Paul’s learning would have offered a laboured
diflLr cation on the abffraft nature of the fupreme fpirit,
(which would have been reafoning metaphyfically) when
encountered by the learned phiiofophers from amoncr the
Epicureans and Stoics ; when accufed of being a fetter
forth of ftrange gods— when brought unto Areopagus-- -
furrounded by phiiofophers, fenators and plebeians— under¬
taking to convince them of their fuperftition, and reclaim
them from their idolatry. But to lead them to the know¬
ledge of the true God, (their ignorance of whom was
proclaimed in the infeription on one of their altars) what
method did he take ? Obfervable to this purpofe is his
fpeech, while he ftood in the midft of Mars-hill. “ Ye
men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too
fuperftitious— -God that made the world, and all things
therein, feeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth,
“ dwelleth not in temples made with hands : Neither is
worfhiped with mens hands, as though he needed any
tlrng*, feeing he giveth to all life, and breath and all
“ things.”
How plain, and yet how forceable, is this reafoning
adapted equally to wife and unwife. He does not^ dif-
couife as a philofopher woijild on the nature of fpirit ab-
fhabted from matter, but makes a familiar appeal to the
woiivS of viable creation and providence, in proof of the
ext (fence and perfection of God, and thence infers the ac-
countaolenefs or mankind to him, as moral governor and
Jud|e- j his was to realon as became a minifter of that
rn after who fent him not to preach with wifdom of words.
t To die fame purpofe he obferves, that the works of vi-
fiole natyre, and particularly the operations of their own
minds, fhould have been regarded by the pagan Romans
as demonltrable proofs of the being, attributes and pro¬
vidence of God— that their not being induced to ojorify
him as God, on this clear evidence, was fo far from be¬
ing any argument of their fuperior wifdom, that on the
contrary, it proved them inexcufeable and fools, notwith-
ftanding all their profefiions of wifdom. + In like mmner
he fays, God left not himfelf without witnefs among the
, „ • ... - heathen,
T kom. 1. 19, 20 ; 22. cn. 21. 14, 15.
..'v - ■ v • -
.
Sect. X, MelaphyjtcaV 'rtafctimg.
heathen, in that he did good, and gave rain from heaven,
and fruitful feafons . * ..
Thefe inftances are examples of Paul’s reafoning with
Pagan idolaters. He argues from the works of creation
and providence, which lie open alike to learned and un¬
learned. Here is no abftrad:, metaphyfical reafoning—
all is eafy to be underftcod. And he declares he had ra¬
ther J peak jive words with his under (landing, that he nrght
teach ethers , than ten theufand words in cm unknown tongue .§
When he treated with the Jewifh doctors, or the people
of Ifrael, he did not (as before heathen) recur to the works
of nature ; but taking the principles of natural religion for
granted, he reafoned with them out of thofe feriptures,
which they acknowledged were given by infpiration of God.
And though all his writings difeover the good reafener,
as well as the good man, full of the holy Ghoft ^ yet we
do not recoiled!: that he reafoned metaphyfically, either
before jews or heathen— Great plainnefs of fptech ap¬
pears in all his reafonings, as became a minifter of the new
teftament. j- He was not afhamed of the gofpel of Chrift
before the Jewifh Rabbi’s or pagan philofophers, although
it’s diftinguifhing do&rine was to the former a Humbling
block, and to the latter foolilhnefs. The Greeks held the
gofpel revelation in great contempt, becaufe they found not
that wifdom of this world which they fought in it. The
apoftle held their worldly wifdom in equal contempt, be¬
caufe it fetitlelfin oppofition to that gofpel which is the
power of God, and the wiidom of God. He came not
with excellency of fpeech or of wifdom (which he, if any
man, could have ufed) declaring the teftimony of God. His
fpeech and pleaching was not with enticing words of
man s wiiuom \ but in demonftration of the {pint, and of
power, that the faith of Chriftians might Hand, not in the
wifdom of men, but in the power of Gcd. He with his
brethren renounced the hidden things of difliont fly, not walk¬
ing in craftineis,nor handling the word of God deceitfully,
but by the manifeftation of the truth commending themfclves
to every man’s confcience in the fight of God. I deter¬
mined, fays he to the Corinthians, not to knew any th;ng
:v> ACis viv. 17.
among
t 1 1 Cqr. iii, 1 2.
$ 1 Ccr, xiv. 19.
r$Z Metapkyjical reafoning, Szct. X,
among you., faye.Jefus Chrift and him crucified-— and ex-
preffeth his fears, left by any means the minds of his Chrif-
fi^n friends at Corinth fhould be corrupted from the fim-
plicity that is in Chrift. He enters a caution to the Colof-
Bans, Beware left any man fpojl you through philofophy
and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudi¬
ments of the, world, and not after Chrift. He admonilheth
Timothy to avoid oppofitions of feience fajfely fo called—
to withdraw trom fuch as dote about queftions and ftrifes.
of words. Upon the whole he declares, that the world by
wifdom. knew not God— that what the pride of philofophy
ftigmatiz.ed as the foolifhnefs of preaching, was the fcherne
infinite wjfdom had determined upon for the falvation of
believers — that the foolifhnefs of God was wifer than men,
and the weaknefs of God ftronger than men.— Thus was
fulfilled what was foretold, “ I will deftroy the wifdom of
“ the wife, and will bring to nothing the underftanding
“ of. the prudent. Where is the wife ? where is the feribej
“ where is the difputer of this world? hath not God.
“ made foolifh the wifdom of this world ?”•
From what has been obferved it appears, that the chief
of the apoftles, notwithftanding his learning, was fo far
from making ufe of metaphyfical reafoning in treating
with thofe who believed the gofpel, that he made no uie
of it for the convi&ion of infidels, either among Jews or
heathen— that he rather difclaifned it as dangerous, than,
patronized it as helpful, to the caufe of truth. Speaking
of his own miniftry, and that of his fellow-apoftles, he
faith, We fpeak not as pleafing men, but God who trieth
our hearts. For neither at anv time ufed we flattering
words— -nor of men fought we glory. And doubtlefs the
flejhly wifdom mention’d 2 Cor, i. 12, denotes the fame as
the wifdom of this world, mentioned in the. former epiftle,
through which it came to pals that the gofpel was defpifed
and fet at naught ^ and in oppofition to which the apof-.
ties of Chrift had their converlation in the world, in feli¬
city and godly fmcerityr by the grace of God.,
Jt may be faid, St. Paul muff have ufed abftraft reafon*
ing on feme occafions, or his beloved brother Peter would
not have teftified* that there are things in his epiftles bard.
v
• •
b'ktaphyfual rtajiming.
fa be under food. But may not this be owing wholly to
the nature ot epiftolary and controverfial writings ? theip
referring to rites and cuftoms fince altered or laid afide $
Qt to difputes then agitated, with, which diftant places op
after ages cannot be fuppoied to be perfectly acquainted ?
A general hint, might be fufficient for the information of
diofe to whom his epiftles were immediately wrote. Were
fuch hints as well underftood by others, his controverfial
pieces might.be as plain as any other pant of his writings.
But if we have not the means of underftanding them fo
clearly, ’tis a juft conclufion, that we are not fo nearly
concern’d in them,
“ Itt is become a. fjafhion,” fays Dr. Sherlock, u to drefs
iC up the great doftrines and proofs of religion in axioms ,
<c and theorems and demonftrations— Had the gofpel fet out
^ at firft with this air of mathematics, it had loft one
<c ftrong proof of its divine original, arifing from the
plainnefs of its doftrine, and the Simplicity, of the evidence
“ which was offered in its behalf ; which . made the gofpel
“ to be a proper tender to all mankind.”
But it is more than time to remind the reader what im¬
provement Mr. Edwards hath made of metaphyfical rea-
joniog. This we fhalL do bv adducing a number of in-
ftances, which may ferve to. (hew the prccarioufnefs^ fub-
tilty and danger of fuch reafoning. All the argumentati¬
on of his book really concludes in this,thatGod is the caufe
of fin. This is the. capital error, which, we truftj a-pro-
feffing people will never admit*. And though he doth not
acknowledge it, yet it.muft be embraced if his foundation
be firm. TheTollowing fpecimen may fhew, that his con-
cjufions are by no means fairly, drawn from his premifes —
or that *on.c or the other -are falft.
Becaufe inert matter cannot begin or alter its own mo¬
tion •, hence Mr. Edwards infers, that an intelligent fpirit
can in no cafe, begin or alter its own volitions and actions.
If there can be no effedl without a caufe ; he infers, that
there, can be no principle of efficiency in moral agents.
. If a moral .agent is fuppofed to determine his own voli¬
tions •, then he infers, that the aft of volition itfeif is ielf-
determined,. and hath ^no caufe.
. " " ' ' ~ He
'V
N
1
J —
• Jle takes for granted, that volition, even with refpect to
the molt cafual thing, is an aft of preference ; and then
concludes, that, in the moft indifferent thing, there mull
be an apparent reafon for willing as we do rather than
Becaufe a perfect equilibrium or abfolute indifference is
not effential to liberty ; he concludes, that a power to
chufe one thing or its oppofite is incompatible with liberty.
If every moral volition hath fome motive, then that
motive is the caufe of the volition — and therefore moral
agents themfelves are not the caufe.
Becaufe a thing is in our power, if confequent to our
eledion ; therefore it is in our power, though the eledion
©f it is not.
Becaufe the oppofition of one’s will to what is required,
may be no excufe j therefore the want of a power to be
willing is none.
(His reafoning on felf-determination may be well fum-
med up thus : Becaufe a man cannot take the fecond ftep
without the firft * therefore he cannot take the firft without
a previous one.)
/ Becaufe Adam’s kpfe may be the fource of a blameable
impotency in his pofterity ; therefore original impotency
in himfelf might be blameable.
Becaufe the effence of fin lies in its nature • therefore
thb. Goer of wickednefs is not the caufe of it — and therefore
it is no reproach to fay, that God is the caule of fin.
It is laid down for a principle, that a creature never
commits fin till divine influence and affiftance is with¬
drawn ; hence it is infered (not unjuftly, if the principle
affumed be true) that man’s firft apoftacy was owing to
toe want or withdraw of divine influence and affiftance.
Becaufe natural (or neceflary) effeds, andjmoral habits
of holinefs, proceed from the pofitive influence and exer¬
tion of the Deity j therefore moral evil doth.
. Becaufe God is neceflariiy holy, &c. therefore the holi¬
nefs or pollution of creatures is neceflary— -therefore a real
and original neceffity of fin is confiftent with blame and
punilhmenf.
Becaufe God permits fmners to harden themfelves »
therefore
i . »
Sect. X.
Metaphyfical reafioning.
therefore their obduracy is the effefc of his ordination,
dilpofal and determination, as the caufe.
Becaufc God certainly foreknows the finful volitions
and actions of his creatures ; therefore they are necellarjr
—therefore they proceed from his efficient determination. -
If we are not certain fin is not for the ’belt ; then we
are certain it is for the bell.
Becauie God brings good out of moral evil ; therefore
it is belt— therefore it is a neceflary means of the greateft
good— therefore it is part of the divine plan— therefore
the divine perfections could not have been manifefted, had
not fin entrc J the world — therefore glorified intelligences
are preferved n their allegiance through terror of the pu--
niffiment oi the damned — therefore what is infinitely op--
polite to the divine nature, law and government is not
contrary, but agreeable, to his will— therefore God is the
efficient caule oi fin, and infinitely plealed with the great
good it brings to the world, otherwife he would have pre-f
vented it. *
* w nat wonders hath metaphyfic wrought! The Ariftotelian phi-
lolopnci can demonftrate, that the mind is material. «« The Cartefian
on the contrary, fpirituailzeth body, and its qualities.” He can de-
niOBilra-e, that '« found, tafte, fmell, color, beat and cold, which the
vulgar take to be qualities ot body, are not” fo ; “ but meer fenfations
. e/n ’’ ‘ Y>a, ‘ exteiifian, figure, and all the primary qualities”
haVe, by later philofophers, been held “ to be mere fenfations, no left
than the fecondary qualities. By a kind of metaphyfical Animation
a.I the qualities of matter are converted into fenfations,” and « theex-
rfn°Cr u ■ we fee and feel” is denied* ’Tis “ a ^Igar error” to
Juppijie there is “a material world. ” ®
lenT;^^/^ HhU °/ Phil«>fophy, fpirit as well as body is at
length turned out of exiftence by this fhort dilemma : Either they
thev C3aS h°f 0r reufleaion> or they are not. If they are,-
are^not^/l ^ "°e*lftence but flwhen we are confeious of them ; if they
effea , m,3S °H [ atIOn °r re!taion> the" hody aud fpirit, caufe and
Sr;:.rrd‘ *«■ .
ȣ? mis: ti7't'Pz%
may be regenerated, and vet imjuftified, dellitute of faith h r"
d^ha chiId of the
dcmonftrare (ag
t Reid on the mind. Chap. vii. j Kaims (| Van Maftrichf.
A
X
(
X|6 Meuxpvyfical mfmiftgi Sect. Xy
This is a juft Jreprefentat ion of Mr. Edwards’s reafbrt*
ing, though he is not explicit in the whole of it. If it
Jliould be thought, that in fuch a way of reasoning any
thing may be proved by any thing, it will, doubtlefs, be
acknowledged, that it is neither eligible nor fafe to bring
the principles of religion to fuch a trial. We cannot be
perfuaded, that the pains taken in this way is doing fervice
to men of thought and contemplation : And what occafion
Mr. Edwards could have for it, feeing he a had to do with
cc thofe who believe the bible,” we cailnot imagine. It
tends to bewilder common people— -to miflead them, it may
be, fatally. It gives occafion to infidels and libertines*
Nor can it feem ftrange, if from thinking favorably of fuch
a religious fyftem as his book contains, men come to be
unfettled and fceptical as to any religion.
Under a notion of doing honor to the divine perfections
and government, men may pufh their enquiries far beyond
their capacity and the means of their knowledge. Inltcad
of failing along the fhore with their {lender bark, they run
the hazzard of launching forth into the main ocean, and
plunge themfelves in deep waters. In confequence of fuch
bold enquiries, fuch efforts to fathom the abyfs of the
Deity, no wonder hard and reproachful things are faid of
him ; which, however pioully they may be intended, are
extremely injurious to religion. It feems as if an honeft
intention can very hardly excufe the freedom and confi¬
dence with which fome fpeak of that Being who poffethetff
infinite perfection, and whofe nature and operations are
unfearchable. As a fine writer * hath obferved, “ The
Deity is to the human minds, what the main ocean is to
narrow veffels : They may take in as much of his nature
as their fcanty dimenfions can admit, and yet there will
remain an infinite furplus {till, which they want capacities
to receive.”
“ Reid, we may c n.V meiaptyfied) htmey ; which differs from the other
“ fpeciee of the diftemper in this, that it is not continued, but inte/^
“ mitterit ; It is apt to ieize the patient in folitary aft d fpeculativr
“ moments ; but when he enters into focicty, common fenie recover*
her authority,” (P. 379.)
S E F* D
- - - * .-L - am, XislltAivn
SECTION
J
Recapitulation.
MR. Edwardses book was wrote with a view to fob-
vert the opinion of fdf-determination, and efta-
bliffi the d'o&rihe of univerfal neceffity. He endeavoreth
to prove, that the volitions and a&ions of moral agents
have a like dependance on a caufe without themfelves as
effects in the natural World-*--that all events, from the be¬
ginning of the world to the end, are unalterably, unavoid¬
ably and circumftantially determined. And while he teach-
eth, that this neceffity, in reference to moral events, is of
the moral kind, and therefore foppoleth it confiftertt with
the moft perfeft liberty, he yet maintains that moral acti¬
ons are all fubjeft to an original real neceffity as abfolutc
its natural.
In fopport of this general fyftem, he fets himfelf to ffiew^
What determines the will ? and it is particularly and very
largely infilled, as a thing of chief importance^ that the
will is always determined by the higheft motive, or by
what appears moll agreable to the mind ; which is called
a moral caufe, and the determination of the will hereby a
neceffary determination. !
Three things have been propofed in the examination of
this fyfterri. Firft, An enquiry into the fuppofed connec¬
tion of volition with the higheft motive. Secondly, The
indiffioluble connexion of moral caufes and effects. And
thirdly, An attempt to ffiew, that internal, moral liberty,
as diftinguilhed from external or animal, belongs to moral
agents— -that Mr. Edwards’s feherpe of neceffity, if admit¬
ted in theory, is not applicable to praftice.
Under the firft of thefe heads, it was fhewn, that if the
higheft motive Were allowed to be the itext and immediate
caufe of volition, this is no refolution of the queftion, as it
doth not ffiew the original and true caufe thereof. The
enquiry is not purfued to the end, the foundation of the
will’s determination is not difeovefed; What it is that
gives eaufal influence to motive, cr wherein its energy
S confifti,-
V.
Recapitulation . Sect. XI.
confifts, remains flill to be pointed out. But it was en¬
deavored to be proved* in the next place, by various confi-
derations, and particularly from Mr. Edwards’s own au¬
thority and reafoning, that in truth the ftrongeft motive
is mot the moral caufe of volition, and that there is no ne-
ceffary coincidence between the one and the other. And
laftly, that volition is not the proper caufe of external
aftion, any more than the higheft motive is of volition.
After the mention of feme preliminary principles, it
was enquired, under the next head of the propofed exa¬
mination, whether the wills of moral agents are neceffarily
determined by an extrinfic, or by an intrinfic caufe, and
whether there can be natural liberty without moral, on Mr.
Edwards’s fcherne. 'f'his fchemewas reprefented as making
God the an thor of fin, by plain and direft confequence — the
fuppofed advantage of fin to the univerfe was briefly noticed;
and general obfervations & refleftionsfubjoincd,with a view
to make it manifeft, that it no being can, or ever could,
chufe or aft otherwife in any cafe, ’tis very immaterial by
what name this neceffity is called, fince a neceffity more
abfolute cannot be conceived of— that the runing up mo¬
ral events, like natural, through a chain of fecond caufes
to the firft, is confounding the agency of intelligent crea¬
tures with mechanifm — making their volitions and conduct
the agency of the Deity, properly fpeaking— or rather,
that, upon the principles of Mr. Edwards, the Deity him-
fclf is notan agent, but an inftrument of neceffity and fate.
There is no felf-mover — direftion— determination, or
fource of activity, in the univerfe. Wherein our author
profeffeth himfelf a friend of liberty ,* he either contradifts
his own principles, or allows of no liberty that is of any
moment, or at all connefted with moral agency.
We endeavoured, under the Lift branch of our general
defign, to exhibit a fcherne more confonant to reafon and
truth •, fhewing from the difcernment that diftinguifheth
moral agents from the brute-creation, and their capacity
of chufing andafting otherwife than they in faft do, that
internal moral liberty and felf-determination belong to
them— that it no way interferes with this liberty to admit
the exhibition and influence of motives in moral volitions.
' . :T The
Sect. XI. Recapitulation. *39
The fcheme of neceffity exhibited in Mr. Edwards’s book,
if true in fpeculation, was, upon the whole, fhewn to be
falfe in its praftical application — of moft dangerous ten¬
dency and confequence. A fpecimen was alfo annexed of
Mr. Edwards’s agreeing, in his leading fentiments, with
antient and modern fatalifts. N
This is a view of the fubjedt fo far as it v/as confidered
in our former publication. In the prefent, the fame gene¬
ral defign has been refumed and continued. A further
proof of felf-determination hath been adduced from the
capacity in moral agents of deliberating, fulpending, &c.—
the diftindlion of rational agency from animal has been
ftated — a diftindlion entirely confounded in Mr. Edwards’s
^ook, which has been further fhewn to contain a full de^
nial of moral liberty. It has been argued, that events in
the moral world are not uniform , as in the material^-that
the Deity muft be the efficient caufe of moral evil, or it
hath no fuch caufe, unlefs felf-determination be admitted—
that motives do not neceffitate, nor are the caufe of voliti¬
on, which hath a moral perfon or agent for its caufe. The
diftindlion of natural and moral neceffity hath been parti¬
cularly attended to, and, in Mr. Edwards’s ufe of it, fhewn
to be groundlefs ; fmee, if he means any thing, a ftrift and
abfolute neceffity is equally intended by the former as by
the latter — we have touched the argument from the neceffi-
ty of the divine moral reftitude, and prefume it was made
to appear, that there is no infering herefrom a flridt necef*
fityinthe moral volitions and aftions of creatures. From
Mr. Edwards’s notion of neceffity, it follows, that God is
the author or caufe of fin, or it hath no caufe. This fame
conclufion has further been fhewn to follow from his plan of
the origin of evil, which we havediftin&ly examined— a plan
which, indeed, renders the exiftence of fin forever impoffi-
ble. His hypothefis, which derives moral evil from the
withdraw of divine influence and affiftance, has been fhewn
not to differ materially, either from theirs who explicitly
aferibe it to divine efficiency, or from theirs who luppofe
God might make creatures originally vicious. The only
confiftent hypothefis is that which derives evil from the
abufe of moral liberty. The diilinftionof the eflfence of
W2*-‘
140
Recapitulation .
Sect. XI
virtue and vice from their caufe, has, we flatter ourfelves,
been evinced to be futile and evafive, by no means to anf-
wer Mrt Edwards’s purpofe, however important he efteem-
ed it, and how much foever his principles required it. It
has been confidered, whether moral evil is indeed belt for
the -world •, or fuppofe it is, whether it be belt that God
fhould effcCt it by his agency. We have alfo examined the
argument from divine prefcience, and particularly fhewn,
that the certainty of moral events is altogether different
from neceffity, the former not affeCting their nature, or the
manner of their coming to. pafs, or any way influencing
them, as the latter doth— that prefcience Hands not in the
relation of caufe to the things foreknown. Texts of fcripT
turc ufually alledged in fupport of the fcheme of neceffity
have been fhewn to be mifeonftrued. A reply has been
made to fome principal objections, and a diffiertation ad¬
ded on metaphyfical reafoning, fhewing that it rather ferves
to bewilder than elucidate the prefent fubjedt. We have,
therefore, made but little ufe of it •, although it has in fome
meafure been evinced, (as we fuppofe) in the courfe of our
examination, that the rnetaphyfieian is eaflly repulfed
with his own weapons.
In the examination fome arguments were touched, a-
mong many which occur’d, evincing the afpeCt Mr. Ed¬
wards’s felwne hath on the moral perfections and govern¬
ment of God, and its confequent practical tendency. O-
tker arguments have been now mentioned with the fame
The oppoflte truth was there exhibited iji part ;
view.
v/e have now further explain’d ourfelves, and purfued the
deflem before opened, as far as appeared needful at prefent.
To fave the trouble of repetition, we have feveral times re-
fered the reader to things faid in the examination.
Our aim has been to attend to the principal point in de¬
bate, not to dwell on lefler and circumftantial things. If
the former hath been kept in view, it may be reafonabjy
requefted, that if any gentleman fhall think it needful to
pubiifh remarks on what we have written, he will not make
incidental things a principal objeCt of attention. To di¬
vert his own or the reader’s mind from what is mofl mate¬
rial would be alike injuftice to both, as well as uncandid to
the
. v
St
Sect r XL
Recapitulation .
the examiner. The main objection to /Mr. Edwards $
fcheme is, that he argues for a neceffity which can be de¬
fended on this only hypothefis, that God is the caufe of
tin. To this fingle queftion, the whole controverfy is re¬
ducible. Whoever would defend his book muft either
ffiew, that the leading principles of it do not fqppofe the
deity to be the efficient of moral evil ; or elfe that fuch a
luppofition is no reproach to his charafter and government.
We dare affirm he is not the efficient caufe of moral evil ;
yea, ffiould we prefume to affirm that he is this caule, it
would, we doubt not in the leaft, be ftriking at the founda¬
tion of all religion.
The pulic attention and candor would now have been
afked no longer, had it not been the opinion of a number of
refpedlable gentlemen, that we are called upon to take fome
notice of the “ effay on moral agency” &c. through which
are interfperfed remarks on what we wrote before, and in
fome parts of which the author has condelcended more
profeffedly to attend to the examination. Our ftriftures on
this effay ffiall be difpatched with all convenient brevity.
Stricturis,
5?
-/ Wi
Strictures on an eftay on moral agency
(So called) tc Containing remarks on a late
(c anonymous publication, entitled, An
*{ exattiination of the late Rev d President
“ Edwards's enquiry on freedom of will ,
“ By Stephen Weft, A. M.
tc Paftor of the church in Stockbridge.”
:jr
%■
?
i
l
;lTi
i
|
tli
I
I
. <b i
i I
" I
IHIS effay contains fcarce any thing new. But few
-arguments are advanced in it, except fuch as Mr.
Edwards had made ufe of, and handled with more appear¬
ance of reafon. In examining Mr. -Edwards, we have fuf-
ficiently replied to the moft material things in Mr, Weft. Mr.
Weft,indenyingoriginalrighteovifnefs, departs, indeed,from
Mr. Edwards. * There is alfo a verbal difference between
thefe two gentlemen refpe&ing the agency of the Deity in
fin. While Mr. Edwards denies (in words) apofitive di¬
vine influence or efficiency in moral evil, Mr. Weft ex-
prefsly maintains it, and argues (in his manner) for it,
through a number of feftions, in the fecond part of his
effay. This, however, is no more than Mr. Edwards’s
doftrine amounts to, as hath been fhewn. We purpole to
refume this point after taking notice of fome other things
in the effay before us, and fome exceptions to our former
publication.
In the feftion o n power, we coniefture that Mr. Weft
hath applied this^word improperly, as a philofopher and as
a moralift. The word, as ufed in mechanics, is never ap¬
plied, by any philofopher we have had opportunity to read,
m the manner Pvlr. Weft applies it, to the body moved ; but
uniformly
* Comnare part I. fcdl% r, 2. of Mr, Well’s effay (particularly f.
^5.} with Edwards p. 43.
II
V
* r - +• , .
Strictures on Mr. PTeJl’s ejfay.
« :» i
Ht
i - _ ' _ t *
uniformly and conftantly to the mover. * From this arbi¬
trary ufe of the word power, this philofophy falfely fo cal¬
led, he proceeds to make his dedu&ion, that the word, in
its application to human nature, imports only a capacity
of being the fubjeft of certain effedfs from divine operation —
*tis “ a power to be wrought upon , not a power to operated 9
(P- 43-) .
Admitting his application of the word power to me¬
chanics had been philofophical, what is the inference ?
that moral agency and mechanifm are the fame ? So it feems.
But this, we fuppofe, Mr. Weft would not be fond of main¬
taining ; becaufe he appears to difapprove Lord Kaim’s o-
pinion recited p. 128.— And becaufe he [Mr. Weft] hath
attempted to fhew, that his own fcheme does not make
mankind machines. Part I. feft. 7. Moreover, in this
fame feftion on power, he informs us, that he is “ far from
apprehending” that his beforementioned ufe “ of the word
“ power is the only fenfe in which it may be ufed with pro¬
priety, as applied to moral agents— to men. It may
doubtlefs be ufed with propriety to indicate — fomething
“ wherein man is a moral agent, and on account of which
“ he is a fit fubjeft of praife or blame, commendation or
“ confute.” P. 42. The word power, then, as above ap¬
plied to human nature, “ points out no abilities properly in
“ men — nothing wherein they are moral agents.”
P. 44. He “attempts to illuftrate that idea of power,
“ which indicateth and denoteth iome ability properly in
“ men — fomething wherein man is a moral agent , and in
which there is defert of praife or blame, ”&c. What
is this power or ability, which is elfential to moral agency ?
We are told it is “voluntary exertion.” Whatever “ ex-
“ ternal attion — takes place upon our willing it, is in our
power.” (P.46.) Whatever “event or aftion doth not fol-
“ low the ele&ion of the mind, is not in our power.”-—
Yet in the next paragraph, Mr. Weft faith, Power, in this
“ conftruftion of it, is not eflential to moral agency.”
■ „ Thefe
_ . P* 37* 3S* oi Mr. Well’s efTay with Pemberton’s view
of Sir Ilaac Newton’s philofophy, p. 51. § S, 9. p. 83. $ 5 1 . Martin
on mechanics, panioi. Qzanam’s curlus inathematicus, vol. 4. part I.
paflim. Chambers in tit. Lever. Were theic philofophcrs ** utter
!' Grangers to the laws of nature.” (Effay p. 4©,) '
(C
cc
N
$4
gjl
i
H4 Strictures-^ Mr. V/ eft's eft ay.
1 licfe things require no very critical animadverfiorii.
When the word power is applied to human nature in Mr.
Well’s nrfl fenfe, it points out nothing wherein men are moral
agents. When it is ufed in his fecond fenfe, it is hot ejften-
tial to moral agency. The confequence is plain, that meri
are not moral agents, having no power or ability that in¬
dicated moral agency. We are clear with Mr. Well,
that power, in either of the fenfeshe ufeth it, doth not de¬
note moral agency. “ The mind may be free, and exert it-
“ felf with great ftrength, without any of ” the laft-men-
tioned “power.” And in the firft-mentioned fenfe, “ it in-
dicateth nothing wherein man is a moral agent.” A
f>ower or liberty with reference to external alliens o'nlyn al-
owed to human nature by fome gentlemen, who yet grant,
that virtue and vice lie in the frame of the heart. Liber¬
ty, fay they, is effential to moral agency. What liberty ?
External?- no-, for an intelligent creature may be holy or finful
without fuch liberty. Internal? no-, for in refpefito inward vo¬
litions &difpofitions, they have c5not a power to operate, but
“ only a power to be wrought upon.” (P.43.) We appeal to
common fenfe whether fuch a fcherne leaves any room to
aferibe liberty or agency to mankind ? . Whether it doth
not wholly confound moral agency with mechaftifm ? For
whoever attributed liberty or agency to the meer fubjeft
and inftrument of a foreign operation and action ? As
well rr^ight the law, ax, or ftaffin the hands of any man
be called agents. Is this the refult of a u careful and firidt
u examination and explanation of the powers of human
natufe r” Is it a little peculiar, that in an elfay profeffed-
ly wrote on tc moral agency,55 the fubjeft itfelf has been
kept wholy ounof fight ?
The two fir ft fedtions we have now publifhed feem to
fuperfede the occafion for a particular reply to Mr. Weft’s
on moral agency and power. We refer him there for fur¬
ther fatisfaction. We omy remark, that as there appears
to us no difference between fuppofing God to be the caufe
of fin by his action on t he creature after made , and fuppoft
ing an intelligent being to be -made finful by him at firfl -s
Jo,- if we underltand Mr. Weft, he means to make no dif¬
ference*
)
Strictures on Mr. thefts effitj, 14$
foehce, but aficrts both. Mr. Edwards rather chofe td
exprefs himfelf in fuch manner as leads the reader to con*
elude his opinion was, that God is the mediate caufe of fin ;
Mr. Weft maintains that he is the immediate caufe of it*
Indeed he obferves, 44 the whole arid only difference*’ be¬
tween u an immediate and mediate dependanee is* that, irt
44 the one caj. the caufe— -operates through ohe or a num-
44 ber of means— 4h the other * its tendency and influence are
u immediately ie.en, and it doth not operate through any
u medium. It is quite unphilofophical ( not to fay atbeijtical)
to fuffer any number of intervening media to obfeure the
agency of that divine hand, which God is lifting up* and
44 ' making vifiblc in all his works.” * We hence conclude,
thit Mr. Weft will not except to our reafoning* fedtiori
fccond, that it makes no material difference whether the
Deity is luppofed to be the mediate or immediate caufe of fin
slid moral turpitude. And when he flhall ftlew, that God
is the caufe of every adl of will irt the creatures* fhould
the examiner be inftrumental to continue the difpute* he
would contradift his own opinion, exprefied p* 6. of the
examination.
P. 140. Mr. Weft Concedes, 44 that what Mr. EdWatdi
t4 hath laid on the fubjedt of motives i$ liable to feme of the
44 exceptions which the examiner hath taken againft it.”
Yet he is 44 humbly of opinion if” what he hath offered ill
his own effay “ were properly confideted* we fliould not
u find the appearance of fuch inconfiftcricy and abfurdity
u ---as the examiner would perfuade the public-— may be
u fattened upon Mr. Edwards.” -f- The examiner, with
many others* would have been glad to have feen this 14 ap-
peamnee of inconfiftency” removed. Notwithftanding the
u carefulnefs”Mr. W> hastaken in “examining and explain^
44 ing the nature and influence of motives,” J the fubjedt re¬
mains entangled. The word motive 44 irriporteth* faith he, no*
u thing different from the real choice of the mind— ‘When
44 motive is confidered as caufe or antecedent * its correlative
u is outward action— Motives are never to have caufal iri-
u fldence or efficiency attributed to them.” There is alfo>
another ferife in which the word motive is ufed. 44 Some*
T 44 time%
f P. 96. f p. 7z» t Pm I, fe&, 3,
I4S 1 Strictures on Mr. Weft’s effay .
w times, faith he, it is ufed, neither for volition, nor the
“ caufe of volition ^ but merely for the external objeft
“ which doth, or ought to, engage the affe&ion, and ter-
“ minate the choice.— Thus, the motives of the gofpel mean
“ the reafons exhibited in the gofpel, why men ought to for-
“ fake their fins, and turn unto God. Multitudes have
“ thefe reafons (motives) full in view and yet utterly
“ refufe and negledt to return.” As fuppofe motives of
intereft, honor, profit, extant in the mind’s view at the fame
time with the motives of the gofpel ; the former govern to
the negled and refufal of the latter. The inferier per¬
ceived motive determines the mind’s choice to the rejection
of the fuperior. For are motives “ exhibited and full in
view,” and yet not apparent to or perceived by the mind to
which they are exhibited, and in whofe view they ftand ?
If they are perceived, then how can it be that the higheft
motive always determines volition ? Are not thofe motives,
which ought to govern, higheft, if full in the view ? Yet “mul-
“ titudes utterly negledt and refufe them. ” On the other
hand, if they are not apparent or perceived, then how arc
they exhibited to, and full in view of the mind ? how ref ufed
or neglected ? Mr. Weft infifts, that motives influence the
mind only as the mind is in aftual motion in the percep¬
tion of them. But if perception and choice be the fame,
how then do motives influence volition ? how have they a
tendency to it ? Do they influence, have they a tendency, to
that which is actually effected ? After volition has taken
place ^ his too late for their influence and tendency. But
perhaps what follows may clear up this difficulty :
Though “ no tendency of motives to volition is perceived
cc and felt, otherwife than in the affinal taking place and
cc exertion of choice ; yet there is a foundation in the na-
tc ture of things, arifing from fome certain quality in ob-
cc jedts, and from the particular ftate, temper and com-
cc plexion of the mind, for their being chofen as foon as
cc they fliall come into the view of the mind.” (The rea¬
der will remember he had juft been fpeaking of motives
full in view , but utterly refufed.) Apply this to the evan¬
gelical motives to repentance. With refpedt to thofe whole
46 ftate, tamper and complexion of mind, ” antecedently
correfpond
i
H 7
Strictures on Mr. Weft's effay.
eorrefpond to thefe motives, they have a tendency to lead
to repentance : But with re lp e it to thofe in whom there
is not this antecedent correfpondence of temper, they
have not this tendency in the leaft. There is no founda¬
tion for a tendency in gofpel motives to engage men’s
choice, unlefs the ftate and temper of their minds corref-
pond to thefe motives, antecedent to the exhibition of
them. Now will Mr. Weft fay, that there is this corref¬
pondence of temper in any unregenerate perfon ? We truft
he will not. The confequence will then be, that that
change, which the gofpel hath a tendency and is defigned
to produce in men, muft be a finally effected before it’s
motives are exhibited — the end muft be accomplifhed be¬
fore the means are applied — finners muft forfake their
fins and turn to God, and then the gofpel motives will
have a tendency to lead them to repentance ; but not be¬
fore. The gofpel then is no tender to the unregenerate.
And if not to them, who are thole “multitudes ” to whom
its motives are exhibited, and who “ utterly refufe and-
nfgled ” them-, though “ full in their view
Such a notion of tendency and influence in- motives is
very Angular.- When did any writer before Mr. Weft
ever ufe the term motives in this fenfe ? that the thing
motives are defigned to- engage to muft be effeded before
theexibition and perception of them ? that motives obtain
this appellation from the mind’s being in adual motion ?
that motives full in view are utterly negleded and refufed ?
We are quite- content the public fliould judge, whether
Mr. Weft’s attempt to reconcile Mr. Edwards° with him-
felf has removed the appearance of ineonfiftency andN ab-
furdity, or hath not rather confufed and jumbled Hill'
more the fubjed- of the determination of the will by mo¬
tives. In what fenfe the influence of motives in moral vo¬
litions may be admitted, we have endeavoured to fhew
PartHI. fed. 2. of the examination, and fedion 2d. of the-
prefent continuation thereof.
P. 24 •, 76,-79. Quotations are made in abundance
from the examiner to prove him grofsly inconfiftent with:
himfelf, and that he hath given in ample teftimony to the
*ruth of dodrine he oppofeth. Had Mr. Weft “ pro-
*f pcrly confidered ” that at p, 92. he quotes the examine
as admitting, that every moral event muft have a .came,
and faying, that moral agents are the caufes of the r own
actions, he would not, perhaps, have given hirnfell t te trou¬
ble to copy fo much from the examination. We do ma re¬
tain that the fubjeds of moral volitions are alfo the. caufe
of their own volitions, This is a different thing from fay¬
ing, that volition is its own caule. The diftio.disn between
the terms volition and agent is plain. Agents determine
themfelves ; we fay not that the properties or addons of
agents are felf-determined— thar volition, which is already
become effed, is the caufe of it’s own exiftence. Mr.
Weft had no, occafton to reprefent the examiner’s dodrine
in this light. And though he iuppofeth that an enquiry in¬
to the caufe of volition belongs not to t he fubjed of moral
agency, yet we prefume enough hath been laid, particularly
in the 5th fed ion, to fhew that it doth. In the fame part
of Mr. Weft’s effay, the examiner- is cenfu red pretty fe-
v.erely for not allowing more weight to a particular dif-
tindion of Mr. Edwards’s, and treating it with contempt.
■“ Upqn a review of the matter,” Mr, Weft “ thinks the
s£ examiner himfelf will be convinced that he hath no$
« herein donejufticeto Mr, Edwards,”
The examiner hath “ reviewed the matter,” and is.
« convinced” of no other “ injuftice herein done” by him
« to Mr. Edwards,” than that he did not fufficiently ex-
pofe the weaknefs of the diftindion refered to. While he
ajks pardon for this omiflion, he hopes he has made fome
atonement for it by taking the trouble to write an whole
fedion p.rofeffedly on the point. Herein he hath alfo anl-
yvered to another exception of Mr. Weft’s a few lines below1
on the fame page •, (p. 83.) and in his turn muft fault Mr,
Weft for an unfair reprefentation of him. The reader by
turning to the page in the examination, which Mr, Weft
refers to, will fee the representation is partial.
' In what Mr, Weft hath offered, in divers parts of jus,
effay, in a critical way, on the antecedent ftate of the mind
and volition., he appears flow in undemanding the exami¬
ner, and doth not reprefent him to fuch advantage as might
feave been done conflftently enough with found criticifm.
Part
:
•e. • ii.'si v V *
%;v ■• •;. V . 4: •• >
-’-V: ‘ * ^5r‘ v V5r„>
Strictures m Mr. Wefts efay.
Part I. fed, 8. Mr. Weft hath more profeffedly remark¬
ed on the examiner, and accufeth him as having injured
foach Edwards and the truth. ^ ^ _• ^
general accufation (for injury to Mr. Edwards)
is divided mto feven diftind articles. The 2d, 3d, 4^
and an. articles' are fufRciently anfwered by the fix hrit
fid 4. 4: examiner hath now publifhed. For anfwer to
the yi a article, the reader is refered to Mr Edward**
book, and t0 Mr- Weft’S Cflray> Part L ^ 2n(i
more p. rticqiarly p. 51, 52. , .
Ait. id. and 7th. “ The examiner hath condemned
“ Mr Edwards as being in alliance with heathen phnolo-
“ phers and Atheiih,” Some things obferved under the
former of tbefe articles anfwered fedion VII. In this charge
reference is had to the examiner’s appendix, which, it is
alledped, was wrote with a defign to “ caft an odium on
“ Mr. Edwards’s fentiments and charader”---and was ‘ an
« invidious employment.” The examiner is not confci-
ous of writing from envy, or of any defign to caft dn o-
dium on the perfon or charader of Mr. Edwards. He
aimed to treat this gentleman as a great and good man,
After the expreffions of efteem for him, interfperfed th.o
the examination, the author little tho’t he Ihould be ac-
cufed of writing againfthim from envy, or “ with a view
“ to caft an odium on his charader.” If a fingle fentence
difrefpedful to Mr, Edwards’s perfon or charader is con¬
tained in the examination, upon it’s being pointed out,
the examiner will retrad it as inadvertently and undelign
edly written. Mr. Edwards hath (not without a degree
of feyerity) remarked on Dr. Watts’s efiay on freedom.
Both thefe gentlemen were “ eminent Chriftian divines,”
the one in Old, the other in New-England. Mr. Ed¬
wards thought Dr, Watts was in an error ; and fo far
was he from thinking he needed an apology for writing a-
ainft him, becaufe “ he was a good divine in many re-
:ds,” that he faith, “there is the more need, on that
“ account, of oppofing his Arminian dodrine on free¬
dom *, as it will be likely to have the more pernicious
influence, for being taught by a divine of his name
** and charader*”
* t P' > i
«(
«(
■
I
*5®
Strictures on Mr. Weft's ejfay.
The appendix was drawn up with a view to render cer-
tam fatahftzcal defines odious. We obferve Mr Weflr
^'7 i * 1*™*° j* coincide!^ we havfe*
thinks it of nf ^ i. ^Utu aLm'amo the agreement, he
thinks it of no weight to Ihew that Mr. Edwards’s doc¬
trine is wrong ; and intimates, that the examiner Ihould
have anfwered and confuted the arguments both of Mr
Edwards and thole [ fatalifts , epicurians and atheifts ] with
« leamhil»0inhldfe?'''^n e,nC0miun? is alfo Pafs’d on their
charaSer8 eno”gh>not their religious
character Tis fufficient to obferve, That the dodrine
. he writers with whom Mr. Edwards’s fentiments were
SStfJP by ?C general confent of Chriftians, been
luppoied falfe ; and moreover, repeatedly confuted by the
advocates for revealed and natural religion. We did not
think it worth while, in our former publication, to enter
on the enquiry. Whether the principles of thofe fatalifts
epicureans and atheifts were the truth ; but ventured to’
take the oppofite_ “ principles upon truft .” Mr. Weft mav
find by looking into the preface, page 4, and part II. at
the beginning, that we propofed to confider the fubiecl in
a practical, rather than in a fpeculative , metaphyfical wav _
that a number of principles were taken for granted. If he
really difputes any of thofe preliminary principles, orfhould
directly appear as an advocate for fatality and acheifm, and
tnere Ihould be danger of atheifm’s gaining ground in con¬
ference of what he may puhlifh ; no doubt there are thole
who will debate the fubjeft of neceffity with him, as it
ftands on the footing of fatality or atheifm— or at leaft
encourage a re-publication of fome of the irrefragable an-
iwers ot thofe authors wlio have appeared in this contro-
verfy with avowed fatalifts and atheifts. At prefent we
are not willing to think there is occafion to enter on a con¬
futation of atheiftical principles. We Ihould be forry if
m a C hr.iftian land, natural religion at leaft may not be pre-
fuppofed. We fuppofed we had “ to do with thofe who
beneve the bible,” as Mr. Edwards faid he had. f P. 1 38 1
If Mr. Weft Ihould write another eflay on moral agency
wehopewelhouid have no occafion to alter our opinion*
Mr. Weft, it feems, was fenfible, that the principles ex¬
tracted
Strictures on Mr. IVeft's ejfay . 151
tra&ed from thofe writers, with whom we have compared
Mr. Edwards, were indeed “ obnoxious and unpopular,’*
no lefs than the dodtrine he himfelf hath advanced, or he
would not have intimated his concern, that the fpecimen
of coincidence exhibited in our appendix might prejudice
the reader againft Mr. Edwards, “ raife a a upular cry a-
“ gainft him, and caft an odium on his fentiments.” Mr.'
Weft remarks, what the examiner himfelf had faid, that he
did not fuppofe the agreement of Mr. Edwards’s fcheme
with their opinion who difiented from the common belief,
even in the heathen world, proves it to be falfe. We were,
indeed, far from fuppofing that this alone proved it. falfef
At the fame time we knew, that the dodtrine of the old
fatalifts was as generally rejedted among Chriftians, as the <
principles of Bellarmine among proteftants— and fuppofed
on as good reafons. It was, therefore, thought it might be
taken for granted, that Mr. Edwards’s foundation principle
being fhewn to coincide with the fatality of the heathen,
would be fufficient with all Chriftians for it’s being rejedt-
cd : Nor have we any fcruple, but Mr. Weft’s attempt to
vindicate it will ferve the good purpofe of bringing it into
juft abhorrence.
We are, upon the whole, by no means compelled to
grant, that we have mifreprefented Mr. Edwards in any of
the things laid to our charge. If wc had indeed miftook
his meaning, the difficulty of apprehending him his ufing
words (as he declares) out of their common acceptation •,
bewildering himfelf and his readers with a multiplicity of
refinements and fubtile diftindtions, and the probability
that in many places he had no determinate ideas, would be
fome apology. It hath not, however, been in any meafurc
fhewn, that we have been guilty of mifreprefentation.
N. B. On Mr. Weft’s admonition, (p. 152.) we have
reviewed part IV. fedt. 6. of Mr. Edwards’s enquiry, and
find it no anfwer to the objedtion ; but are rather confirm*
ed in the opinion, that he chofe to cc evade a diredt anfwer.’*
The other part of the accufation againft the examiner
is, that he hath injured the truth.
Mr. Weft juftly remarks, that “ Mr. Edwards’s cha-
!! radter is but of imall importance compared to that of
u the
*1* Strictures m Mr. Wefts tftay.
the caufe of truth.” * As the examiner hopes it doth
not appear that he hath done any injuftice to the former*
fo he prefumes he is clear in regard to the latter— Though
he pretends not that he is wholly free from error, yet Mr.
Weft has not convinced him of publifhing anything in¬
jurious to truth. The main thing in which it is alledged
that he hath injured the truth is, his affertinga power of
felf-determi n ation in moral agents. In what ienle the
examiner afierts fuch a power, with the evidence in fup-
port of it, the reader may fee, if he will take the trouble
to look over Part III. fed. i. of the examination, and Lei
I. and II. of the prefent continuation of it.
Mr. Weft reprefents it as the examiner’s “realk itU
** merit, ---that unregenerate finners have as full power, id
ie al} intents and purpoles, to do every thing that is tt-
u ally required of them — as the regenerate have , or ever!
u the angels of God in heaven.” j- In proof of this, he
hath made two quotations from p. 1 1 6, of the examinati¬
on, leaving out fome intermediate words, which, had he
quoted; the reader would have feen, that the above-men¬
tioned is as far from being the author’s real fentitnent as
the mpft obnoxious in Mr. Weft’s eftay. The fir ft quo¬
tation is in the following words : “ We deny that arty are
“ commanded, invited, exhorted, &c. to exert powers and
“ faculties they are notpoffefiedof * to ad from princi-
“ pies they are not endowed with.” Here the quotation
ftops. Juftice to hinifelf obligeth the examiner to re-pubr
lip what intervenes this and the other quotation— “ to uft
means out of their power. Such faculties, principles*
“ powers and affedions as they are poffefted of* fuch means
“ as are within ‘their power, are the only ories they can be
“ required to ad from and improve : Arguments laid be-
“ fore wicked men are adapted to operate on their rea-
u fon and moral difeernment ; on the principle ofinge-
** nnity and gratitude * on their hope, fear, joy, lorrow,
**• and the various movements of the mind.” Had Mr,
Weft produced thefe intermediate Words, his readers would
liayc feen, that the terms “ powers and faculties ” in his
quotation mcah ‘‘ reafon and moral difcernirient” — that
•• by
* Preface, 8. f P. 162.
*5i
Strictures on Mr. Wefts ejfay.
by the word “ principles ” the examiner meant fuch prin¬
ciples as thefe “ ingenuity, gratitude, hope, fear, joy, for-
<< row,” &c. Now are not the unregenerate “ pofTefied ” of
the powers and faculties fpoken of ? 'Are not “ reafon and
moral difeernmem” efiVntial to moral agency ? Are thofe who
are no? pofTefied of fuch powers and faculties “ commanded*
“ invited, exhorted to exert” them ? And are not the un-
fegenerv.e “endowed with” the natural principles or af¬
fections “ of ingenuity, gratitude, hope, fear,” &c ? Or ard
thofe who arc not endowed with fuch principles and af-
feftinos “ commanded, invited, exhorted, &c. to aft from”
them ? Is the moral faculty neceflary to moral agency ?
Doth God “ command, invite or exhort” to natural impof-
fibilities ?— that men ufe means they have not ? The an-
fwer to thefe queftions will fhew whether the examiner
hath injured the truth, or been injured by his remarker.
Nothing could be farther from the examiner’s real fenti-
ment or intention than to afiert, that man’s moral power
in unregeneracy is equal to all his necefilties, or to his
whole duty. Nothing would be more contrary to, than
what Mr. Weft reprefents to be in fv.El and reality , his o-
pinion, viz. that the unregenerate are not commanded, in¬
vited, exhorted to exert or aft from any other moral prin¬
ciples, affeftions and difpofitions than they are endowed
with. He would further faften this fentiment on the ex¬
aminer by his other quotation refered to above, and which
immediately follows the intervening fentences already quot¬
ed. This other quotation is a difmember’d part of a fen-
tence in the words following. “ Nor ean it be propofed
“ that the unregenerate fhould aft from the higheft fpiri-
“ tual principles”— —here Mr. Weft’s quotation Hops,
which fhould have been continued, (inftead of a period,
with a corrtma only, after the word principles) thus : “but
“ from fuch as they are capable of being influenced by
“ as reafonable beings, poffefied of a moral faculty, and
“ fubjefts of moral government, ”&c. In feme proceed¬
ing pages, the examiner had been fpeaking of the means
of grace ufed with unregenerate men in order to their con-
verfion. Now to “ propofe ” any thhig as a medium o£
eonverlion, which would imply that the thing itfelf hath
U taken
*54 Strictures on Mr. Weft's ejjay.
taken ■place, the examiner fuppofed, and ftill believes, to b@
abiurd. But to “ propofe to the unregenerate to a6t From
“ the higheft fpiritual principles,” as a medium of regene-
racy, would be to Ihppofe regeneracy had already taken
place. Therefore, in this view, “ it cannot be propofed
“ that the unregenerate fhould a£t from the higheft fpiri-
“ tual principles.” For by the very fuppofition, the in*
tervention of the propofed medium is fuperfeded. The
examiner cannot fee wherein the argument fails, or is inju¬
rious to truth. The whole paragraph, together with the
connexion it ftands in, clearly fhews the examiner’s de¬
sign and meaning to have been as now explained. That
it is the duty of the unregenerate to forfake their fins—
that they have no excufe for making any delay in turning
to God— that they are obliged to love him with all their
heart— and confequently to ad from moral and fpiritual
principles they are not poffefled of, or endowed with, the
examiner fully believes, nor hath he ever denied. If it
‘ was not w th defign, but wholly for want of under-
“ handing what the opinion and real fentiment” of the
examiner is, that Mr. Weft hath fo grofsly “mifrepre-
fented'’ him, he can eafily forgive this wrong : But it is not
fo eafy to fee how Mr. Weft Can forgive himlelf, if he
hath thus “ perverted ” the examiner’s “meaning, and
“ wreited his words from their plain and obvious im-
“ port, defignedly, by forced and unnatural conftrudtion—
“ having no other end in view than to raife the popular
“ cry againft him, and caft an odium upon his fentiments
“ and character.*”— The examiner doth not charge Mr.
Weft with the laft mentioned view and defign. He hopes
better things. But as Mr. Weft himfelf is the beft judge
or his own views and defigns ; fo he cannot think it a-
iniis that the examiner hath taken occafion to mention
this thing, refering the decifion of it to his own mind-
tor the examiner claims no warrant to judge another
man’s fervant. Fie thinks much injuftice is done to his
fentiments by Mr. Weft’s reprefentation of them in vari¬
ous parts of his efiay; but more efpecially P. 76,-79-, 104;
1 60,--- 1 67. He is willing to hope that this mifreprefen-
. tation
* Preface p. 9, Effjy p, 106 j ijo.
*55
Structures on Mr. Weft's tjfty.
ration was not invidious. Poflibly the examiner did not
exprefs his fentiments clearly. He hath now in kis firft
feftion touched the fubjedt of means again, and, it may be,
faid fome things that may ferve to elucidate his fentiments.
Though as this point doth not diredtly fall within his de-
ffgn, he hath not enlarged upon it. Perhaps Mr. vVdt’s
real fentiment is, that there is no medium of regeneration---
that the gofpel is not a means of illumination and conver-
fion. For he has intimated that gofpel motives are no
motives except to thofe whofe temper and ft ate of mind
correfpond to them antecedent to the exhibition or percep¬
tion of them : Which lentiment, however, remains to be
reconciled with his other affertion, that “ golpel motives
“ full in view are utterly negledted and refufed by multi-
“ aides.” The examiner is willing, upon the whole, that
what is offered on the fubjedt of means, p. hi,— 116. of
the examination fliould ftand as it doth.— -And the rather
as he hath Mr. Edwards’s concurrence with him in the
principal things meant to be there afierted. *
P. I40
* We {hall infert in this place fome pertinent psfiages from Mr.
Edward*’* fermon on preffing into the kingdom of God. What he
offers, in the following quotations, it will be obferved, refpc&s thofe
who at prefent are in a “ natural condition ; who, he faith, may have
“ ftrong dejires to get out of it, and to get an intereft in ChriJi — To
** obtain falvation is deflred by them above all things in the world — •
M when they come to anfwer the expreflion of preffing into the kingdom
41 of God , this concern — in a manner engrofftta the care of the mind’*
■—It further “ denotes earneftnefs and firmnrfs of refoluticn — as it was in
the pfalmift. One thing have I defiredt and that will I feek after . There
muft be a fenfe of the great importance and necefjity of the mercy to be
fought, and there muft aifo be a fenfe of opportunity to obtain it, or the
encouragement there is to feek it — The firmnefs of refolution lies- in
the fulnefs of the ditpofition of the heart to do whar is refolved to be
done. Thofe that are prejjtng into the kingdom of God have a difpoftiort
of heart to do every thing that is required, and that lies in their power
to do, and to continue in it — ’tis the conftant bent of the foul, it pot¬
able, to obtain the kingdom of God, It fignifies,” moreover, “ great -
nefs of endeavor . ’Tis exprefled Eccl. 9. 10. by doing with cur might
what our hand finds to do— Where there is firength of define , andyfr mnejs
of refoiution^ there will beanfwerable endeavors ; Perfci.s thus engaged
in their hearts will to enter in at the Jlrait gate, and will be vio¬
lent for heaven ; their pradice will be agreable to the counfel of the
wife man, in Pcov. ii.at the beginning, bee P. 135, 136.
P. 137. Piefling, &c. denotes an tngagednefs and earneftm/s that,ijs-
tU 8.5 e t b x about that bvfinefs of getting into (he kingdom of God — P. 138,.
The.a
X$6 Strictures on Mr. Weft's ejfay .
P. 140 ; 167. of the effay, and p. 8. of the preface, the
reader will find that Mr. Weft hath allowed a linall fhare
of merit to the examiner’s performance. This would have
been accepted with much thankfulnefs •, but the examiner
is denied the fatisfa&ion of receiving or acknowledging
the favor, by what is immediately added in thole places—
and by his being charged elfewhere with “ palpably mift
“ taking” Mr. Edwards— (p. 146.) with u difinggnuity
u and unfairnefs, injuftice, want of candor5’— no “ lover
“ of truth,” nor an “ honeft enquirer after it55 — .writing
from CG envy, to caft an odium, and raile a popular cry”-,*
condemned
Then are perfons in the moll likely way to obtain the kingdom of
heaven, when the intent of th&ir minds, ard the engagednefs of their
fpirits, is about their proper work and buftnefs, and all the bent of their
fjuls is to attend on God’s means, and to do what be commands and
<Jire6ts them to.”
Further : “ By preffing, & c. is denoted a breaking through ippftion
and difficulties — They that are preffing— are fo fet for falvatsou that
thole things by which others are dtfeouraged, and flop’d, and turn’d
back, don’t flop them* but they prefs through them — P. 139, Thofe
things that, before he was thoroughly roufed from his fecurity, he
ufed to flick at, and was wont to have long parlyings and deputing*
with his own confcience about, and let carnal reafon to work to invent
arguments and picas to excule himfelffrom, he now Hicks at no longer ;
he has done with this endhefs difputing and reafoning, and prefles vi¬
olently through all difficulties ; let what will be in the way, heaven is
what he mull, and will obtain, not if he can without difficulty^ but if ip
he pffible. ' • / # *
P 142, Such a marrerof fpeaking is needful to prepare perfons for
the kingdom of God — -the ordinary means God makes ufeof, to bring
perfons to an acquaintance with themfelves, to a fight of their own
hearts, to a lenfe of their own helplefinels, and to a defpair in their
own llrength and righteoufnefs.”
P. 143. “ Obje&ion t. Somemay be ready to fay, We cannot do
$his of ourlelves. Sec,
An f. 1. Though earneflnefs of mind be not immediately in your
power ; yet the corfideration of what has been faid of the need of it*
may be a means of Hiring you up to it. ’Tis true, perfons never will
be thoroughly engaged in this bufinefs, unless it be by God8* influ¬
ence : bur God influences perfons by means— P. 144, If perfons caa
but be made fen Able of the neceffky of falvaiion, and alfo do fully con-
fidcr the exceeding difficulty of it, and the greatnefs of the oppcfitiona
and how (hort and uncertain the time is ; but yet are fenfible that
they have an opportunity, and that there is a pcfiibility of their ob¬
taining, they wifi need no more in ord$t to their bd&g thoroughly en-
^&oed and refolyed in this raatfer.
p. M4-
Strictures on Mr. Wefts ejfay. . 457
condemned as a libertine , heretic^ &c. * Thefe are heavy
charges ; fuch as the examiner would be forry to deferve
r..fuch as no man fhould allow himfelf to bring againft:
another but oa the cleareft evidence. The gofpelof Chrift
inftrutfts its profeffors, and efpecially its minifters, in a more
excellent way. I
To re-criminate is juft.53 Mr. Weft has furniftied
abundant occafion. But the examiner had rather the pub¬
ic would take this bufmefs on them, than perform it him¬
felf.
Mr. Weft frequently faults the examiner for not
particularly replying to fome peculiar arguments of Mr,
Edwards’s. The anfwer is, We do not think ourfelves
obliged to follow a metaphyfician dole through all the
mazes of error. We fear the public will think that more
than atteht on enough hath been already given to metaphy-
fical fubcilties. If the reader’s patience hath held out thus
far, we are very thankful, and are loth to trefpafs on it
any further.
Mr. Weft hath pretermitted many material difficulties
the examiner had noticed in Mr. Edwards’s fcheme. The
whole firjl part of the examination is unnoticed, and im¬
plicitly confirmed, by him. Nor is the leaft notice taken
of feftion 3d. part III, where the examiner attempts to
fhew*
P. 144. 2ly. Though ftrong defires and refolutiors of mind be
ot in your power, yet painfulnefs of endeavors is in your power. ’Tis
in your power to take pains in the ufe of means ; yea, very great
pains. You can be very painful and diligent in watching your own
heart, and driving againft fin ; though there is all manner of corrupt
tion in the heart, that is continually ready to work, yet you can very
laborioufly watch and ftrive againft thefe corruptions ; and ’tii in your
power, with great diligence to attend the matter of your duty towards
God, and towards your neighbour, ’Tis in your power to attend all
ord nances, and all public and private duties of religion, and to do it
with your might,
P. 145, Earneftnefs of mind, and diligence of endeavor, tend to
promote each other : He that has an heart earneftly engaged, will
take pains ; and he that is diligent and painful in all duty, probably
will not be fo long, before he finds the fenfibienefs of his heart, and
tamtftnejs of his fpirit greatly increafed.”
How far thefe things comport with what Mr. Edwards hath offered
jn his book on the will, ihofe may judge who will be at the trouble to
make the comparifon. See particularly part III, feft* 5.
* P. 31 ; 88 y 138. and &&ioa 8. part L
I
'*'53 Strictures on Mr. Weft's eft ay.
4 > <r ♦ -s \ ’ ' , V 1 , , *.
{hew, that if Mr. Edwards’s fcheme be true in fpeculation,
it is not applicable to practice. But very few things in the
other parts of the examination are remarked upon, and
moft of thofe that are, much mifreprefented. If it would
not be too much vanity , the examiner would conftrue Mr.
Weft’s pretermifiion of fome things as a tacit approbation
of them. But he calls to mind, that “ a vindication of 1
“ Mr. Edwards was not fo particularly in” Mr. Weft’s
‘‘ view.” And wherein he has mifunderftood or mifrepre¬
fented th^examiner, the latter might be fo unhappy as not
to exprefs his fentiments with precifion and perfpicuity.
It was far from any flight of the examiner’s performance,
that Mr. Weft omitted to remark on the greater and princi¬
pal part of it. He hath admitted the examiner’s chief ob¬
jection to Mr. Edwards’s book, which is more generous
than was even expeded.
The objedion refered to is, that Mr. Edwards’s doc¬
trine makes God the caufe of fin. This Mr. Weft admits,
and fets himfelf to prove that there is no weight in it. The
examiner was fully perfuaded that this was the clear con-
fequence of Mr. Edwards’s dodrine, and imagined that
whenever it was made to appear, the advocates for the doc¬
trine among Chriftians would immediately renounce it. He
little expeded that the confequence would be adopted as
a principle, and an attempt made to defend it, by any one
of Mr. Edwards’s friends. He hath the fatisfadion to find,
that many worthy gentlemen, who have thought favour¬
ably of Mr. Edwards’s book, exprefs much difapprobati-
cn of Mr. Weft’s performance. Nor is tho examiner
without hopes, that what Mr. Weft hath wrote may anfwer
the good end of bringing into juft difcredit the dodrine
for wfiich he hath appeared as an advocate:
Moral and Chriftian writers hitherto have chofen to
fay, that God permits or fuffers moral evil. But, fays Mr.
Weft, u in my humble opinion, thefe terms have been
u improperly ufed. We have no occafion for thefe foften-
4C ing, lenient, gentle, timid, infignificant terms, in order
u to relieve our imaginations— it implying no inconfiften-
cy to fuppofe, that God, cither mediately or immediate-
ly3 by his creative will and agency caufe th the exjft:-
encc
Strictures on Mr . JVefi's ejjay 4 *59
« ence of fin.” Hence he fuppofeth that the fcripture ex-
preffions, I will\ harden Pharaoh's heart , ^he Lord hardned
the heart of Pharaoh^ “reprefent God's actually effect¬
ing THIS HARDNESS, BY HIS OWN POSITIVE AGENCY .**
So exceeding peremptory is he in this opmion, that to
put any other conftruftion on thefe expreffions, is to “fub-
“ tilize and perfectly interpret them away”— -ccGod hath
“ the fame right to make fome of mankind holy, and o*
cc thers ftnfuf as the potter hath power over the clay to
cc form one veflel unto honour, and another unto difho^
tc nor.” In arty other way of “ analyfing the Word of
God,” he thinks, “we muft forever defpair of determining
“ any doctrine by it”— and tells us, that “the apoftle Paul
cc is full cin this do6trine of divine efficiency in morai
“ evil”— which, “ however difguftful and unpopular in
“ our day, we hope,” fays he, “ the time will come when
“ the fcriptures fhall be underftood in their true fimplici-
“ ty, beauty and perfpicuity ; and the fpirit of God be
“ fo plentifully poured out, that the paffions and cor-
“ ruptions of men fhall not be irritated by plain evangeli *
“ cal truth” * In his “ humble opinion,” tis a matter clear
and important, that “ we are compelled to refolve all” the
moral evil that takes place in the world “ into the con-
“ ftant divine agency and operation as cause of the ex-
“ iftence of moral evil as its effect— the only thing that
“ hath productive influence and efficiency” there-
“ in. ||
Here the reader hath a general view of Mr. Weft’s
fcheme, and fome fpecimen of the fpirit with which he
wrote. Similar inftances of pofitivenefs, aflurance and un-
charitablenefs are interfperfed through the whole of his
efiay, and may be feen, by thofe who defire it, in the three
firft pages of his preface— alfo p. 31 ; 75; 88*, 128 > 140:
172 ; 217, 218 ; 253, and fundry other places. Here thofe
who cannot believe with him, that God is the efficient caufe
of all the wickednefs of men and devils, are reprefented as
men of corrupt minds — deftitute of the fpirit of God-
irritated with plain evangelical truth— of a proud and
haughty fpirit, fpurning at the thought of a dependance
on
* P. 241,-247; R P. 66 ; 131; 24T,
x6o Strictures on Mr. PFefis effiay.
on the fovereign of the univerfe— oppofers of the free, fo-
vereign and glorious grace of God-— objecting to the molt
important doctrines of revelation— devifmg fubtil methods
to ftifle the upbraidings of confcience— having a defign
to eradicate from their own minds, and thofe of others, all
principles of religion. This is to be “ challenged in a
high tone (p. 127.) and ill comports with lome profeffi-
ons of modefty and diffidence in the preface to his perform¬
ance — with his frequently befpeaking the public candor to
a“ new and obnoxious dodtrine advanced5’ by him — with the
affurances (as an encouragement to follow him in “ an un¬
beaten path5’) that he would not be “ pofitive”— that his
“ fears and apprehenfions had been great leaft he ffiould re¬
proach” his maker— with his further requefting the public to
be even laviffi of their candor, and not conftrue “ any air of
“ peremptorinefs as intended to exp refs the confidence he
“ had in his own fentiments, but as meant to give the argu-
“ ment its greateft advantage.”
They who defire candor muft be candid. “ Perempto-
“ rinefs” rather manifefts a writer’s “ confidence” than
helps his “ argument.” It feldom fails to excite difguft. It
is efpecially offenfive in “ a young writer” — Molt of all
when writing againft “ the reigning fentiments”— writing
on a fubjeft too, which “ hath engaged the attention, and
employed the pens, of the greateft geniufes, in all ages,”
while yet none of them (among the friend? of religion)
ever had the aflfurance to advance and defend this princi-
pie, that all the wickednefs in the world proceeds from
the creating will and efficiency of Gcd. Well might Mr. Weft
call his dodtrine “ new, difguftful and unpopular.” And
was no more refpecl due to the public, whofe candor was
afked ! No more to the republic of letters in particular !
No more to wife and good men of all denominations !
Could he expedt, that his fpeaking of himfelf as “ an inex¬
perienced writer ” would atone for the afperfion caft on all
who do not embrace this new and ftrange doftrine, as ene¬
mies to the lovereignty and grace of God ?— deftitute of re¬
ligion and confcience ? If there be a God and moral gover¬
nor, may we not take this one “principle upon truft,” that
he is not the caufe of fin ?
The
Strictures §n Mr. PFe/l’s ejfisy* *6t
The point in which all Mr. Weft’s arguments -meet —
which he takes for granted through the ftrft part of his eft
fay, andfets himfelf to defend in the fecond, is, the divine
agency and efficiency in fin. Mr. Edwards would not ad¬
mit this was a conference from his dottrine. And many
may be ready to think, that, in reprefenting Mr, Edwards
in this light, Mr. Weft hath done greater irrjuftice to that
eminent divine, than any he chargeth the examiner with. Fn
truth, when Mr. Weft faw that Mn Edwards’s fcheme
concluded in this, he ought at once to have renounced a
doftrine fo reproachful to his maker. Let God be true,
every mam a LYAR. A dire6t denial of the God
that is above would not be a greater grief and offence to
moft intelligent and ferious Chriftians, than this doftrine
of his caufality in moral ev il. They efteem the affertion
blafphemous. Mr. Weft, doubtleis, views the matter in
a very different light. But is it not aftonifhing that any
* difeerning, ferious perfon fhould affert peremptorily, and
with great uncharitablenefs too towards thofc who differ
from him, what is afferted, and often repeated, in his efiay !
Had he been humble and modeft, would he not have been
more fearful leaft he fhould publifh things inconfiftent
with divine moral reftitufle ? In the leading fentiment of
his effay, we have no other controverfy with him than all
the Chriftians in the world have— mo other than all fojber,
confident theifts have.
The Chriftian’s bible inftrufts him, that the new man is
God’s creation : But he never learnt from it, that the old
vtany with his deeds, is fo. It inftru&s him, that the foil
of God was manifefted to deftroy the works of the devil ;
not that he came to deftroy the works of God-— or that the
works of the devil are the ^produfl: of divine rgency. It
mftrufts him, that Jefus the fon of God came to fave his
people from their fins \ not that his deftgn v/as to fave them
from the effefts of the divine influence and operation upon
them. His bible inftrudls dieChriftian, that it is God who
worketh in* us to will and to dp that which is good) not that
he worketh in us to will and to do that which is finfiul and
contrary to his holy nature and law. The latter is exprefft
Iv afenbed to the Ip hit which is in die wcrrld, in contradift
X tinflion
A
1 62 Strictures on Mr. Uf eft's effiay.
tin&ion from the fpirit which is in good men. (The (pi-
rit that worketh in the children of difobedience is not,
however, the proper efficient of their wickednefs, he only
folliciteth them to it. For every man is then tempted,
when he is drawn away of his own luft, and enticed.) The
Chriftian learns from his bible, that God cannot be temped,
tvith evil , and that he tempteth no man •, not that every aCt
of fin is to be refolved into his productive influence .
may fuppofe a reader of Mr. Weft’s eflay, to
addrefs him thus : I admit, fir, your pofition of
the divine agency or efficiency in fin. You have
clearly eftablilhed it. But I deny that that being,
whom you make the only caufeof moral evil, is holy,
juft and good. I demand a proof of his moral per¬
fections, on your principles. My bible, indeed, tells
me, that God is holy, and commands me to be holy
for this reafon. But I deny the principle laid down.
It fhould have been, I the Lord your God am unho¬
ly ; and then the injunction would have flood thus,
Be ye alfo unholy. If I reafon wrong, pray fet me
right— and* as you have made me aprofelyte to your
hypothefis, ffiew me, if poffible, that God is holy,
•notwithftanding his fuppofed efficiency in fin.
The fatality of the heathen is really lefs abhorrent than
Mr. Weft’s opinion of the divine efficiency in moral evil.
They cc fancied that Jupiter , and all the gods, were oblig¬
ed to fubmit to fate, which was to be controuled by no
power whatever. The Stoics fuppofed that the untraCta-
blenefs of matter was the caufe of evil •, that God would
have made all things perfeCt, but an evil bias in matter, re¬
pugnant to his benevolence,” prevented, “ whence arofeall
manner of evil.” This has fome appearance of refpeCt to
the divine moral character : But Mr. Weft’s opinion robs
the deity of this character, even in appearance, as well as
in reality. When fuch things are published as “plain, im¬
portant, evangelical truths,” what fhall we fay ? Doth the
publifher really defire to have the foundations, even of na¬
tural religion, laid again? Were an avowed atheist to
affcrc
fratarwa
Strictures on Mr. JVeft's ejfay .
affert them, we ffiould tell him he belied the perceptions
and operations of his own mind, as well as thofe of all
mankind. _ . r .
There appears the fame “ air of peremptorineis m
what Mr. Weft hath wrote on divine foreknowledge. The
two firft pages of his preface manifeft this. We only ob-
ferve, that he reprefents thofe who profefs to believe di¬
vine prefcience and human liberty, and ftill fuppoie that
an human intellect cannot reconcile them together, as main¬
taining that they are irreconcileable and inconjijlent with each
other, Let an inftance be produced in fupport of this..
We know not a fingle writer who maintains that prefcience
and liberty are inconfiftent, profeffing at the lame time a
full belief of both. There is a plain difference between a
perfon’s faying that he cannot reconcile them, yea, that no
human underftanding can ; and faying, they are abfolutely
irreconcileable and inconfiftent. If Mr. Weft doth not;
difeern a difference, he may * poffibly find that wifer men-
do, if he will beat the trouble to turn to the fe&ion on
foreknowledge— to which we alfo refer him, together with,
the 4th. 5th. 8th. and 9th. fe&ions, for the neceffary obfer-
vations on the merits of his opinion concerning the divine
agency in moral evil.
P. 103, 104. he faith, that the examiner’s fcheme “ eon-
fejfedly ” involved this difficulty, that prefcience cannot be
reconciled with hberty--^(diftinguiffiing this word by a dif¬
ferent type, as we have done.) If the examiner hath con-
fejjed this— or if it can, by plain implication, be fhewn to,
be contained in any thing he hath publiffied, he will in%
mediately retraft it, as contrary to his own principles and
common fenfe. Mr. Weft beft knows whether he “ de-
fignedly mifunderftood. or perverted” the examiner’s
meaning.” But after having reprefented him to the
public as conf effing what cannot be fixed upon him by im¬
plication^ Mr. Weft fhould not have taken occafion to tri¬
umph over him as chargeable with the moft palpable ccim^
propriety,” and incapable of being impreffed with a fenfe
of it. This is lomewhat extraordinary. Mr. Weft will
deferve pity, if this intimation doth not make “ a deeper
impreffion on his piind,” than what he hath wrote in the
pages
if?
\St
■ ■ ■■ ” |
■ ^
'
**• -
164
Strictures en Mr. Weft's eft'ay.
pages la ft rtfered to hath made on the examiner— and an
imprdfton of a quite different kind. By turning to the
place, the reader may at once judge, whether the exami¬
ner’s words contain the cmfejfton afcribed to him.
In reply to Mr. Weft’s hypotheils, part II. feet. 1,254.
rdpeifting the defirablenefs of moral evil, and its being a
neceffary mean's of effedting the greateft good, we refer
him to the fixth fed! ion we have now publifhed. He will,
perhaps, find it a difficult talk to prove, that an holy God
creates vicious difpofitiorts in multitudes, that they may
tie fit objefts of eternal punifhment, as a means of mani-
fefting his glorious name, in their perdition, to a few vel-
fels of mercy : In other words, that the wickednefs and
puni foment of infernals is what lecures the he linefs and
happinefs of faints and angels •, and that with this view
God cfFe'its their wickedneis, that he may infliifl their
pumfhment. What warrant hath Mr. Weft, or any man,
to fay, that, had not moral evil exifted, the governor of
the world could not have exhibited his hatred of fin, his
Jove of holinefs, his goodnefs and authority illuftrioufly in
el her ways ? Has the authority and dominion of Jehovah
its foundation or fecurity in fin ?
Mr. Weft hath undertaken to make a companion be¬
tween a fyftem ‘without fin, and one with it. Can he then
clearly discern what would have been, had fin never entred
the world ? in a fyftem in which univerfal holinels Should
¥
prevail ? If he doth not fuppole he can, Why doth he make
his compariforp when he had juft before “ acknowledged,
“ that Where the objects between which a companion is to
be made are not both in view , we cannot judge of them
u by way of comparison M (P. 173.) Are the things he
hath faid on the prefer a blentfs and dejireablenefs of moral
evii certainly manifeft and fell- evident truths ?” * And
mu ft it argue cc prejudice, fournefs and bitternefs” to rejedt
them ? Flow came Mr. Weft by his decifive knowledge
in tilde high matters ! Who is prejudiced, four , and bitter !ft
tc The grand pillars of Mr. ifd wards’s doctrine ftand
firm and unfjhak.cn, ’’ in Mr. Weft’s opinion* fr notwith¬
standing what the examiner before publifhed. If the doc¬
trine
* P. *9>,* t Pxsface p« C\ 7. 1 Prcf. p. 3, 9.
* P* j9>*
trine
Weft’
Strictures on Mr. Weft's ejftay.
reallv terminates in the leading fentiment of Mr.
,’sefhy, let the intelligent judge whether its grand pi -
1 r« irni iron?. In truth, the examiner thinks, that what
Mr - Weft ham wrote hath feaken them more than his own
examination of the do<W.. It feems to be now conced¬
ed. that Mr. Edwards’s fcheme makes God ^ffcien
came of (in. If this be his doftrine, few fenfible, fenous
perlbns. will think there is occafion to proceed any forth ie .
It was the foundation which was propoied to be examined.
Let radon and religion fay, whether tins be not fubver ed
if it hath no other bottom than a fuppofed divine caufality
in moral evil. If we may not be confident in the contrary
fentiment, we may not be of any thing. We cannotd^
termine any dodtrine by the bible, on this hypothefis. tor
if God may be the caufe of wickednefs, he may deceive us.
How then can we have any dependance on his wor -
Thou ok Mr. Weft could not “ juftly expedt a particu¬
lar « anfwer to” his own « realbnings,” * confuting the
nature and fpirit of his performance > yet he may poffibly
find, either in the preceedmg ftnflures, or in th t continuation
of the examination, that moft of the things he hath offered
in a way of argument have had fome attention paid them—
at kaft the moft material. Perfonal things have had very
little notice : They ought not to have been introduced
into the debate. The examiner trulls the public will
think he has fufficiently vindicated himfelf from fome ex¬
ceptions and mifreprefentations of Mr. Weft s •, and, if ie
hath “ in any thing corrected him,” X that it hath been
done without reviling : For he would not be found beating
his f dlow-fervant. “ Many things, which appeared to be
“ exceptionable, have been paffed unnoticed j fince tucy
all meet in one capital error.
But after boldly advancing this doftrine, that all man¬
ner of fin and blafphemy is the effedt of God s action on
the creature, may we not well maivel to mid him (in teftir
mon.y of his zeal and valor for the truth) bringing an ac¬
tuation againft thofe who diffelieve it, as feting themfelves
againft the dodtrines of Calvinifm and of grace— pluming
himfelf on the fuppofttion of his being an advocate for
thefe
* P, 254.
t Pref. to effjy, r. 9
■ f -r ■■■/■' U
■
.
'
ft.
166
Strictures on Mr.
Weft's ejfay.
thefe doftrines ! Do Calvinifts deny original righteouf-
nds _ Do they fay that the prefent impotency of man¬
kind is not the penal confequence of the fall as its fource,
and is only moral, not natural ? Do Calvinifts affert the
“TO fin. • L«the intclli§ent judge whether
Thc ^ueftlon’ h°wever, is not,
y . t is Calvmilm ? but, what is truth ? What faith the
scripture ? As to the doftrines of grace, proteftant divines
have generally accounted them fuch as thefe— The atone¬
ment of the mediator ; juftification by faith in it ; the effica¬
cy of repentance to procure pardon through the redempti-
°n in Chnft Jefus ; the promife of divine aids, of peace
wun Cod, and of eternal hfe, through the fame mediator.
h by the doftrines of grace Mr. Weft means any thino-
contrary to thefe, let him explain himfelf.
W e cannot conclude without renewed expreffions of our
“I Gmfhmcn-t, that a gentleman who is fet for the defence of
‘ . S°fPeh (and we prefume really believes it) Ihould pub-
hih fo glaring a perverlion of it, (as many things contain’d
m tiie efiay evidently are) inftead of manifefting the truth
it is in Jelus. It reminds us of St. Paul’s addrefs to
the Galatians, Who hath bewitched you ! If this be not to
preach another gef pci, ’tis difficult to fay what is. We can do
nothing againfi the truth , but for the truth : Which words,
while expreffive of the duty of a gofpel minifter, are a cau¬
tion to him to take heed ts his doctrine, that he be not in-
ftrumental in corrupting mens minds from the fmplicity that-
is in Chrift—T o take heed, left haply he be found TO FIGHT
<a gainst God. ’Tis a cheap facrifice to give up any hy¬
pothesis to the honor of th£ truth as it is in Jesus ;
But a areadlul thing to corrupt the word of God.
I hole who are employed to fpread the favor of the Re¬
deemer’s name, and to addrefs mankind in the fulnefs of
the bkjfmg oj the gofpel ofCbriJl ; whole incumbent Duty ic
is to ufe great plainnefs of fpeech *, fhould account a reputa¬
tion for lkill in metaphysical difquifitions unworthy their
emulation.
Mr. Weft’s fcheme, on bare propofal, ftrikes an intel¬
ligent and devout mind with horror. Jt carries its own
refutation. It is a palpable reproach to God, and repug¬
nant
Strictures on Mr. JVeft's ejfay. 167
nant to every juft idea of religion. No fuppofeable confe-
quences can be more Ihocking than the naked do&rine it-
felf ; on the footing of which there is no moral agency
and accountablencfs, no moral governor, no righteous
judgment. He ought to be withftood to the face, as one
who hath fpoken wickedly for God — (though we truft
from prejudice and mifapprehenfion, not from wilful en-
jYiity the truth.) We mean not to accule him of any
defined perverfion of the do&rines of revelation. We wilh
he may fee his error, as we are perfuaded it is very great.
Should he be convinced of it, we doubt not but he will
be ingenuous enough to acknowledge it, in honor both to
himfclf and the truth.
When impious tenets are publickly advanced, a vindi¬
cation of the divine chara&er forbids us to be unconcerned-
If any things we have faid towards the clofe of theie ftric-
tures fhould have the appearance of feverity , that feverity
hath not the perfon , but the opinions of our author for its
objett — opinions to which too ftrong a diflike cannot be
exprefled — We have, at the fame time, aimed to keep in
mind the apoftolic advice, In meeknefs inftruliing tbofe that
oppefe tbemfelves .
We can heartily join in “ committing the caufe to him
“ who judgeth righteous judgment.5*
\
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